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Les trois  chapitres  principaux de cette thèse ont  pour  point  commun  l'analyse 
économique de  la communication interpersonnelle en tant que choix sous contrainte. 
Or,  comme  on  dit,  talk  is  chec1p.  Pourtant,  les  trois  chapitres  élaborent  trois 
contraintes différentes qui  pourraient s'imposer à la communication interpersonnelle. 
Dans  le  premier chapitre,  la contrainte est de  nature stratégique : en équilibre,  les 
communications  différentes  susc itent  des  réactions  différentes  chez  les 
interlocuteurs. Donc  les  individus choisissent  leur  communication en fonction de la 
réaction qu'ils espèrent  susciter. Dans le deuxième chapitre,  la contrainte est plus 
intrinsèque. On y recherche de manière expérimentale dans quelle mesure les gens se 
contraignent  à dire la vérité pour  la vérité.  Dans le troisième chapitre.  la contrainte 
est encore diftërente car elle est due cette fois au fait  que le communicateur n'a pas 
pour but de communiquer quoi que ce soit.  Il  veut, en tàit. se donner une idée tàussée 
du sujet.  Ainsi, un  interlocuteur qui essaierait d'apprendre de  la communication doit 
tenir  en  comte  ces  distorsions  éventuelles,  qui  deviennent  une  contrainte  sur  la 
transmission de l'information. 
Les  trois chapitres  s'inscrivent  dans un  courant  d'économie comportementale. 
Cette  mouvance  essaie  d'ouvrir  un  peu  la  « boîte  noire»  des  préférences,  en 
soulevant  des  questions sur  les  facteurs qui  motivent  les choix réels. Ces questions 
sont  dangereuses  car  elles  risquent  de  supposer  ce  qu'il  tàllait  démontrer,  en 
réduisant l'explication d'un comportement à la simple volonté de le tàire. Pour éviter 
ce  piège,  il  tàut  se  pencher sur  une vision des  motivations qu'on croit  raisonnables 
avant de travailler sur  les comportements  spécifiques. Les  prolégomènes  de  la thèse 
bâtissent donc un  cadre  d'analyse qui cherche à soutenir une ré flexion précise sur  la 
nature du  comportement  social qu'on essaie d'interpréter.  Ce cadre est appliqué par 
la suite dans 1  'élaboration des modèles dans les trois chapitres. 
Mots-clés : incitations normatives; communication; jeux; comportement; honnêteté --------------------------------------
SUMMARY 
The  three  main  chapters  of this  thesis  share  the  common  characteristic  that 
each analyses interpersonal communication as an  economie act; that  is,  as a problem 
of constrained  choice.  This  raises  an  immediate  problem:  if,  as  they  say,  talk  is 
cheap,  what can  the  constraints on  communication  be? The  three  chapters develop 
three different kinds of constraint.  ln  the  first  chapter,  the  constraint  is  strategie:  in 
equilibrium, different communications elicit different reactions from  the  people  who 
receive them.  Thus,  individuals  choose  their communication  based  on the  reaction 
that they  hope  to  elicit.  ln  the  second chapter,  the  constraint  is more  intrinsic. This 
paper studies the extent to  which  people constrain themselves  to  speak  the  truth  for 
the  tru th ·s sake. The paper describes an  experiment that drains a communicative act 
of nearly ali  its  significance save truth  value,  and  asks subjects to  forego  monetary 
gain  to  preserve  their  truthfulness.  ln  the  third  chapter,  the  constraint  is  again 
different, due  in  this case to  the  fact  that the  communicator's goal is  not actually to 
transmit  information,  but  rather  to  distort  her  own  idea  of the  truth.  Thus.  the 
interlocutor  must  try  to  disentangle  the  speaker·s  self-deception  ti·om  the 
unobservable  truth  she  may  have  seen.  This  becomes  a constraint on  the  extent  to 
which information passes between the two individuals. 
The  three  chapters  fall  into  the  domain  of behavioral  economies,  construed 
widely as an attempt to open up  somewhat the ·'black box" of economie preferences, 
by  raising questions about what  factors  motivate actual  choice. These questions can 
be  dangerous, as  they  risk  begging  their  own  question, "explaining''  behavior  by 
assuming a preference to engage in  it. To avoid this trap.  it  is  important to give some 
attention  to  a  vision  of what  might  constitute  reasonable  motivations  generally. 
before  working  on  specifie  behaviors.  The  prolegomenon  of the  thesis  outlines  a 
conceptual  framework  to  support more  precise  retlection on the  nature of the  social 
behavior under study.  This  framework  provides a structure which is then  applied in 
the elaboration of  the models within the three chapters proper. 
Keywords: normative incentives; honesty; communication; behavior; games PROLEGOMENON: 
NORMATIVE INCENTIVES IN ECONOMIC CHOICE:  A GENETIC 
TAXONOMY
1 
Abstract:  This  essay  introduces  the  concept  of a  normative  incentive,  a 
component  of the economie  choice process that explicitly reflects what people fee! 
they  "should",  as  opposed  to  what  they  "want  to"  do.  lt elaborates  an  analytic 
framework  for normative  incentives based on two dimensions of categorization, and 
illustrates  how  important  normative  concepts such as  reciprocity and  morality seem 
to  eut  across  the  categories  defined,  suggesting  that  they  may  not  be  monolithic 
phenomena. 
Résumé: Ce  papier développe une taxonomie  des  « motivations normatives  ». 
Il  propose  que  les  individus  fassent  un  arbitrage  entre  les  coüts  et  avantages 
habituellement  pris  en  compte  dans  le  modèle  de  1" homo  economie us  et  leurs 
motivations normatives.  Ce lles-ci renvoient à ce  que l'individu  «pense qu'il devrait 
faire » par opposition ce  qu'il «aurait  envie de tàire ». La  taxonomie proposée  est 
bidimensionnelle. Le  premier axe  fait  référence  aux intentions.  aux actions ou aux 
conséquences;  le  second  à  la  distinction  entre  motivations  intrinsèques  et 
extrinsèques,  selon que le sentiment qui  les soutient est la culpabilité ou la crainte de 
la  désapprobation sociale. On  montre  que  la  plupart  des  modèles  de  motivations 
in formelles peuvent être décrits par cette taxonomie. 
0. 1  Introduction 
Economies has a famously  impoverished view of human  nature.  Just  what  makes the 
science seem so  thoroughly dismal may  be the view  it  takes of the human objects of 
1 This essay is an expandcd form  of Spiegelman (20 Il). 2 
its  investigations:  the  notorious  Homo  economicu.</.  ln  its  most  primai  version, this 
strange species  is  portrayed  as  something of a comic  book supervillain:  the  brilliant 
sociopath,  with  infinite  intellectual  capacity  aimed  only  at  satisfaction  of his  own 
desires
3
•  In  both  aspects  (limitless  capacity  and  selfish  intent),  the  caricature  is. 
obviously,  not  just  an  illegitimate  portrait  of  human  experience,  but  also  an 
unnecessarily simplistic interpretation of the  theory that bore  it.  Justifications of the 
mode!  have evolved from  Mill's ( 1874) restrictive argument that economie analysis is 
limited to domains where people are (a) mostly seltish and (b) capable ofdetermining 
the  optimal  way  to  go  about  their  business.  The  more  current  generalizing 
formulation. as  expressed  by  Friedman ( 1966), is  that  (a)  the  agenfs ''own  desires'' 
can  be  taken  to  include  whatever  richer aspects  of human  nature  the  modeler - or 
more importantly, the economie actor in question- deems relevant, and (b) as  long as 
people behave "as if' they maximized an objective function, it does not matter (to the 
theory) whether they are actually capable of doing so.  lt  is  therefore argued that what 
the  H  economicus  mode!  provides  is  not content describing  individual  behavior, but 
rather an  abstract framework  for analysis. 
To be at allusetùl in organizing discussion of  social phenomena, the  fi·amework 
must be  dressed  in  content.  For  instance, it  is  generally assumed  that  people  pretèr 
more  consumption  of marketable  goods  to  less,  celeris  parihus;  that  they  dislike 
effort; and  that  future  costs and  benefits are discounted.  lt  is  oft:en  also assumed  that 
risky prospects are evaluated differently from  sure ones,  for given material outcomes. 
These elements of the content of preferences are  probably justitied on the grounds of 
their apparent universal relevance; they are considered  to  hold  nearly as  generally as 
the  preference  relation  itself,  though  in  a  less  ·'analogical"  fashion.  But  another 
2 Pers ky ( 1995) has noted that from  its inception, this term  has been one of criticism. It was apparent! y 
originally coined to differentiate the agents of John  Stuart Mill's ( 1836) economie analysis !'rom actual 
human beings. 
3  No  accident, perhaps,  that Oskar Morgenstern ( 1  935)  illustratcs  what wc  wou  id  toda y ca li  an anti-
coordination game with Dr Moriarty following Sherlock  Holmes on the train to  Dovcr! 3 
common  feature  of the  "standard"  content  of preferences  emerges:  it  conforms 
curiously weil  to  the Homo  economicus carticature!  Due, 1 believe, to  the  history  of 
the  exclusionary  interpretation  of H.  econ. ,  many  economists  would  agree  to  a 
statement along the  !ines "we  are on safer ground assuming that  people are  basically 
self-interested  than  assuming  the  contrary."  Fortunately,  this  (undeniably  dismal) 
position  is  often  patently  false.  Perhaps  as  universal  as  labor  disutility  are,  for 
example,  the  tendency  to  seek  distinction  (a  desire  for  rank,  rather  than  leve!,  of 
benefit), the  tendency for  reciprocity (a  desire  to  respond  to others  in  kind  to their 
behavior), the  tendency  for altruism  (a  desire  to  help  others)  and  the  tendency  for 
rule-jàllowing (a desire to do the "right" thing). Each of these tendencies has been the 
subject of a long and  deep  1  iterature in  eco nom  ics,  and  it  wou Id  be  beyond  the scope 
of any  paper to  survey them ali.  Rather, my point  in  this essay is to provide a rough 
taxonomy of the motivations that serve as the mechanisms by which  these tendencies 
arise. The four tendencies above can  perhaps be compared  to  the phenotype of social 
behavior, based on a ·'genetic code" of underlying  mechanisms. Thus  two  instances 
of reciprocity,  for  instance,  may  be  based  on  quite  different  choice  mechanisms. 
Conversely, there  may  be sorne  underlying similarity of mechanism in  the  source  of 
severa!  different  "phenotypic"  regularities  listed.  My  goal  is  to  provide  a 
classification for  the "genetic  building blacks of' types of mechanisms, which 1 cali 
normative  incentives.  The  specitic  variety of mechanism that  operates  in  a specilic 
instance is  important  because  it  may determine the  empirical predictions  the mode! 
generates.  If so, it will  be of signi ticance  for  testing the theories. as severa! examples 
will show. 
The  point of departure  is  a basic  proposition:  When  hw11an  actors are  aware 
that  their decisions are  inter-related with  those of  other hunwn ac/ors.  they trode 
11wterial  costs  and  bene.fits  off against  normative  incentives.  ln  this  context,  a 
normative  ince nt  ive  is a component of the choice process that makes a certain choice 
more appealing  from  a moral, persona!  or socially constructed  perspective. If.  in  the 4 
standard  heuristic, human  nature is to calculate and carry out the  lowest-cost method 
of getting  what  you  want,  then  in  modest  contrast  the  heuristic  of normative 
incentives describes people factoring what they feel  they should do into the equation. 
The  proposition  that  normative  incentives  are  sornehow  prirned  by  the 
awareness  of the  decision-makers  that  their  choices  interact  with  those  of other 
human  beings  receives  substantial  support  from  the  empirical  literature  on  social 
distance, which  attempts to  experimentally manipulate the  degree  of this  awareness 
(Leonard  1968; Charness,  Haruvy et al.  2001;  Dufwenberg and  Muren 2006;  Rank in 
2006;  Ahmed  2007;  Charness  and  Gneezy  2008;  Hoffman,  McCabe  et  al.  2008; 
Fiedler, Haruvy et al.  20 Il). lt also implies that the appropriate theoretical construct 
for  their  analysis  will  usually  take  the  form  of a  game  of sorne  kind,  with  the 
normative incentives providing sorne structure to specify the payofts. The structure is 
chosen to  represent social  context effects  in  the  interaction. These contextual effects 
are the ·'genes" in the biological analogy above, which combine into the  unique DNA 
of a particular interaction.  ln  the following, 1 propose a framework of sub-categories 
based  on  two  aspects,  or "axes" of the  situation:  first, the  kind  of social  object  to 
which  they apply- intentions, actions or outcomes- and  second.  the social  nature of 
the  incentive - extrinsic  versus  intrinsic.  These  classi tïcations  correspond  to  ideas 
that  have  emerged  in  various  places  in  the  literature.  As  1 go.  1 will  illustrate  the 
classification with references to sorne of the major work. 
0.2  Axis 1:  The moments of an  interaction 
Analysis of the  social object to  which  normative  incentives are  attached  has focused 
generally on three chronological "moments," or  phases.  of an  interaction.  ln  the  first 
phase,  prior  to  the  interaction,  the  individuals  in  the  interaction  ail  have  various 
intentions.  The  second  phase  commences  once  the  interaction  has  begun.  Sorne 
individuals  act  (through  choices  the  make), and  those  actions constitute  the  second 
phase of the  interaction. The third phase  is  the  ou/come for  each  individual. which  is 5 
produced  by the  choices made  by ail  the  acting  individuals coming together.  Each 
phase may be the object of a normative incentive, and together they represent the first 
axis of variation 1 will consider.  1  will say that normative incentives may be outcome-
based, action-based or intention-based. 
Let  us  begin  with  the  end:  the  outcome.  Rationality  in  economies  is  often 
characterized as  instrumental  in  the sense that decisions are made  so as  to guide the 
actor towards sorne  preferred  end. This is certainly the case  for H.  economicus,  for 
instance, who cares only for his own material ends. In  general, however, the ends that 
the  actor seeks need be neither material, nor his own. The simplest manner in  which 
normative incentives might enter into consideration of the outcome of an interaction 
is what has been termed "benevolence",  formalised in economie models as  long ago 
as  Edgeworth  ( 1880).  For  instance,  suppose  two  players,  i  and  j,  (denoted  by 
subscripts) are interacting. The utility of a benevolent player i might be represented as 
(!  =x + ax 
'  '  ' 
where x is the material payoff and  a is the altruism tenn  showing the strength  of the 
benevolence. Ordinarily, one  assumes  that  a  <  1 (otherwise  i  would  give  ali  his 
money to j). Notice also  that if a < 0, then i can be interpreted as  being "spiteful'' to 
j.
4 This utility formulation means that  i's preferences  over any two  values  of x; will 
generally depend  on the  vector x =  (x;,  x1).  Whether i pretèrs outcome vector x or 
outcome y depends,  perhaps crucially,  on how  much j gets from the deal.  Notice  that 
this does  not give one any grounds to assume that i would  not behave  as  a Homo 
~ l hroughout,  the .. natural language··  labels 1 gi,·c to various inccnti,·cs  will  be.  nccessarily,  as  vague 
as the concepts behind them. lndeed, one finds that in the (economies) litcrature, the same inccntivc is 
often labeled differently in  different papers, and different  inccntivcs oftcn rcceive  the same labe l.  But 
these  differences  are semantic, not essential.  As  long  as  the mcaning  bchind  the term is clcar,  the 
disconcertcd  rcader  may,  with  apologies  to  Wittgenstein,  substitute  .. bububu''  lor any  tcrm  ,,·hich 
seems misused. 6 
economicus with regards to the  function  U.  However, it does supply more descriptive 
structure for how people might make decisions  in real situations. 
Benevolence  do  es  not exhaust  the  possibi 1  ities  for  outcome-based  normative 
incentives.  Martin  Dufwenberg and  co-authors (Dufwenberg and  Kirchsteiger  2004; 
Battigalli  and  Dufwenberg  2007; Battigalli  and  Dufwenberg 2009)  adapt  the basic 
motivation  into  an  outcome-based  mode!  of guilt,  in  which  people  care  about  the 
material  payoffs of those  with  whom  they interact only  to  the  extent that they  think 
those others are disappointed
5
. These are special cases of reference-dependent  utility. 
since  the  perceived  subjective  benefit  of a  given  payoff depends  on  how  it  is 
"framed''  by  the  second-order  expectations.  Such  guilt  aversion  can  perhaps  be 
considered  to  approximate  moral  codes  of  appropriate  conduct  regarding  other 
people. Another mode! of  outcome-based moral behavior is that of Deffains and  Fluet 
(2009),  in  which  the  moral  code  of "do  no  harm"  only  restricts  the  behavior  or 
intentions  of the  actors  inasmuch  as  these  intluence  the  probability of the harmful 
result. 
Models  of inequity aversion  (Bolton  and  Ockenfels  2000:  Fehr.  Klein  et al. 
2001; Demougin  and  Fluet 2003) offer  the related insight that often what  people care 
aboutis not (only) the  levels of the payotfthey receive, but also their relative  payoft: 
compared  to  other  players.  More  genera lly, rank-based or positional utility (Frank 
1985;  Clark  and  Oswald  1998)  suggests  that  individuals  care  about  their  standing 
overall  among  a potentially  large  group.  Numerous laboratory tests  of this  kind  of 
preference  confirm  the  effect.  Frank  (ibid.)  also  adduces  empirical  field  data  to 
support this claim, suggesting that this positional  utility accounts for  shallower pay 
scales than would  be  otherwise  predicted in  many industries,  as  those  low  in  the  pay 
' The payoff that  player i thinks player j  expectcd  to receive  is ca lled ï s "second-arder expcctation" 
for j's payoff.  Of course.  one could also  define third- fourth- or any higher arder of expectation, and 
indecd these are implicit  in  Nash equilibria.  The difference  in models of guilt is that thcse cxpectations 
enter cxplicitly into the utility function. 7 
scale are "compensated" for  their position, and  those high  in  the  pay  scale '·pay for 
the privilege" with lower material wages. It has  also  been  noted since Keynes ( 1936) 
that this kind  of comparison-based utility can  lead  to  "arms  races"  in  which  people 
overexert themselves in order to "keep up with the Joneses." This, of course, was one 
of Veblen 's ( 1899) main  insights. 
Notice that when  the  motive  is ·'keeping  up  with  the  Jonses," the  payoff is  no 
longer material. As Veblen says (p. 75) 
...  it  is  only  when  taken  in  a  sense  far  removed  from  its  naïve 
meaning  that  consumption  of goods  can  be  said  to  afford  the 
incentive from  which accumulation invariably proceeds. The motive 
that lies at  the  root of accumulation  is  emulation ... The possession 
of  wealth con fers  honor. 
The  implication  of the  argument  is  that  the  institution  of property  itself is 
primarily founded  on  normative, rather  than  purely  instrumental, preferences. Once 
again, this is  pedigree economies. Alfred Marshall  ( 1994,  p. 73) remarks with Nassau 
Senior that 
Strong  as  is  the  desire  for  [goods  consumption  ],  it  is  weak 
compared  with  the  desire  for  distinction:  a  feeling  which  if 1 
consider its  universality, and  its  constancy, that  it  affects ail  men 
and  at  ail  times, that  it  cornes with  us  from the  cradle and  never 
leaves  us  till  1 go  into  the  grave,  may  be  pronounced  to  be  the 
most powerful ofhuman passions. 
Gary  Becker ( 1974)  included  preferences  for the  good opinion of one·s peers 
into  a  formai  economie  mode!.  Schelling  ( 1974).  working  in  a  sociological 
framework  more  ideologically  amenable  to  the  idea,  also  proposed  an  alternate 
conception  of social  influence. A  ker lof ( 1980), Bernheim  ( 1994)  and  more  recently 
Bénabou  and  Tirole  (2006),  and  Deffains  and  Fluet  (2007)  have  fonnulated 8 
asymmetric information models  in  which the  reputation attendant on a certain choice 
is an endogenous feature. Su ch  models are  based on the different equil ibrium  actions 
of individuals with different, unobservable characteristics. lndividuals tend to "shade·' 
their  actions  to  resemble  those  of people  with  more  favorable  characteristics.  An 
interesting wrinkle  on these  reputational  models can be  found  in  the  work on self-
esteem  by Bénabou and  Tiro le (20 1  0)  and  self-signal  ing by Botond  Koszegi (2006). 
ln  these  models  one  meets  the  surprisingly  intuitive  idea  that  people  don 't  have 
perfect access to  their own character.  As  a result, they make  their choices  partly in 
order  to  give  themselves  evidence  that  they  have  sorne  favorable  characteristics. 
Notice that actions motivated by this "taste  for  reputation" are conceptually distinct 
from  the  usual  "signaling"  models  (Spence  1973).  ln  signalling  models,  the 
reputation is  purely  instrumental, whereas  here, as  Veblen  points out, it  represents a 
kind of"consumption" utility ali its own. 
ln  summary.  ·'genotypically" outcome-based normative  incentives  can produce 
the  "phenotypes··  of altruism, reciprocity,  moral  rule-following  or distinction.  The 
outcomes  of interactions  that  appear  to  exh ibit  these  phenotypes  can  either  be 
material  payoffs or beliefs. Among outcome-relevant beliefs,  we distinguish between 
posterior beliefs that are  part of the  outcome  it se lt~ and  prior beliefs which  serve  to 
frame  the evaluation of the outcome which  eventually occurs. The  uni ting feature  of 
ali  outcome-based normative  incentives  is that they  are consequentialist  in  a strong 
sense  that  the  process  by  which  a  result  occurs  does  not  directly  matter  to  the 
evaluation  it  receives.  lt  may  indirectly  matter,  as  when  a  person  can  generate 
different reputational effects by  achiev ing the  same  material  result  in  different ways. 
But  ali  different  procedures  which generate the  same  reputational  result  will.  ipso 
facto,  be  evaluated  as  equivalent  by  a  person  who  cares  only  for  reputational 
outcomes.  ln  this  respect,  outcome-based  normative  incentives  do  not  represent  a 
large divergence  from  the  standard  models of H.  economicus. Actions.  for  instance, 
are still entirely instrumental  in  their value. 9 
However, experimental  evidence tends  to  agree  with  intuitive experience  that 
such  strongly  consequentalist  models  are  inherently  insufficient  to  completely 
describe people's preferences in an  interaction. People don't only care what happens, 
they also, for various non-instrumental reasons, care how (action) and  for what reason 
(intention)  it  happens.  That  is, they  may have  preference  over changes  in  the  two 
other moments of an  interaction; the  acts  themselves, and  the intentions of the actors 
leading into the  interaction. 
Given the  importance of consequences in  economies,  the  proposai  that  actions 
have  costs  and  benefits,  independently  of  their  consequences,  is  surprisingly 
common.  The  disutility  of  tabor,  for  instance,  is  based  on  an  action,  not  a 
consequence. Even  consumption  benefit, in  fact, is  not rea lly an outcome,  but rather 
an  action.
6
.  To  build  it  into a consequentialist mode! of behavior requires a weaker 
kind  of consequentialism,  in  which  the  "consequences" are expanded to include  the 
process  by  which  they are attained. ln  other words  the consideration of the disutility 
of work  requires an  implicit  formulation  along  the  !ines  of ''1 prefer to  eat  a  lot 
without having worked to  get the  food."
7  Formally, this  is  identical to  the procedure 
by which we can consider act-based,  non-consequentialist normative incentives. lt  is 
merely the source of the utility which changes. 
If altruism seems particularly linked to outcome-based models,  the idea of rule-
following seems weil suited to  models of act-based  normative  incentives. This relates 
to  the  idea  of social  norms,  which  have  been  the  subject  of a  rather  extensive 
literature  (Elster  1989;  Bicchieri  2002;  L6pez-Pérez  2008;  Tammi  2008;  Adena 
20 Il ).  One of the earliest formai  introductions of act-based  normative incentives was 
6  Mill,  , p. 321 ,  recognized  this  in  his  formulation  of the  original  Homo  economicus,  arguing  that 
political economy is concerned with man ·'solely as  a being ,.vho  desires to  possess wealth. . . .  fandl 
makes  entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive; except  ... aversion to labour, and 
desire of' the present enjoymenl o( costly indulgences" (  cmphasis addcd). 
7  Notice  that part  of the problem with  the analysis cames  from modeling a fundamentally dynamic 
phenomenon (action) with a static design. 10 
the  work of Andrea  ni  ( \989;  1990),  who  described  a "warm  glow'· of extra  uti lity 
that agents fee!  in addition to material consequences of pertorming some ·'good'" act. 
L6pez-Pérez (2008) introduces an elegant  mechanism in  extensive  games, by which 
the  final payoff is adjusted  to  take  account  for the normative impact  of the actions 
taken  in  the  history of that terminal  node.  As  with  outcomes,  it  may  be the case that 
beliefs  can  frame  the  evaluation  of  actions.  L6pez-Pérez  and  Spiegelman 
(forthcoming) consider an  application of the guilt aversion addressed in  an outcome-
based madel by Charness and  Dufwenberg (2006) to act-based models. They consider 
two players A and B, where A hasan incentive to lie to B. The mode\ focuses on lies, 
and  predicts  that A will  refrain  from lying only if A thinks that B expects the truth. 
Generalized  to  any  action, act-based  guilt  aversion  yields  a  mode! of conditional 
norm-following, much like that described in  Bicchieri (2006). 
One  might  have  expected that a primary normative incentive based purely on 
the act itself, with  no regard  for the consequences, would  be  morality.  lndeed, that is 
usually what is meant  by ''deontological" concerns.  Considering morality as  a non-
consequentialist  incentive  corresponds  to  Sen  's  ( 1977)  argument  th at  principled 
behavior is  counter-preferential: the outcomes  involved are not the deciding  factor. 
White  (2004)  elaborates  general arguments  about  the  torm  that  Kantian  morality 
should  take  in  preferences,  and  Karni  and  Safra  (2002)  characterize  a  utility 
representation of justice.  Detfains and  Fluet (2009)  present  a  mode! where agents 
sutfer disutility when they transgress a moral code comparable to  Kant"s  categorical 
imperative. Brekke, Kverndokk  et al.  (2003)  have  agents suftèring disutility as  their 
actions diverge from a social-wei  fare-maximizing lev el.  Kaplow and  Shave ll  (2007) 
develop  a  mode! of moral  guilt  and  pride  that  keeps  agents  from  taking  some 
specified harmful acts.  More on the mechanics of integrating mora lity  into the utility 
function can be fou  nd in  Spiegelman (20 Il). Il 
One difficulty with treating morality from  an  economie  perspective arises from 
the  tension  it  creates  with  economies'  normative  positions. lt is  not  clear  that  the 
common  strategy  of e_ quating  moral  strictures  with  utilitarian  social  benefit  is 
justified. Problems such as the footbridge-and-trolley dilemma (Thomson  1976;  Foot 
1978)  show  that  moral  intuition  goes  beyond  material  outcomes.  As  Sen  ( 1977) 
recognized, counterpreferential choice drives a potential wedge between the concepts 
- identical  in  the  standard  framework  - of  goa l~orie nted behaviour  and  welfare 
maximization.  This wedge  opens the  "serious" questions  that have  to  be  answered 
before normative  implications can  be  teased out  of theoretical predictions (Hausman 
and  McPherson  1993). The  theorist  and  policy maker  must  make  decisions  about 
their own ethical positions, decisions which are implicit in  the structure of the utility-
based rules  in  the  models above.  For  instance,  Shiell  and  Rush (2003)  find  ev idence 
suggesting that stated willingness to pay is intluenced by ·'commitment" as we il  as  by 
the  more  "consequentialist"  considerations.  The  extent  to  which  these  should  be 
considered  in  the cost-benefit analysis is an open question.  ls it  legitimate to rnaintain 
a utilitarian social welfare function  when individuals are constrained  by moral rules? 
The  answer depends  on the  metaphysical  nature of the  rule,  and  the  nature  of the 
constraint.  If the  ''true" ethic  is  deontological, then  social  weltàre must  be  recast  in 
terms of violations of the rule. If the "true" et  hic  is ut il itarian, and the rule  is mostly a 
"just''  method of achieving  it,  then  the  basic  social weltàre  principles of standard 
economie modeling rem ain justi fied. 
Economie models have, for the most part, assumed the latter.  ft seems clear that 
moral  behavior  is at  the  very  least  not  completely  independent  from  social  welfare. 
Kant's  (2005  [ 1785])  Categorical Imperative  (CI)  requires  choosing a "maxim'' or 
rule of action that one could, at the  same time, wish to  become a universal  law.  This 
suggests socially optimal  behaviour, and  has  been taken  in severa( studies to  imply it. 
For  instance,  Brekke,  Kverndokk  et  al.  (2003)  identify  the  Kantian  ideal with  the 
efficient production of a public good  in  their mode!  of moral  behaviour. which  leads 12 
to  an  equivalence between Kantian and  Benthamite morality!  Similarly,  Kaplow and 
Shavell (2007) assume that a "po licy maker" chooses the "guilt" or "pride'· associated 
with  a certain  action  to  minimize the  harm  those  actions  cause,  subject  to  various 
constraints
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,  and  suggest  that,  in  fact, existent  moral  codes  seem  to  behave  "as  if' 
they were so constructed.  Bilodeau and  Grave!  (2004) show the equivalence between 
social  optimum  and  categorical  imperative-driven  outcomes  is  not  general.  lt  does 
hold  in  public goods games, and other cases of similar structure, but  in  general  there 
may not even exist any Categoricallmperative. For instance, in a •·matching pennies .. 
game there is  no  rule that everyone could follow, white at the same time wishing that 
everyone else would do the same. 
1 have  focused  here  on  the  rule-following  phenotype.  However,  it  is  quite 
apparent  that  reciprocity could  also  be  sparked  by  act-based  incentives.  lndeed, the 
Chapter 1 of this thesis develops just su ch a model. Summarizing act-based normative 
incentives,  we  see  they  can  stem  from  (a)  ·'pure'· aversion  to  the  act  in  question 
(  potentially  based  on  constraint  to  tollow  sorne  ·'moralistic"  rule),  (  b)  the  ac tor' s 
interpretation  of other  people' s  prior  expectations  (guilt  aversion)  or  (  c)  from 
observers'  approval or disapproval of the  act  itself, in  which  case, as  in  reputational 
concerns, the posterior bel iefs of other people are the source of the  uti 1  ity. lndeed, the 
diftèrence between stigma and  disapproval  is  subtle.  For disapproval to  be  operative, 
the  source  of the approval  must  be  the  act  itself.  and  not  the  resultant in tèrence. The 
admonition  to  .. love  the  sinner,  hate  the  sin"  reflects  the  difference.  Although  the 
theoretical  difference  is  clear,  in  many  cases  it  may  be  di ttlcult  to  distinguish 
empirically between stigma and  disapproval  as  motivations.  One empirical  foothold 
may  be  that  disapproval  of the  action  itselt:  as  an  impersonal  eftèct,  should  be 
relatively invariant to  social  distance. Stigma,  on the other  hand. may  be  much more 
' They note that this harm  can, in  principle,  refer to non-matcrial outcomcs  such  as  rights violations (an cxample 
of the gcneralizing solution to the H. economicus). 13 
keenly felt  when the  interacting people are less anonymous. For instance.  the  effects 
of  experimental  treatments  that  alter  social  distance  might  be  interpreted  as 
identifying disapproval (base effect) and stigma ("slope"). 
The  final  moment  of the  interaction is the  intention of the  interacting people 
going  in. lnfonnally,  there can  be no question that  intentions matter.  To give a few 
examples: 
• Someone  cuts  ahead  of you  in  line  at  the  cinema.  Y  our  reaction  will  be 
different, depending on whether you think the  persan didn 't see you, or wh  ether they 
intentionally ignored  you. 
• A new  acquaintance  doesn't return a phone  cali.  Are  they  busy,  or are they 
avoiding you? 
• One of the key requirements in  labor negotiations is often that the parties  fee! 
they are negotiating '"in  good faith". This comes  down to whether they  really intend 
to find  middle ground, or just to push through their preconceived expectations. 
In  ail  of the above examples, the actions and  outcomes are  the same,  and  yet a 
"reasonable" evaluation of the  behaviour  varies widely with  the  perceived  intention. 
A  significant  difference  between  intention-based  incentives  and  act- or outcome-
based incentives  is that wh ile outcomes are observable more or less by detinition. and 
actions may weil  be observable, unless they are hidden by the actor, intentions are,  as 
a general rule,  unobservable,  and  so  will  usually have  to be inferred. This inference 
can be  extracted  mostly  through  observable signs,  i.e., through actions or outcomes. 
As a result, models of intention-based normative  incentives  must speci  fy  how  people 
use observable outcomes and/or actions to infer intentions.  lndeed.  they  must specify 
exactly what an '·intention" is.  ln  general, it seems that a person·s intention is closely 
related to the goal they are trying to  attain.  ln  other words, to some extent a person's 
intentions may be the same thing as the ir  preferences. Fo llowing this li  ne of thought. 
a  mode!  of  intention-based  normative  incentives  would  involve  people  who 14 
intrinsically  cared  what  other  people's  preferences  were.  This  is  the  approach 
developed  by  Levine  ( 1998)  and  Rotem berg  (2008).  The  specifie  intention  is  a 
generalized  altruism,  in  which  (in  Levine)  the  a  parameter  noted  above  can  be 
positive  (altruism)  or  negative  (spite).  Notice  that  this  means  that  the  perceived 
intention  in  Levi ne ( 1998) is essentially same thing as a reputation, a posterior belief 
about  an  unobservable  type  based  on  the  equilibrium  distribution  of actions.  The 
mode!  nevertheless  is  not an  outcome-based  reputational  mode!, because the  player 
whose reputation is established does not get any direct benetit from  it. The reputation 
provides  them  with  instrumental  benefit,  because  the  normative  incentive  acting on 
the  others  (who  assess  the  reputation)  leads  these  others  to  act  favorably  towards 
th ose  whom  they  perce ive  to  have  good  intentions,  and  un favorably  towards th ose 
whom they perceive to  be spiteful. Rotemberg's formulation  formalizes an emotional 
response (anger) which  is  triggered  when  the  perceived type of the  interacting agent 
is  below  a  certain  threshold.  Actions  suggesting  ''good"  (altruistic)  characteristics 
lead to esteem, and this esteem generates a material benefit. Actions suggesting .. bad" 
(spiteful)  characteristics  lead  to  stigmatization,  and  generate  a  material  harm. 
However, the normative incentive is the component ofthe system that leads people to 
engage in  this "reciprocal" behavior, and  this depends on  the  perceived  intentions of 
the actor. 
This tendency  to  mode!  the  character of intention-based  normative  incentives 
as a ki nd of reciprocity is  pervasive (Rabin  1993; Dufwenberg and  Kirchsteiger 2004: 
Falk and  Fischbacher 2006t  As a general term,  reciprocity  is  usually detined as the 
tendency  of people  to  do  unto  others  as  they  have  had  done  unto  themselves 
" One  exception  is  Battigalli  and  Dufw <:nberg  (2009).  which  includcs  an  intcntion-bascd  thcory of 
guilt. ln this model, player A will  be more generous with playcr 8 if A's second-arder cxpcctations are 
that she believes player 8 thinks player A had bad intentions, rcgardlcss of what A thinks 8's intentions 
are.  Thus  thcre  is  no  reciprocity,  but (sccond-order) perceived  intentions do  enter  the  deliberative 
process. 15 
(Dohmen,  Falk et  al.  2009)
10
• As  shown  above,  this  definition  does  not  imply  that 
reciprocity  is  intention-based.  ln  principle, one  could  define  a reciprocal  tendency 
over outcomes (so that A will  try  to  give B about the  same outcome that  B gave A, 
regardless of how  that cornes about, or why A believes B did  what she  did),  or over 
acts themselves (in which case,  if B did x to A,  then A will  tend  to  want to do x back, 
regardless  of the  consequences  or  of the  interpreted  intentions).  However,  as  an 
empirical  matter,  it  seems  that  intention-based  models  of  reciprocity  offer 
significantly  more  explanatory  power  than  other  models.  ln  empirical  settings, 
perceived  intentions  have  been  identified  by  comparing reactions  to  human  players 
with reactions to computerized players in a dictator game (Falk, Fehr et al.  2003), by 
direct elicitation of beliefs (Falk and  Fischbacher 2006), and  by modi fying  the action 
set  possible (McCabe,  Rigdon  et al.  2003; Cox and  Deck 2006;  Falk,  Fischbacher et 
al.  2008;  HotTman, McCabe et al.  2008).  lt has  been robustly suggested that people's 
preferences  include  consideration  of the  intentions of the  other  people  with  whom 
they interact. 
The  models  described above are  ali  normative because  they  explicitly  include 
considerations  of  interests  that  go  beyond  persona!  preferences.  Outcome-based 
normative  incentives dictate  how  we  '"should''  respond  to  different  posterior beliefs 
about  payoffs or unobservable types, or what kinds of posterior beliefs  we  .. should" 
try  to  instil.  Act-based  normative  incentives  dictate  how  we  ''should''  respond  to 
certain actions, or  what actions we ·'should" take. Finally, intention-based  incentives 
dictate how people ashould" think of or act towards each other, and how we ·'should" 
respond when they do or don't. 
10  The  literature on  rcciprocity has  dcvcloped  into a very  large  field  of its own.  and  in  the  process 
distinctions have arisen.  For instance,  positive  rcciprocity - rewards for  "good" bchaYior - has  been 
distinguished  from  negative  reciproeity- punishment  lor '·bad" behavior.  ln  a similar \'Cin.  one  can 
distinguish  between weak reciprocity  - which  is restricted  to  good  or  bad  bchavior  directcd  at  the 
rcciprocator herself- and  strong  reciprocity,  in  which  the  rcciprocator may  rcward  or  (more  oftcn) 
punish a third party 16 
To  illustrate, one subject that has received particular attention is dishonesty.
11 lt 
is  frequently observed that people do  not  lie  as  much  as  a naive  interpretation of H 
economicus  would  predict.  Why  not?  One  can  distinguish,  in  principle,  between 
severa!  different  reasons  based  on  the  axis  of  moments  elaborated  above.  For 
instance, lies have an  outcome, which  is sowing false  beliefs  in  others.  If people  fee! 
''bad'' about  this, or  about  the  subsequent  decisions  that  the  deceived  other  might 
make, then  such  outcomes will  attenuate any gain  that  might  be  had  from lying. On 
the  other hand, "pure'' lie  aversion  posits a disutility experienced merely by  uttering 
an  untruth. (Lundquist, Ellingsen et al.  2007;  Kartik 2009;  Lundquist, Ellingsen et al. 
2009).  One  might  say  that  people  suffer  from  some  sort  of ''cognitive  dissonance'' 
when  they  make  statements  they  believe  to  be  untrue,  or  that  it  is  inherently 
displeasing  to  them to  violate  a social  or moral  rule  against  lies.  L6pez-Pérez  and 
Spiegelman (2011)  test a theory  that  players feel  bad  for  lying only  if they  believe 
that the person being lied  to expected the truth. This theory,  for  instance, ex plains the 
exculpable  nature  of the  "bluff'  in  poker, and  is  an  application of models of guilt 
(Battigalli  and  Dufwenberg  2007;  Battigalli  and  Dufwenberg  2009)  to  act-based, 
rather than  outcome-based incentives.  Finally, it  should  be  noted  that  an  inadvertent 
lie - in  which  persan A may say something to  persan B that he  believes (in  error) to 
be  true - does  not have  nearly the  normative force  of an intentional  one.  Thus  the 
intention to cause others to  believe things  that the speaker does  not  believe seems to 
be a key part ofwhat lying means. This is also consistent with the acceptability of the 
poker bluff.  These  different  models  of lie-aversion  have  quite  different  empirical 
implications, which could  be susceptible to experimental manipulation. 
11  Sec Gncczy (2005), and  attendant  litcraturc,  including the modcst contribution in  the second chaptcr 
of  this thesis (L6pez-Pérez and Spiegelman, 20 Il). 17 
0.3  Axis 2:  Intrinsic versus extrinsic 
There  are  other  alternative  classifications  for  incentives  which can  be  made.  For 
instance, severa! authors distinguish intrinsic from  extrinsic incentives (Kreps 1997). 
It  should  be  noted  that,  ali  incentives  are  fundamentally  intrinsic.  Even  Homo 
economicus has  an intrinsic desire for consumption and  leisure,  which mediates  the 
way he interacts with  his environment. On the other hand, no motivation is wholly an 
island.  People  always  seek  information  from  their  environment  to  help  them 
determine how to apply their standards of behavior.  ln  practice, many authors re  fer to 
extrinsic  incentives  as  material  incentives,  and  intrinsic  incentives  as  a one  of a 
variety of normative incentives.  1 will  categorise normative  incentives as  intrinsic  or 
extrinsic  in  the  fo llowing way. If a person requires  information about  the outcome, 
action or intention to be transmitted to others in order for the incentive to bind, then it 
is extrinsic. 1  f the incentive binds even wh en no information is transmitted to others, 
then  it  is  intrinsic.  The  definition  that  the  dichotomy  rests  on  the  importance  of 
information to  other people  retlects  the  fundamentally social aspect of normative 
incentives  (and  human  behaviour).  lt  has  the  advantage  of separating  incentives 
which  can be manipulated through dissimulation or exaggeration from those  which 
cannot, which in  turn has usetùl  empirical implications. 
The  main  extrinsic  normative  incentives  are  esteem  versus  stigmatization 
(outcome),  approval  versus  disapproval  (act)  and  some  kinds  of  reciprocity 
(intention).  lntrinsic incentives include persona! and moral opinions. and social nonns 
th at have  been internalized. Guilt and  pride,  moral outrage or duty.  benevolence. self-
esteem and  ego-utility and aversion to norm-breaking are intrinsic incentives.  Models 
of inequity aversion and  positional or rank-based utility appear to pose something of 
a challenge  to  these definitions,  since  in these cases the incentive  is detined  only in 
tenns  of  the  outside  relationships.  Such  considerations  show  again  the  empirical 
usefu lness of the classification  scheme.  The question,  which  can  be  experimentally 
identified, turns upon  a simple point: must information pass to others  in  order for the 18 
incentives to  bind? To the extent that players cannot diminish their rank-based  utility 
or  disutility (which  is  an  internai opinion)  by  hiding  their  rank  from others,  the 
incentives  are  intrinsic.  The  distinction therefore  pennits  a  closer  analysis of the 
phenomenon,  both  theoretically  and  in  its empirical  predictions.  The  table  below 
classifies  sorne  of the  more  common  normative  incentives  along  the  two  axes  1 
propose. 
T  bi  01  a  e  N  f  .  th  t  orma Ive  meen  Ives m  e  axonomy 
1ntrinsic  Extrinsic 
Intention (1)  Gui lt-from-biarne  lntention-based  Reciproc ity; 
Spi te 
Action (A)  Cost of lying;  moral concerns;  Act-based  reciprocity. 
act-based guilt aversion  disapproval 
Outcome (0)  Simple  guilt;  benevolence;  Esteem, reputation 
self-esteem;  inequity aversion; 
rank-based  utility 
0.4  Conclusion 
The classification system that  1 propose  in  th is  paper diverges  from  the  standard 
interpretation of '"economie man'', but  more importantly  it  diverges  from the main 
sources  of normative  feeling that are observed  in social  interactions.  1 argue  that 
tàmiliar  goals  such  as  distinction,  reciprocity,  altruism  and  rule-fo llowing  are 
analogous to phenotypes,  outward  expressions of motivational mechanisms that can 
be  profitably  explained  at  a  "genotypic"  leve t.  The  genotypic  and  phenotypic 
classification systems do not have  a one-to-one relationship.  in  general.  Distinction 
may  be  intrinsic  or  extrinsic,  but  is  largely  outcome-based.  An  intention-based 
distinction might be conceived as a motivation to, for example. moral one upmanship. 
This could be  empirically discriminated  from  the  (outcome-based)  incentive  to  have 
the  greatest moral reputation  by testing  to see  whether  it  was sensitive  to  privacy. 19 
Considering altruism, outcome-based  motivations could  be  empirically disentangled 
from  non-consequentialist  motivations  by cutting  any sure  link  between altruistic 
actions and their expected results. If altruism is intention-based, for example, ·'it's the 
thought that counts", so a costly action that ended up  having no impact would  fulfill 
the  obligation  that  the  normative  incentive  generates.  The  distinction  between 
extrinsic  and  intrinsic  altruism  can  be  considered  as  a  parallel  to  Sen's  ( 1977) 
discussion of co mm itment and  sympathy.  ln  the latter, decision-maker A chooses to 
help  decision-maker B  because  B's  welfare  gives  benefit  to  A. Such  sympathy  is 
described by the altruism mode! that goes back to  Edgeworth, cited earlier.  ln  cases 
of commitment, by contrast, A helps B even though there  is no persona! benefit  from 
doing so. In  Sen's example, appeals to send aid  for a famine would  be more effective 
on the  sympathetic  if they contain  information about the suffering of the  hunger-
stricken. The committed, on the other hand, would give anyway. 
Reciprocity and rule-following,  for their parts,  can bind at intentions (1 ). actions 
(A) or outcomes (0). Examples offamiliar moral rules of the three kinds include:  do 
no harm  (0 );  do not kil!  (A);  and do not lie (1).  The classification of the last two  can 
be justified with  the claim  that  even killing accidentally is traumatic; however, the 
culpability from lying is tied to the intention to  instil a fàlse belief - lying by accident 
carries no biarne. Of course, the re lev  ance of these motivations in  any particular case 
is an empirical issue.  lndeed, the principal use  of the taxonomy may  be to generate 
empirical  predictions  such  as  those  above.  To  take  the  example  of reciprocity. 
suppose some process  generates  an allocation in  which A receives  more than B. and 
then B has  the opportunity to  generate allocations that are equal (no reciprocity)  or 
that  tàvor  B  (reciprocity).  If the  initial  process  were  a  lottery,  it  would  incite 
reciprocity in  case  (0), but less  in  case  (1)  and  (A).  If the  initial process  were  one 
which A  chose  over another,  the availability  of such  alternative  courses  of action 
might affect reciprocity in case (A) or (1) but not in case (0). 20 
1 have  found  the  "genetic  taxonomy"  elaborated  in  this paper to  be a useful 
analytical  tool for developing models of normative  incentives.  lts use for identify ing 
empirical predictions has also been demonstrated, for  instance,  in  Chapter Ill  of this 
thesis.  Economies  has  resisted  the  explicit  introduction of  normative  incentives  in 
large  part  because  of  the  weil  known  fact  that  any  observed  behavior  can  be 
explained  by assuming  the  "right" utility function. My goal here has  been to try to 
establish sorne guidelines for determining whether the "right'"  utility function is really 
right. The development of experimental methods in economies has  from the start held 
promise of this sort  of identification, but  for that to work, the experiment  should  be 
based on clear  predictions.  The taxonomy 1 propose  supplies  such predictions,  and 
will, 1 hope, therefore be useful  in  the further work of identifying a more behaviorally 
descriptive  content  to  the  kind  preference  relation  that guide  economie  choice  in 
Homo sapiens. 
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PRIDE, PREJUDICE, AND THE CREDIBILITY OF CHEAP TALK: 
THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE. 
Abstract: This paper presents a simple  application and  experimental test of a theoretical mode! of 
discriminatory social  preferences. First.  it establishes  conditions under which a combination or ··guilt 
and  pride" can support an equilibrium  in which costless messages engender cooperative strategies in a 
one-shot  Prisoners'  Dilemma  (PD)  game.  The  main  result  is  a  signaling  equilibrium  with  full 
separation of signais,  and  cooperation  whenever the  social distance  is  lcss  than  a certain  thrcshold 
lev  el. 
The second part of the  paper is an experimental application and test of a discrete version of the theory. 
Using the minimal group  paradigm.  subjects are put  into a set  of interlocking groups.  11 6 subjects 
played 4 games each (within-subje<.:ts) undcr different  inl(lllnational (trcatment) contcxts.  Rcsults arc 
broadly consistent with  the theory:  people cooperate more whcn laced with group mem bcrs.  They arc 
also less .. honest'' \\ ith their messages when messages arc sequential  than when they arc simultancous. 
which suggests a strategie motivation to the messages. 
Résumé: Ce chapitre présente  un  modèle et un  test expérimental d'une théorie de prélërcnces sociales 
discriminatoires.  Le  premier consiste en un jeu de dilemme de prisonnier (OP) où l'avantage  de laire 
défection est affecté par le sentiment de culpabilité que donne aujoucur le  lait de  laire du  mal à autrui. 
Si l'on ajoute que  ce  sentiment  diminue avec  la distance  sociale  perçue entre  les joueurs. on peut 
délinir des groupes sociaux comportementaux comme les  individus surtisamment proches en distance 
sociale  pour  quï ls coopèrent  dans le DP. Le  résultat principal théorique consiste à un  équil ibre de 
signaux où  les individus révèlent leur véritable distance sociale en « chcap talk » simultanée. a\ a  nt de 
jouer. 
La deuxième partie du papier construit  un  test expérimental de  la théorie. en app liquant  le paradigme 
des groupes  minimaux (PGM).  116 sujets ont  été assignés à des groupes qui  n:llètcnt la  structure du 
modèle  théorique  ct ont  joué au  DP  sous 4  traitements. qui \·arient  dans lïnlormation  donnée  sur 
lïdcntité de l'opposant. Les prédictions du modèle sont globalement conlirmécs. --------- -- --·--- - ·- - ~-----------, 
28 
1.1  Introduction 
!ch bin ein Berliner! 
-John F.  Kennedy, June 26, 1963 
The  door-to-door  salesman,  having  noticed  the  tricycle  m your  front  yard,  pulls  a 
well-thumbed snapshot of his own children from  his wallet for your admiration. What 
makes  him  think this  increases  the  chance of a sale?  At a conference overseas, you 
unexpectedly  meet  someone  from  your  own  university. Although  you  hardly speak 
when  you  work  two  floors  apart,  at  the  conference  you  go  out  to  dinner  together. 
Why? The ''human  library'' allows members of the public "borrow" people- gays or 
blacks or single parents or  the  homeless - and  have a conversation  with  them  for  a 
certain  period  of time  in  an  attempt to  tight  prejudice  against these  groups Human 
library  web  site,  (20 l 0).  Why  does  this  attempt  seem  intuitively  plausible?  The 
unifying  thread  that  runs  through  ail  these  examples  is  .. common  ground" - shared 
persona!  characteristics.  When  two  people  realize  that  they  both  are  parents.  or  that 
they  are  both  from  the  same  city,  it  generates  or amplifies a  sense  of solidarity 
between them.  ln  the case of the human  library, one might think that any two  people, 
if they  spend  time  talking,  will  discover some  basis  for  identification,  which will 
engender a kind ofsympathy born ofsolidarity. 
lfthis solidarity is strong enough, then  it can  induce sacrifices by individuals in 
the  group  for  the  benefit  of other  group  members.  Thus  communication  can,  by 
revealing  common  characteristics,  engender  solidarity  and  promote  pro-social 
behaviour.  In  order  for  this process  to  work,  individuals  must  have  sorne  way  to 
credibly communicate  their  group  membership
12
.  Modern  humans  use  a  variety of 
methods to  signal  the  groups to  which  they  fee! some  affiliation:  hairstyle.  clothing 
11  They  must  also  in  fact  share  some  common  characteristics  - if  communication  rcveals  no 
commonalities, ali  bets are off!  Some implications of this wi ll  be discussed below. 29 
choice, tattoos, even the operating system you run on your computer can be seen, and 
in  sorne  way  intended, as  signais of affiliation with  sorne social groups.  (Are you a 
Mac  person, or a PC person? Or are you a Linux person?)  Many of these  signais are 
costly  in  sorne way, so  give  evidence  of a vested  interest  in  the group. But  many. 
including probably the richest, simple verbal communication, are  also  fraught with a 
certain  inherent "cheapness". 
The  theoretical part  of  this  paper establishes  conditions  under which cheap 
signais  are  credible  enough  to  engender  cooperative  strategies  in  a  one-shot 
Prisoners' Dilemma (PD) game.  lt is weil  documented that pre-game communication 
increases cooperativeness in this context.  Overviews of the 1  iterature i  nclude th  ose of 
Led  yard  ( 1995),  Sally  ( 1995),  and  Crawford  ( 1998).  This  paper  runs  somewhat 
counter to  most of this literature  in  focusing on communication about type,  rather 
than communication about  intentions.
13  lt thus works at the intersection of cheap talk 
and  another venerable  literature,  that of in-group  bias.  Empirical results from social 
psychology  robustly show  that  people  behave  more  tàvorably towards  those  with 
whom they can identify  a common group  membership, although the mechanism  by 
which this works is not entirely clear.  This paper was  not designed  to  clucidate this 
mechanism. Rather, 1 focus on two  other  limitations to this empirical literature as  it 
currently stands.  First, ali  the studies of which 1 am aware  let the group  membership 
information  remain  exogenous  since  subjects  in  the  experiment, or agents  in  the 
model, al  ways  know  for  sure the group membershi p of the  other people with whom 
they  interact.  One  contribution  of the  model  presented  here  is  to  relax  this 
assumption,  and  let  the  credibility  of the  group  membership  in formation  be  an 
endogenous (equilibrium)  choice by  the interacting agents.  Groups  are unobservable 
13  It  might be  noted in  this  context, along the !ines of Rabin  ( 1990) th at in  many  cases  type implies 
behavior, and  expectations depend  on  perceived type.  Thus  type  and  expectations cannat always  be 
truly separated. 30 
m this  paper,  and  identifiers  are  cheap  talk. Second,  previous  models  tend  to  be 
characterized  by exclusive  group  membership  (Chen  and  Li  2009).  A player  who 
belongs to one  group  cannot simultaneously belong to  other groups,  as  weil. On  the 
other  hand, casual introspection  and  models such as  (Wichardt  2008)  highlight  the 
insight  that  often people  have  many  group  affi liations simultaneously,  which may 
place  different  or contlicting  demands  on behavior, causing  choices  to  be  highly 
dependent on social context. (Spiegelman 2009) showed that altruism could not be an 
effective force  to  ensure that cheap messages were credible  in  the  presence of such 
exclusive  unobservable  groups. The  current  study  instead  develops  the  concept of 
social  ''neighborhoods,"  overlapping  regions  within  any  one  of which (the  theory 
predicts)  that  individuals will  cooperate. These suggest  interlocking  sets  of groups 
such  that the  in-group  bias behavior occurs between any  individuals who come  tl·om 
the same  neighborhood. 
White the mechanism behind  in-group bias remains obscure (Guth, Ploner et al. 
2008),  what  does  seem clear is  that, if one  wishes  to  maintain the  rational  choice 
framework  to  explain  behavior,  then  considerations  beyond  material  self-interest 
must be involved. This  literature, and  extensions of it  by experimental economists. 
shows  that people are  willing to sacritice some expected  mate rial well-being  for  the 
benetit of others when  faced  with  so-called "in-group" opponents than  when  tàced 
with  ''out-group"  others.  Squaring  such  behavior with  an assumption of expected 
utility  maximization  has  implicated  a  broad  class  of  considerations  known  as 
normative  incentives.  Normative  incentives  are  factors  that  affect  a  player's 
decisions,  but  not  her  payoff.  They  are  often  interpretable  as  what  she  feels  she 
.. should" do from  a persona!, moral or socially constructed perspective. which  is  the 
source  of the  name.  Spiegelman  (20 1  1)  develops a conceptual  framework  for  such 
normative  incentives  according  to  whether  they  bind  at  the  leve!  of outcomes 
(including  posterior  beliefs),  actions  themselves,  or  intentions  (prior  beliefs  about 
types or actions). As an example of the difference, simple benevolence is an outcome-31 
based  normative  incentive:  one  player  gains  utility  from  co-players'  payoffs.  A 
"wann glow," (Andreoni,  1989) or  moral  utility  by  contrast,  cornes  from  the  act  of 
choosing  cooperative  behavior,  regard1ess  of the  consequences,  and  represents 
another kind of incentive. 
lt should  be  a  familiar  idea  to  economists  that  many  different  competing 
impulses live simultaneously within the human heart. This is, after ali, the heart of  the 
idea  of a  tradeoff.  Robinson  Crusoe  wants  both  to  eat  and  to  sleep,  in  many 
formulations  independently from  each other.  A monopolist wants to  se l!  many units, 
but  also  to  sel!  them  at  a higher  priee.  The  principal  wants  to  reduce  the  agent's 
payment, but also  to  give  him  an  incentive  to  work.  An  indifference curve "exists'· 
because the agent whom  it describes wants both more x1 and  more x2• A central tenet 
of my work- and  1 am  of course far from  alone  in  this- is that normative  incentives 
can  be  analysed  in  a  very  similar  way  to  material  ones.  In  the  current  mode!,  1 
consider  a continuum  of agents  occupying  the  perimeter  of a  unit  circle.  The  arc 
distance between them  is a measure of"social distance".  ln-group bias is explained as 
the  effect  of two  complementary  normative  incentives  that  operate  in  the  .. soc ial 
landscape'· of an arc.  1 dub the two normative incentives .. guilt'" and  '·pride'·. Guilt is 
the disutility that agents fee!  when defecting in a PD game. This can  be envisioned as 
negative affect due to causing harm  to another person for  material  gain.  1  assume that 
the  negative affect decrease with  the social distance between  the actor and  the object 
of the  harm.  The  second,  competing  normative  incentive  is closer  to  the  .. sinful" 
orgueil than tojierté. Rather than a positive feeling coming tl·om  some exemplary act. 
it  is  modeled  as  the  negative  response  to  a perceived  affront.  1 adopt  faithfully  the 
interpretation  of the  PD  outcomes  (Temptation,  Sucker,  Reward,  Punishment). 
assuming  that  when  faced  with  the  "sucker"  payoff (cooperation  in  the  face  of 
defection) players suffer an  additional utility penalty. The  result  is that players faced 
with  an  opponent who  they  expect will  defect  are  placed  in  a classic  bind.  If they 
cooperate, they will fee!  no guilt, but will  have to "swallow their pride". On the other 32 
hand, if they "stand up for themselves" and defect in turn, they keep the ir pride intact, 
but  suffer  the  pangs  of guilt  for  harming  another.  ln  terms  of the  intensity  of the 
emotion,  there  may  weil  be  sorne  crowding  out  between  these  two  competing 
incentives, but  1 assume that they are  both  simultaneously  operative.  As, 1 believe, 
much  introspective evidence corroborates, 1 will assume that  in  cases of conflict,  the 
pride will generally win out. 
Characterizations of the  strength of the  normative  incentive  required  to  ensure 
cooperation  under (a)  known  neighbor status and  (b)  no information about  neighbor 
status serve  as  benchmarks for  the  usefulness  of signais as  coordination deviees.  In 
the  full  mode!,  the  only  source  of group  information  in  the  mode!  is  costless, 
unverifiable  messages.
14  These  messages  are  modeled  as  locations  on the  circle; 
players  share  a  "language"  consisting  of a  conventional  zero  point.  The  central 
research  question  is:  under  what  conditions  can  such  messages  transmit  credible 
information  about  group  membership?  The  theoretical  answer  to  this  question  is 
tormalized  as  a separating  equilibrium, where  each social  type  chooses  a different 
message to  send, and  players cooperate if and  only if each believes the other comes 
from  their '"neighbourhood,"  defined  as  any  distance  less  than  sorne  maximum  arc 
length on the circle. 
This madel yields severa(  empirical predictions. These predictions are  tested  in 
the  second  part  of the  paper,  which  outlines  a discrete  version  of the  mode!  tor 
empirical application, and  reports on  an  experiment  comprising  four  within-subjects 
treatments,  administered  to  a  sample  of 116  subjects.  The  treatments  ali  impose 
exogenous  groups  on  subjects,  and  involve  a  one-shot  prisoner· s  dilemma-type 
14  ln  this paper. 1 focus on ·'strategie'" motivations  for  communication. ln doing so. l abstract  li·om  the 
expressive  role of communication.  This may  appear  a rather surprising  choicc,  particularly to  non-
cconomists. To  the  extent  thal  messages  are credible  because  people  simply want  to  express  thcir 
group membership, the  results  in  this  paper will  only be  strcngthencd. 1 will  note  severa! points  at 
which this ki nd of effect might be visible. A  Iso notice that the experimental treatment dcscribed  in  this 
papcr,  based on  a minimal group paradigm of random,  cxogcnous groups.  reprcscnts a setting wherc 
expressive motivations will be minimized. 33 
decision. They  differ  in  the  informational  context.  ln  Treatment  1 (T 1  ),  groups are 
observable; in Treatment 2 (T2), they are  unobservable;  in Treatment 3 (T3), subjects 
can  exchange simultaneous messages which  may  or may  not  represent their groups; 
Treatment  4 (T4)  is  like  T3,  except  that  the  signais are  sequential -one player  is 
randomly chosen to  send  a message first,  and the  second  observes  the  first  message 
be fore sending a reply. Th us we  have a short (  4-period,  116-subject) panel design. 
This design permits severa!  kinds of insight.  First,  it  rep licates  the  result of in-
group  bias  in  a  minimal  group  paradigm.  without  severa!  of the  characteristic 
restrictions on groups, thereby  generalizing those  results.  ln  particular, players who 
have  indication  that  their  opponent  cornes  from  the  same  "'team'"  (social 
neighborhood)  cooperate  signitlcantly  more  often  than  either  those  who  have 
information that the opponent does  not come  from  their team or  those  who  have  no 
information at ali.  Further, the  latter proportions  are  statistically  identical.  The panel 
nature of the data allows  control for  persona!  characteristics and order effects  in  the 
evaluation of this  question.  Second,  and  more  central to  the  research  question.  it 
allows  investigation of  the extent to which cheap group affiliation signais can be used 
strategically, which  requires that they contain sorne information.  Specitlcally, we  see 
that  when  they  are  emitted  simultaneously,  these  cheap signais  are  taken  at  face 
value, at  !east by sorne subjects; the  in-group bias survives cheap information. On the 
other hand, we  see  that  when  the messages  are  sequential, players  try  to engage  in 
sorne strategie signaling. Thus ··lie'' rates,  while always high.  are significantly higher 
in  the  sequential  treatment  than  in  the  simultaneous  treatment.  and  signiticantly 
higher among second-message senders, who arguably have  a clearer way  to  lie,  than 
among first-message senders. 
1.2  Previous Literature 34 
The  current  mode!  is  one  where  cheap  falk  coveys  information  about  normative 
incentives relating  to  group affiliation,  and  in  particular cooperative  in-group  bias. 
As  such,  the  mode!  straddles  severa!  strands  of literature.  First,  it  investigates 
situations  in  which  players  have  an  opportunity  to  communicate  without  any 
exogenous  costs  - that  is,  where  talk  is  cheap.  Notice  that.  in  order  for 
communication  to  have  any  real  meaning,  there  must  be  some  informational 
asymmetries  ex ante.  Foundational  articles  in  the  study of how these  asymmetries 
may  or may not  be  resolved  are Green  and  Stokey (2007)  and  Crawford  and  Sobel 
( 1982). These develop an endogenous cost of information transmission,  based on the 
effect of the  receiver's equilibrium reaction  to  the  message on the  sender. The most 
important feature  of these models  for  the  current  purposes  concerns the relationship 
between the  theoretical possibility of sending a credible,  yet cheap, message, and  the 
extent to  which  players'  interests are  aligned.  Interests  are  aligned to  the extent that. 
for any given  realization  of the  informed  player's private  information, the  optimal 
response  by the  uninformed  player  is  also  preferred  by  the  infonned  player.  Any 
strategie  interaction  means  that  each agent  has  instrumental preferences  over the 
others·  beliefs:  when  my  payoff depends  on  your  behaviour, and  your  behaviour 
depends on your beliefs, 1 would prefer that you have beliefs that lead you to do make 
the  choices  beneficiai  to  me.  lnterests  are  aligned.  then,  to  the  extent  that  the 
preferred  beliefs coïncide  with  the  truth. lt is thus intuitive that, if the  interests are 
sufficiently aligned,  then  the  sender has an  incentive  to  reveal private  information 
truthfully. The receiver, knowing this, can rely on the credibility ofthe message. The 
sequential  equilibrium  message, as  succinctly expressed  by Crawford  ( 1998)  means 
'"Given  the  realization of my private  information  variable.  1 like what  you wi ll  do 
when  1 send  this  message at  !east as  much  as  anything 1 could  get you to do  by 
sending a different message:· When  it  is  known  to  both  parties  that "this  message'· 
coïncides with  .. my  private  information ..  for  every realization, then messages are, in 
Farrell and  Rabin's ( 1996)  terminology "self-revealing"' (if the  information concerns 
unobservable types) or ·'self-committing" (if  the information concerns future actions). 35 
However, wh en  the  interests  of the two  players are  insu  fficiently al  igned, th en 
this  credibility evaporates.  ln  the  case of perfectly opposed  interests,  any message 
interpretation that  resulted  in  an  action  that  benefited  the sender (which is the only 
kind a rational  sender would emit) would  at the same time result  in  a detriment to the 
receiver  (an  action  a  rational  receiver  would  never  commit). Thus when  players· 
interests  are  opposed  the  only  equilibria  are  ·'babbling"  equilibria,  in  which  the 
Sender's message is uninformative and  is ignored by the  Receiver (Crawford  1998).
15 
ln  the  current  context, the  cheap talk  opportunity does  something of a double 
duty  in  this regard.  The  essence of the  di lem ma posed to the  players in  this paper  is 
that  incentives  are  aligned  (so cheap  talk  should  be effective)  in  some cases,  and 
misaligned  (so  it  should  not)  in  other cases.  The cheap  talk  itself must both  allow 
players to identify the  case, and  by extension to coordinate on a subsequent  action. 
This setup  can be compared to Sally (2005).  For example, his argument  that talk  is 
potentially  conflict-dampening  can  be  captured  within  the  kind  of  normative 
incentive that 1 model explicitly. 
The  presence of  normative  incentives  removes  the  current  paper  somewhat 
from the  more  standard  theoretical  models of cheap talk. ln  this sense,  the current 
madel  has  more  in  common  with  the  continuing  .. challenge"  to  .. neoclassical 
orthodoxy''  which comes  from  behavioral  studies  in  experimental economies. The 
scare quotes  are used because much of this challenge  is aimed not at the neoclassical 
model itself.  but  rather at an almost straw-man mental shortcut  of equating .. utility" 
with ·'payoffs" or, worse, with  one's own money. Money can only be a measure of 
the  relative  worth  of various  options,  and  hence  an  index  for  utility.  ft  is  the 
1
;  Moreover. babbling equilibria exist even when intcrcsts are aligncd.  If messages arc ignorcd. thcn 
thcre is no reason to emit  a meaningful  message. If messages are not  meaningful, then they will  be 
ignored.  As  severa! authors (e.g.  Sally.  2005; Farrell  and Rabin,  1996) have  pointed  out, it is quitc 
likely that the theoretical possibility  of such equi libria overstates  their empirical rclevance.  In  many 
cases (particularly those  which might be characterized as  sclf-revealing or sclf-committing), babbling 
cquilibria seem to require a willfully perverse interpretation of communication as mcaninglcss. 36 
measurement, not  the  object  itself. The  utility associated  with  the outcome  of any 
social- including any  economie- interaction  is a complex affair of which  material 
benefits  are  only  one  of many  determining  factors  (Guala,  2005).  The  actual 
challenge  is  to attempt to  identify what those other factors are in any  given situation. 
This challenge has  been  enthusiastically undertaken.  Experimental tests of the "self-
interest hypothesis" are  numerous, and  largely consistent. For example,  15  years ago 
David  Sally (Sally  1995) conducted a meta-analysis of 130 PD game treatments in  37 
published  studies, finding  a  mean cooperation rate  of just over  47  percent,  with a 
minimum of5 percent and a maximum of96.9 percent. lt appears very difficult to get 
(ali) people to behave selfishly. 
The natural  response to  this observation is to  attempt  to  figure  out why it  is so 
hard.  In  this  vein, theories  of "other-regarding",  or  "social"  preferences, similar in 
spirit  to  the  normative  incentives  outlined  above,  constitute  severa!  di ftèrent 
literatures by  now. The  unifying fèature  of ali  such  work  is the attempt  to  explicitly 
model non-pecuniary costs and  benefits associated with different alternatives. 
The normative incentives 1 consider  in  the current  paper are  action-based. The 
idea  that  they should  be  action  based  has severa! antecedents  in  the  literature.  For 
instance, it  is related  to  lie-aversion, the  idea  that people  suffèr  a utility cost when 
they  tell  a  lie  (e.g.,  Kartik  2009;  Lundquist,  Ellingsen et al.  2009).  ln  this  view. 
people  are  affected  by  social  norms  or  ethical  principles  that  forbid  lying.  For 
instance,  most religions have some proscription against dishonesty.
16  More generally, 
it can be seen as  a simple  formulation of the kind of ·'commitment-based" incentives 
that  were  proposed  by  Sen  ( 1976).  The  effect  is  also  similar  to  that  in  Andreoni 
( 1989), where  in addition to the benefit of  a public good, individuals gain some utility 
16  Examplcs  of Christian.  Jewish,  Hindu  and  Islamic  pronouncemcnts  can  be  found  in  Lcviticus 
( 19: Il). Talmud (Shabbat 55), Taittiriya Upanishad ( 1. 11.1 ).  and Qur'an (4.135). respectivcly.  GneC/.) 
(2000) and  Ellingscn and  Johannesson (2004)  rcvicw  some  psychological literature on lie-aversion. 
Gneezy (2000) a  iso considers the views of some classical philosophers on the morality of deception. 37 
from  the  act  of giving  (a  "warm  glow"),  although  it  should  be  noted  that  the 
interpretation  is  quite  different.  Andreoni  ( 1989)  frames  the  glow as  an "egoistic'· 
motive,  relating  to  the  direct  pleasure  experienced  from  engaging  in  what  one 
considers  to  be  "ethical"  actions.  It  might  also  be  noted that  the  ·'guilt"  which  1 
discuss  is  different  from  that elaborated  in  Battigalli  and  Dufwenberg (2007.  2009). 
Their models assume that  people suffer a utility cost  if a co-player does  not get the 
payoff that they think she  expects. That  is,  a player's second-arder beliets (beliets 
about beliefs) appear in the  utility function.  ln the  psychologicalliterature (e.g., Gare 
and  Harvey, 1995; Tangney &  Dearing , 2002; Tilghman-Osborne et al., 20 1  0),  gui lt 
is caused  by various  factors  including:  impersonal transgressions,  harming another 
persan, and  trust/oath violation, and  more  generally by  the  acknowledgement  of a 
wrongful commission or omission ofacts. This last is closest to the spirit of the use of 
guilt in  my mode!. 
ln  my mode!, guilt is taken to diminish with  social  distance. This is a venerable 
conjecture  in  the  social sciences  (see  Charness  and  Gneezy  2008  for  sorne  early 
references),  and  has proven  to  be  fertile  ground  for  economie research  in  the  past 
couple of decades.  There have  been severa! different strategies  to  operationalise  this 
idea  in  experimental  treatments.  One  has  been  to  identify  social distance  with the 
degree  of anonymity,  under  the  idea  that  the  social  proximity  that  identitication 
engenders  between  any  individuals  will  trigger  pro-social  norms  (A li  M  2007: 
Charness,  Haruvy et al.  2007;  Hoffman,  McCabe  et  al.  2008;  Fiedler,  Haruvy et  al.: 
Wu, Leliveld et al.). ln a similar ve in Catherine Eckel has done extensive work on the 
effect of seeing the  face,  smiling or otherwise. of one· s co-player  in  experimental 
games  (Eckel and  Grossman  1996;  Eckel, Kacelnik  et  al.  200 1;  Eckel  2007; Eckel 
and  Petrie 2008). 
Given  a  leve! of identification,  however,  social  distance  may  not  constant 
between  any  individuals. If a player's  behaviours  are  different  with  those  who  are 
.. close'' from  her  behaviours with  those  who  are '·far'',  incentives sensitive  to  social 38 
distance  will  result  in  so-called  in-group  bias.  Economie  research  specifically  in 
group  identification was  pioneered  by Akerlof and  Kranton (2000, 2005).  ln  this 
work,  social  identities were  chosen  (2000), or  fostered  in  agents  by a  principal's 
investment (2005). Thus the distribution of group  identification was endogenous.  By 
assumption, affiliation with a given group induces a specifie  kind of behavior in these 
models. Identification with  a give  group  "automatically" causes agents to behave  in 
the  manner associated with members  of that group. Wichardt  (2008) extended this 
analysis  to  include  the  possibility  of multiple,  conflicting  group  affiliations.  For 
instance,  behavior appropriate among the members  of the soccer team may  become 
inappropriate in  the  context of dinner with  his family.  He also  (2007)  constructed a 
mechanism  in  which  adherence  to  an  identity  whose  "appropriate  behavior" 
comprises  confonning  to  a  cooperative  social  norm  becomes  an  evolutionarily 
advantageous trait. 
ln  the abovementioned  models, the group behavior  is characteristic,  but  not 
necessarily favorable to other group members. The model in  this paper is based more 
on an idea  from social psychology, which  attributes  cooperative  behavior to a ··we-
feeling" that cornes from shared social identity.  Simpson (2006, p. 444) describes this 
so-called  social  identity  theory  ·'social  identitication  increases  cooperation  by 
reducing  actors·  tendency  to  draw  distinctions  between  their  own  and  others' 
welfare."  At  the  same  time,  it  has  been  emphasized  that  recognition  of identity 
mismatches  can generate significant discriminatory  behaviour.  Smith (2007)  models 
this phenomenon theoretically in  a large  population with two  well-defined groups,  in 
which  "behavioral"  players  al  ways  discriminate  against  the  other  group,  whi le 
'·rational"  players  face  no  inherent  need  to  do  so.  He  shows  that  in  equilibrium 
rational players may discriminate. 
However, empirical work  seems to  suggest that, at least  in  the kind  of setting 
studied in  the laboratory, in-group favoritism is often  a stronger force than out-group 
discrimination. This  preponderance  seems quite  robust,  replicated.  for  instance,  in 39 
(Yamagishi  and  Mifune  2008);  Koopmans  Rebers  (2009);  Ben-Ner,  McCall, 
Stephane,  Wang (2009);  Ahmed  (2007);  Lemyre Smith ( 1985);  Mackie  and  Cooper 
( 1984); Brewer  ( 1979);  and  Ferguson and  Kelley  ( 1964).  This  in-group  favoritism 
can  manifest  itself  in  many  ways.  For  instance,  Waldzus  et al.  (2005)  show  that 
people  assign  in-group  members  higher  rankings  in  various characteristics  than  out-
group  members;  Ben-Ner,  McCall,  Stephane,  and  Wang  (2009)  show  greater 
conditional cooperation with  in-group members; Kremer and  Brewer ( 1984)  fi nd  that 
in-group  public goods receive greater contributions; Mackie  and  Cooper ( 1984)  that 
hearing in-group members espouse a particular position  makes it  more appealing; and 
Ferguson  and  Kelley ( 1964) that  people  fi nd  products made  by group  members to  be 
of superior quality. ln  a recent paper, (Chen and  Li  2009)  runa wide  battery of tests 
allowing them  to  single  out  severa! motivations.  They  tïnd  evidence  of  in-group 
tàvoritism,  but  also  find  that  in-group  matching results  in  less  envy,  and  a greater 
tendency to choose options that maximize social weltàre.  On  the other hand, it seems 
th at  out-group  discrimination  can  be  primed,  particularly  in  men  (Y uki,  Yokota, 
2009); and  sorne studies have  found  group  status to be  less  relevant to certain results. 
For  instance,  Guth,  Levatti,  Ploner (2009)  tïnd  that  group  status has  little effect on 
trust.  Unsurprisingly for  a phenomenon  based centrally on interpretation.  it  has  been 
found  that  group-based  prefrerences are  susceptible  to priming  and  framing effects 
(Yuki, Yokota,2009,  Hertel  and  Kerr, 200 1, Kramer and  Brewer  1984).  ln  a related 
vein, group  status is  a stronger predictor of behavior when subjects are members of 
real-life minorities (Espinoza Garza,  1985), and  when they are ·'self-uncertain'· (Hogg 
2001 ;  Hogg et  al.  2007).  (Hargreaves  Heap  and  Zizzo  2009)  fi nd  that  groups may 
make people worse off, even though we like cooperating. ln their experimental results 
they fïnd that average trust falls when there are salient groups. although psychological 
benefïts more or less compensate for the  loss in  material wei  fare. It is worth noting as 
weil that many ofthese cited studies use the MPG framework (Tajfel.  1971 ).  in which 
individuals are  randomly assigned  to  groups on the basis of sorne bogus test.  Pinter 
(2006) surveys this and  other methods of inducing minimal  groups, determining that 40 
memorization  of  arbitrary  identifiers  both  increases  group  identification  and 
incidentally,  eliminates  the deception  involved  in  some other methods.  That  is the 
methodology used  in the experiment described in this paper. 
To  sum  up  the  place  of  this  mode!  in  the  literature,  then,  the  theoretical 
literature  on  cheap  talk  largely  seeks  instrumental  reasons  for  in formation 
transmission,  while  this  work  looks  at  the  relationship  to  normative  incentives. 
Experimental  work on cheap talk  and  lying usually has  one informed party and  one 
potential  liar, and  usually focuses on talk about  intentions,  rather than types.  Here  1 
posit bilateral cheap talk as a coordination mechanism on types. This comes  from the 
interpretation of talk as a method of signalling group affiliation. ln  fact, the literature 
on normative  incentives  has  so  far dealt  little with  group  affiliation. Psychologists 
investigate  the  strength  and  robustness  of  the  phenomenon,  but  always  with 
objectively observable (not self-identified)  groups.  The literature on group affiliation 
rarely seeks to investigate under what conditions groups can be identitied, which is 
the main  focus of  the current work. 
1.3  Mode! 
1.3. 1  Introduction 
A continuum of  agents lives on the perimeter of a unit circle
17
• The point occupied by 
a particular agent  will  be considered her type.  Types  are not  ordered, but  they  are 
different.  Assume that the  players share a language,  which consists of a conventional 
zero-point  on the circle,  so  that each can make  an understandable indication of any 
given type as  a point in  the interval [0, 2Tr).  The distance  between two  points x and y 
can be  measured as the minimum arc length between them. denoted  6{x. y). or sim  ply 
17  Or a more general symmetric structure.  The objective is that every point be surrounded by  an cqual 
mcasure of other points. 41 
()  where  possible.  The  maximum  distance  between  any  two  points  is therefore  :rr. 
Agents are distributed around the circle according to a positive, continuous and '·not-
too-steep"  density  function f  For  expositional  clarity,  1 will  make  the  stronger 
assumption 
Simplification 1  :f = l/(2:rr); that is, that the distribution is uniform. 
Agents are drawn by sorne "cosmopolitan" procedure and  paired (i andj) for an 
interaction.  By cosmopolitan, 1 mean that they have a good chance of meeting people 
from ali over the circle.  Again  for exposition, 1  will  make a stronger assumption: 
Simplification 2:  for any individual i of type x and arc of  the circle [a, b], 
Pr[a <l, <hit,  =x]= { f (.:: )d.::  ( 1. 1) 
That is,  draws  are entirely independent.  Combining this with  simplitication  1 
means that the probability of being paired with  another agent  of sorne type between 
any point  a and  b  is  fJ(a.b)/(2:rr).  The selection process  bides  the agents·  types,  so 
these types are effectively private information in what follows. 
The interaction consists of two stages. The last is a PD  game.  whose  payofts 1 
will  denote  by  the  convention  (x(C.C),  x(D,C),  x(C,D),  x(D.D))  =  (R[eward]. 
Tiemptation],  S[ucker],  P[unishment]).  where x(A.B)  is  the  monetary payoff from 
choosing  action  A  when  the  opponent  chooses  action  B.  This  is  preceded  by  a 42 
message stage, where the messages can take any value in [0, 2Jr) n 0
18
. Thus, players 
can send  a message consisting of sorne  point on the circle, or send  no message at ali. 
Messages  will  be  governed  by  - and  interpreted  according  to  - conventional 
(equilibrium)  behaviour.  Although  costless,  they  are  important  because  players· 
utility depends  on  their perception of the opponent's type.  Specifically,  the  closer a 
player  feels  her opponent to  be  on  the  circle,  the  worse  she  feels  for  choosing the 
"selfish" option D in  the PD game.  On  the other hand, people are  proud, and  no  one 
wants  to  be  taken  for  a ·'sucker." The specitic  form  which  1 will  use  for  illustrative 
purposes  is simple: 
'  [  l  Il  (  Il )  Il  1 ', =x, - 1ft  A- gq  1,  - p  l-1,  1,  ( 1.2) 
where  x  E  {R,  T,  S,  P}  is  the  monetary  payoff from  the  PD  game;  rjJ  is a scalar 
measurement  of  the  intensity  of "guilt",  which  diminishes  linearly  from  sorne 
maximum  value A as  e,  the  arc  length between the  opponents.  measured in  radians, 
increases; I/  is an  indicator for choosing D in  the  PD game  for players p = i. j; and  p 
is a "pride'' parameter,  a uti lity-based penalty to  getting the "sucker'' payoff in  the PD 
game.  The  linear form  is not strictly necessary, and  is  adopted  only for  expositional 
convenience.  We  will  see  that  certain  conditions are required for  the results to hold 
with  this  formulation;  other  formulations  would,  naturally,  impose  different 
conditions. 
This general form  of the  mode! is  similar to  a ·'cold  prickle'' as  formulated  by 
(Andreoni  1989), the  moral  cost of doing harm  in  (Deffains and  Fluet  2009). or the 
cost of lying in  (Kartik 2009).  lt differs  from  the altruism-based  conception  that  is at 
the  base of interpretations of social identity theory such  as  (Chen and  Li  2009), but 
yields broadly similar  results, and  has  severa! advantages.  First, it  can  be  interpreted 
IH  Teehnically.  the messages could come from anywhere on  the real tine, and simply be  mapped to the 
[0, 27r]  interval in the obvious way. 43 
as a social  norm, a behavioral rule that the player applies, and  which  the cost-benefit 
analysis  must  overcome.  Much  research  seems  to  confirm  that  this  kind  of  rule 
describes  decision-making  fairly  weil  (L6pez-Pérez  2008).  Second.  it  is  somewhat 
more flexible,  as altruism  parameters are  bound  below  unity. Third, it  can  easily  be 
interpreted  as  a "reduced  form"  version  of other  motivations such  as.  for instance, 
altruism,  the  guilt aversion elaborated  in  (Battigalli and  Dufwenberg 2007;  Battigalli 
and  Dufwenberg 2009), or the "presumption of reciprocity'' alluded to  in  (Yamagishi 
and  Kiyonari  2000).  Fourth, it  does not  rely  on the  opponent's payoff (it  is action-
basee/  or  deontological  as  opposed  to  outcome-based  or  utilitarian);  since  the 
experimental  treatment  does  not  vary  payoffs, this  mode!  seems  a better  tit.  1 will 
assume  that  the  PD  (money-based)  lab  game  structure  exhibits  the  property 
Q = R - S- T + P =  01 9, which  implies  that  a player gets  the  same  benetit  from 
defecting, independently of the opponent's choice. 1 will denote this benefit  . 
1.3.2  Benchmark cases 
As  a  first  benchmark.  consider  the  model's  prediction  when  types  are  perfectly 
observable. Denote the perceived probability that the opponent defects as a. Then as 
a  function  of  this  probability,  (1.2)  implies  that  a  players  have  a  .. zone  of 
cooperation;"  they  will  decide  to  cooperate  with  an  opponent  who  1s  less  than 
distance 
e' (a)= A ~-( L\+ap )  ( 1.3) 
19 Q is a measure of the strategie .. quasi-complementarity  .. of the PD  (money-dcnominated)  !ab  game. 
lf  Q >  0,  then,  while  cooperation  is  always  dominated.  it  is  !css  harmful  when  the  other  also 
coopera  tes.  \\·hich  pushes  players  .. towards ..  strategie  complementarity. 1  r Q <  0,  th en cooperation 
bccomcs  more  harmful  when  the  other  cooperates.  \.V hich  pushes  players  ·'tmYards''  strategie 
substitution. ------------------
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away. Consider the  extreme cases of e*(O)  =Arp- ,1  and  B*( l)  =Arp-(~+  p).  which 
correspond,  respectively, to  the  decision when  playing against someone who is sure 
to cooperate, or who  is sure to  defect.  Notice first  that the  maximum  social distance 
required for cooperation  increases in  the perceived  probability that this opponent wi ll 
defect:  the  zone  of cooperation  contracts as  the  belief of defection grows.  Thus  the 
model generates sorne  reciprocity, since for any player i, there will  be typesj  against 
whom  i  will  cooperate  when  a  is  less  than  sorne  threshold, and  defect  when  it  is 
higher. To take a speci fic - and  important - example, if p > Arp- ,1,  th en e* ( 1)  < 0, 
and  no one will cooperate with a sure defector, regardless of how close they are. This 
primacy  of "pride"  over  "guilt"  seems  to  be  an  intuitive  characteristic  of human 
interaction.  For example, Fernandez-Dols, Aguilar et al.  (20 1  0)  ti nd  that  people rate 
non-contribution to  a public good  as  morally acceptable, tollowing non-contribution 
from others. 1  will therefore maintain the assumption that it holds in the tollowing. 
To  take the opposite example, the  very premise of the model is that  people are 
more 1  ikely to  coopera te  with  th ose towards whom they  feel some social proxim ity. 
This implies that  él(O)  =Arp - ~ E  (0,  ;r). The lower bound  implies that  people will 
cooperate with those to whom  they fee!  close;  the  upper bound  implies that they will 
stop  cooperating  as  the  distance  crosses  sorne  threshold.  Because  distance  is 
reflexive, moreover, a player type who  tinds her opponent is less (more) than distance 
8*(0)  away  can  be  sure  that  the  opponent  will  reach  the  same  conclusion  and 
cooperate (  defect). Th us in the perfectly observable case, these two extreme examples 
exhaust the  possibilities  for  play  except  in  marginal cases of equality, which are  of 
measure zero.  The cooperation zone  can therefore  be  interpreted as  a neighborhood. 
such that ali  agents of type  t wi ll  cooperate  with opponents from within  their zone 
(which will  often  be  referred  to  as  ''neighbors'', and  defect  against opponents  from 
outside the ir zone ("strangers"). The result is summarized below. 45 
Observation 1: With observable types,  the existence ol  in-group bias implies thal () 
< A f/J- LI  < p,  and thot A f/J- LI  <  Tr.  Groups are defined by the  .. coopera/ion :one, .. 
which is calculatedfor any type tas 1 ±  B'(O). 
When  there  is  uncertainty  about  the  opponent's  type,  1 wi ll  assume  players 
perceive utility based on the expected value that type has; agents are  risk-neutral over 
social distance.  As  an  example of particular importance, consider the  case  in  which 
ali types  give  the  same  signal.  Thus  players  have  no  more  information  about  their 
opponents' type after receiving the message than before. This therefore represents the 
converse  benchmark  to  the  perfect  information  setting  described  above.  Given  the 
assumption of complete symmetry among the agents, this means that either everyone 
will  cooperate, or no one will.  ln  neither case wi ll  the "pride'' component of ( 1.2) be 
operative.  ln the case wheref= I/(2Tr), this implies any type wi ll  choose to defèct if 
ff  1 
t. > 2r  ~ ( . 1-::)- d:: 
Jo  2  7f 
or 
( 1  .4) 
which places  an  upper  bound  on  the  difference  between  A ~ and  ~ .  but  does  not 
violate the conditions set out  in  Observation  1.  above.  lt  does  have an  implication  in 
terms of the size of the "cooperation zone", however. Recalling that  e*(O)  = A~ - ~ E 
(0,  li), (1.4)  implies  that  even  under conditions of perfect information,  agents  who 
defect  without  information  will  reciprocate  cooperation  only  with  those  who  are 
closer than 
•  7[ 
B  ( 0) :  .-1  ~ - L'l  <  rjJ  -
2 
( 1.5) 46 
Expression ( 1.5)  implies that  a type  t's "neighborhood"  of t ±8*(0) depends 
positively  on the  strength  of the  guilt  felt  at  defection,  but  cannot  exceed  sorne 
maximum arc length of  <P1r. These points are summarized below. 
Observation 2: ln contexts of  no information, agents will defect when the material 
benefit  is  high  enough.  This  implies  that  in  such  contexts.  the  maximum  social 
distance compatible with cooperation with perfèct information is bounded above at 
<Pw2. 
ln  the  following,  1 will  assume  a context satisfying both  expression ( 1.4)  and  the 
conditions from Observation 1. 
1.3.3  Equilibrium 
The  central idea that 1 wish to explore  in  this paper is that communication fosters 
cooperation by !etting interacting individuals credibly signal  areas of corn mon social 
interest,  which  engenders  a  kind  of conditional  solidarity.  ln  the  terms  of game 
theory,  this  can  be  interpreted  as  a  separating  equilibrium  in  an  appropriately 
specitïed signaling game. The conditions for such an equilibrium  are outlined in  this 
section. lt is weil  known  that these games rarely have unique equilibria. Games where 
the signal is cheap talk have  the additional irritation of babbling equilibria. in  which, 
as described above, everyone ignores  the signais. and (therefore) nobody tries to send 
any worthwhile  information with  them.  The current  mode! is  no  exception to these 
rules.  However,  1  will  focus  on  one  in  particular,  which  corresponds  to  the 
hypothesized  phenomenon  that  people  can  use  cheap-talk  messages  to  credibly 
transmit  unobservable  group  information,  and  th  us  to  coordinate  cooperative 
behavior, conditional on matching types.  Specifica lly,  1 will  consider the  fo llowing 
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1.  For each type x  E  [0, 2;r), the chosen  message is m =x. 
2.  Beliefs  f-1, interpreted as  subjective conditional probabilities,  are such that for 
any x and y in [0, 2;r), 
J1  [ 1 = x lm  = x J  = 1 
,1-1 [x < 1 < y lm  = 0 J  = fi (  z ) dz 
3.  Cooperate iff 6Xm;,  m 1) < 8 *(0) 
These  conditions  describe  action  both  on  and  off  the  equilibrium  path. 
Condition ( 1) sa ys  messages are  honest, and  the  first part of condition (2) sa ys  they 
are taken  as such.  The second  part of condition (2)  says  that silence  (the  only non-
equilibrium  message)  will  be  met  with  uniform  beliefs  around  the  circle,  an 
interpretation  that  is supported  by the  symmetry of the agents  a  priori  when f  = 
1  /(2;r).  Hence, by the assumption that ( 1.4)  holds,  silence  will  meet with  universal 
defection in  the  PD  game, and  is a dominated strategy.  The third  condition implies 
that players will  defect with those they  believe to be neighbors in  the (off-path) cases 
where their own deceptive signal means those neighbors do not recognize  them. and 
thus  will  defect.  This reflects  the  idea that pride is stronger than guilt.  HO\· vever,  it 
may bear more explanation. 
Consider the  case of a deviation in  which a certain  type 1 sends  a message  111 
different  from t, and  then  meets a neighbour  k (of t) who is not neighbours with  the 
announced type m - that  is to  say,  é7X1.  k)  <  tl(O)  <  é7Xm, k). Naturally,  wi ll  k not 
cooperate, since she (incorrectly)  believes t not to be a neighbour. This means that 1 is 
placed  in  the  bind  described at  the  outset.  If she cooperates. she avoids  the gui lt 
associated with  cheating on a neighbour.  This  incentive  would. if the neighbour  in 
question were  also  cooperating,  be  enough  to  get  her  to  do  so.  However.  if she 
cooperates, she will  get the "sucker'' payotr: which stings  her pride. The assumption 48 
that  fl( 1)  < 0 sa ys  that the  second  consideration wins. Th us  the  only  sequentially 
rational  strategy  is  for  t  to  defect, even  though  she  (correctly)  believes k  to  be  a 
neighbour. 
r- rJ" 
m + O 
Strangers 
Figure l.l  Type 1 deviatcs li·om the cquilibrium lü scnd message  111. 
The  remaining  deviations  from  this  equilibrium  concern  the  advantages  of 
sending  "deceptive··  messages.  To  determine  whether agents  will  deviate  from this 
equilibrium,  let  us  consider  the  various effects deviation wi Il  have. The  illustration 
below shows the possible results of a deviation  in  which an individual of type  t sends 
a message of type m,  with  (X_t,  m) :f. O.  Those in  neither t nor  111·s  neighbourhood are 
met  with  defection,  which  they  reciprocate.  1  f  e•(O)  <  JTI2,  th en  each  type· s 
neighborhood con tains strictly less than half the circle, th en the re are guaranteed  to  be 
such  types. Those in  the intersection of the  neighbourhoods (which.  like the  previous 
category. may or may  not exist) are still  treated as  friends (although deceptively so). 
ln  any event, these two  segments of the  circle  are  the  same in  the  equilibrium  as  in 
any deviation, so they wi ll  wash out of the decision. 49 
The determining factor for equilibrium play will  be the difference in  benefit and 
cost  of  the  remaining  two  regions.  To  take  the  cost  first,  those  in  the  t's 
neighbourhood who are not  in m'sare "!ost". The result is mutual defection, resulting 
in  the  P payoff from  the  PD  game,  instead  of R,  as  weil  as  significant  guilt  from 
harming a "close friend". However, there is no  damage to  pride. Following message 
m > t, these people are met with  probability 
m-o· 
Pr(t,-B.(O)<t, <m,-B'(o)IB(t,,m,)=x >O )= f,_
0
.  f(z)J:  (1.6) 
Therefore, the expected net cost of  a deviation is 
m-o' 
r  . [ P -1/! (:::) - R ]  f  (:::) dz  J, _o 
Und er the assumption of a uniform density of agents and the  formulation  from 
( 1.2), this gives 
rl (t  mJ  I.  [  (  P - R)- r/1  ( ..t  - ::) ] /  (::) d:: 
1  1  •'(•  mJ  1 
- lO (!.III)(P - 1?)-r/Jf  (.1- :: )d:: j 
2lf  " 
1 1  (  1  ~ Jl  ;; :·r 1(1.1n)(P - R)-r/J  .10(1.111)-2
o (t .111 )  J 
( 1.  7) 50 
Inspection  shows  th at  ( 1. 7)  is  negative  and  decreasing  for ali  non-negative 
values  of  B. Thus deviation has  a cost, which  increases  with  the magnitude  of the 
deviation envisaged. 
Turning  to  the  benefït  of deviation  from  the  equilibrium,  those  in  m·s 
neighbourhood but  not in t's are "tricked'".  The guilt  from defecting on these  is not 
great  enough to  restrain  t,  and  since  these  people (erroneously)  believe  t  to  be a 
neighbour, they will  cooperate.  The result  is that t receives  monetary payoff T, the 
highest possible.  Further, the (modest) guilt cost of  doing so is paid  in  the equilibrium 
action, as  weil  as in any deviation, and so wi ll  not temper the net benefït of deviation. 
And  again, the deviator feels no  attack on his pride, although the violated party wi ll. 
Focusing  on  the  case  with  m  >  t,  these  people  wi ll  be  met  with  probability 
(~,::'  ./ (= )d= .  This  is  clearly  an  arc  of  the  same  size  as  that  in  ( 1.6).  Th  us,  the 
probabilities  will  be the same  when  the distribution  is  uni form. The expected  net 
benetit of  a deviation is 
B( t,m) 
(T- P)__:_~ 
2 Tr 
( 1.8) 
which increases  linearly with  the magnitude of the deviation. The overall  effect of a 
deviation of size  (] is therefore 
( 
~  l)  1  ( T- R- ~ .1  )B - -B  - . 
2  2Tr 
( 1.  9) 
One  can take  the derivative  of ( 1.  9)  with respect  to  deviation angle  (), to  fi nd the 
optimum deviation. The  FOC  is  8 = (T- R)l ~ - A, subject to 0 < ()  < Jr.  The SOC  is 
satistied,  since  the  form  of (1.9)  is  a downward-opening parabola.  This  in  itself  is 
interesting,  since  it  means  that  under any  parametric  restrictions  (maintaining  the 
simplifications on the functional forms)  there is an optimum  deviation.  ln  this case. 51 
that  optimum  is  zero.  Notice  that  T - R  <  T - P  =  tl < ~A  by  the  parametric 
restrictions above,  so  that  ( 1.9)  is  always  negative,  and  no  deviation  can  ever  give 
greater utility than the equilibrium. Thus conditions  1-3  above constitute a sequential 
equilibrium of the model. This is summarized below. 
Proposition  1:  ln  contexts  where  (a)  agents  defect  against  unknown 
opponents, and (b)  agents cooperate with ident!fiable opponents conditional 
on  believing  they  come from  within  the  social  neighborhood dejined  by 
f:l'(O),  there exists  a Perfect Bayesian  Equilibrium satislving conditions (1)-
(3).  above. 
lt is worth noting that there are other equilibiria.  For  instance, as  in  most cheap 
talk contexts, if it  is expected that messages will  hold  no  information, then  there will 
exist a host  of weak  "babbling" Nash  equilibria  in  which  players  may  pool  on  one 
message or none, or randomize their messages  to  say  whatever they  wish,  since  the 
result  will  be  the  same  in  any case:  universal defection in  the  PD  (under condition 
( 1.4)). This equilibrium  is Pareto dominated by the revealing equilibrium described  in 
conditions  ( 1  )-(3).  But  moreover, one  can  follow  Rabin  and  Farrell  to suggest that, 
given  we  are  assuming  a  common  language.  babbling  equilibria  in  this  case 
correspond  to  willfully  ignoring  the  standard  meaning of words.  The  equilibrium  in 
conditions ( 1  )-(3)  is in a way bi laterally self-signal  ing: if any pair cou  Id  agree to trust 
each other" s messages, then neither would have  an  incentive to lie. 
1.4  A d iscrete version of the mode!. 
We  have shown above that the equilibrium exists, and  in  many contexts the ability to 
identify oneself may  weil  make  it  focal, so  it  seems natural to  think  that  people may 
actually  play  it.  The  second  purpose  of this  paper  was  to  test  the  theory  in  an 
experimental  treatment.  However.  establishing  a  continuous  social  landscape 
experimentally is a difficult proposition. lndeed, with a finite number of subjects it  is 52 
logically impossible. Therefore,  in  this section 1 adapt  the  model to a similar, yet 
slightly different,  discrete setting
20
.  Rather than  have a continuous  distribution of 
types  around  the circle,  1 let the  distribution  be "lumpy", although 1 maintain  the 
overall  symmetry.  The  literature  on the  minimal group  paradigm discussed above 
suggests that assigning people the same group  marker causes  them to automatically 
fonn  some in-group  preference.  ln  the mode! above,  the "group" that  types  identify 
with  on  a  behavioral  leve!  is  their  neighborhood,  or  cooperation  zone,  and  is 
established  endogenously  as  a  function  of  the  parameters  of  social  distance 
preferences.  ln  the  minimal  group  paradigm,  by  contrast,  these  groups  are 
exogenously imposed. Since  the  main  phenomenon 1 wish to  test  is the ability to 
credibly transmit  group  information as  cheap  talk  given the behavioral preferences. 
the transition from endogenous to exogenous groups is without  much theoretical cost. 
On the other hand, it has considerable practical benetit, as it is at the very !east a more 
established method of creating experimental group identities  to say  '·Subjects  X, Y 
and  Z are in group t" than to say "Subjects X, Y and Z are in  positions t - 1, t and  t + 
1." 
lt  is also  plausible that in  many social situations,  the groups to which people 
belong are more discrete than the continuous distribution above suggests. Of course. 
there are  many possible criteria on which a person may have greater or lesser social 
proximity.  A given person may  be  a man. father, athlete. artist, academie, vegetarian 
and  southerner, and  identi fy  differently on ali  those dimensions.  As  the number of 
dimensions  of  discrete  differentiation  possible  increases,  in  the  limit  the  total 
diftèrence  will  become continuous. However, for practical cases. there wi ll  still  be a 
discrete number of  different combinations of identification possible. 
20  This mode! is  a simplified  version  of Spicgelman (2009).  Most of the results  remain qualitativcly 
unchanged when assumptions such as equal-sized groups are relaxed. 53 
1.4.1  Mode! adaptation 
Let the  density f of the  population on the circle be adjusted to have  zero measure 
except  at some finite  number P of points,  each of which represents  an individual or 
persan.  Further,  let  these  people  be  organized  into  T  arbitrarily  small,  non-
overlapping regions called groups,  located at intervals around  the perimeter. The set 
of groups is G, and a typical person i will belong to group g; EG =  {g,  . .... g;,  ... gr}. 
Each group  is related  to some others.  ln  terms of the previous version of the 
madel, this relationship  refers to the "close" ones,  such that for individuals i and j, 
6(i. j) < 8*(0). Since the groups are located on very small  intervals,  fl..i, j) =  fl..g;,  g;). 
for ali  i and), and  1 will  assume that for any individuals i. j.  k and  n such that g; = gk 
and  g1 =  gn  fl..i, j) <  19*(0) <=>  fl..k,n) < 19*(0). Thus the ·'close" relationship  is detined 
on groups.  Stated differently,  this relationship  induces  a graph  on d
1
•  Groups are 
vertices;  edges  represent  the  ·'close'· relationship  1 will  refer to as  being a neighbor, 
friend or team member. The co llection of groups to whom persan i is close (a  group 
including g;) will  be known as i's social neighborhood, and will  be noted  N;.  Yertices 
that are unconnected are  strangers. As  above,  individuals from this  population meet 
tor an interaction consisting of ( 1) a message  and  (2)  an action in  a subsequent  PD 
game. To parallel the simplifications above, 1 will  make the to llowing assumptions: 
•  The measure of each persan is  1 1  P 
•  Each group  contains  an  equal number  of individuals,  denoted  p.  Thus the 
measure of each group  is pl P. 
•  N and 7W are both non-empty for ali  groups. 
~ 1  Formally,  the  relation  can  be  described by  a set of indicator functions  gcnerating a vector  :'llg = 
[ N~' ( 1)  N ~'(2) ... N ~' ( DJ.  The interpretation is that when  N~'(k) =  1, group k is part of group g·s nctwork, 
or neighborhood. However, the formality adds little to the discussion at this point. 54 
•  The graph  is symmetric, or the groups are equally spaced on the circle, so that 
ali  groups have neighborhoods of the  same size. The number of groups  in 
one's neighborhood including one 's  own will, with  sorne abuse  of notation. 
also be cal  led N. 
•  The selection probability distribution is uniform over the whole population. 
These assumptions imply th at the prior probabil ity of meeting a friend  is 
F =  ~ (N - ~ ) 
T  p 
As  the population P ri ses, this converges to the fraction of the population comprising 
the player's neighborhood. 
1.4.2  The interaction structure 
ln  the  message stage of the interaction, the two  selected individuals simultaneously 
emit statements m  from a set of possible statements (a vocahulory ) with  cardinality 
greater than  T.  These  statements may  in equilibrium  serve  to  identify  the sender's 
group  membership
22
• Since by assumption ali  individuals are identical within a group, 
they will  ali  have the same strategie considerations, and  there can never be any strict 
equilibrium in  which members of  a group send di fferent signais. A vocabulary ofsize 
T is  necessary to allow  the  possibility that each group  uniquely  identifies  itself in 
equ ilibrium,  wh  ich can  be  considered a  very conservative  assumption  in  contexts 
where  messages  come  from  natural  languages  or  other  signs  invented  by  the 
individuals.  ln  both  of these cases.  the cardinality of the message space  is hard  even 
to define.  The extra messages allow  for the possibility of "silence,'' taking the place 
of the em  pt  y message in  the continuous-space model. 
22  Notice that here  1 skirt what Farrell  and Rabin ( 1996)  refer to as the ··inesscntial'' multiplicity of 
cquilibria  in  cheap  talk  games.  With  n  groups choosing  bctween  n  +  1 messages,  the  number of 
possible separating equilibria is n 1• lt matters little which particular group selects which message, from 
a formai point of view.  Howevcr, in most rcal-world scenarios the choicc wou  id be tightly restricted by 
the literalmeaning of the messages in question. 55 
Following the  message stage, the selected people play a PD game.  l will  not, in 
this  section, assume  that  Q = R - T- S  + P  =  0,  but  will  maintain  the  standard 
assumption that T > R > P > S. The utility payoff is equal to the material payof( plus 
a normative  utility component similar to that described above. Because  1 am defining 
the  neighborhood  as  containing  all  those  groups  inside  the  threshold  of  ()  \ 0),  it 
follows  that  the  normative  incentive  is  not  strong  enough  to  induce  cooperation 
between  strangers.  Thus  1 can  equivalently  assume  that  there  is  no  (signiticant) 
normative  incentive  of  "guilt",  except  between  neighbors.  To  economize  on 
parameters, 1 will also drop the '"pride" aspect of  the mode!. 
As  in the previous section, the basic assumption is that, if a player chooses D in 
the  PD game when faced  with  a neighbor, she  pays some utility penalty K,  and  pays 
another penalty  whenever she  receives  the  "sucker''  payment, S.  The cheating-cost 
uti 1  ity function is 
(  )  (  ) 
/> N 
U  A,, :1
1  = x,  .·1,, .·1,  - ~  1  1  ,  ( 1.1 0) 
where P is an  indicator variable  taking a value of  1 if player i chooses  D,  and  0 
otherwise, l is an indicator for common group affiliation. 
To summarize, the structure of the game is as follows: 
•  Nature  chooses  two  individuals  from  G  according  to  an  i.i.d.  probability 
distribution.  which  induces  prior beliefs  for each  individual on  the other's 
unobservable type. 
•  The  chosen  individuals  simultaneously  produce  observable  messages.  and 
update  the ir  beliefs  about  the  opponent' s  type  based  on  the  equilibrium 
distribution of messages ac ross types. 56 
•  They  then  play  a  PD  game,  and  receive  monetary  payoffs.  If  the  payoffs 
provide more  information about the opponent' s type, th en bel iefs are  updated 
agam. 
•  Players experience utility based on their posterior beliefs about the opponent's 
type, as 
V, = L (  11 , 1  rn , . A, ) U ( .·J, . ri , 1 g , E  N, ) 
JE N , 
( 1.1  1) 
where fi is the  posterior belief given observed message m and  action A chosen 
from  C  and  D,  and  the  difference  between  the  two  utility  functions  is 
determined  by  the  normative  incentive. Notice  that  ''along  the  path''  of a 
separating equilibrium, given a message m; that is sent  in  equilibrium  by those 
in  group g;,  Jlj = 0 for ali gi :tg; 
Before  moving on to the  equilibrium  with  messages, it  is  worth establishing 
severa!  benchmark  results.  ln  the  full  mode! below,  the  information about  neighbor 
status may  be  uncertain, as  it  relies on cheap talk  signais. This can be compared with 
(a)  behavior when the information about neighbor status is certain, which  is a kind of 
··best  case  scenario", and  (b)  an  analogous  ·\vorst case  scenario" when  there  is no 
information  about  the  neighbor  status  - the  babbling  condition.  ln  equilibrium. 
babbling should  correspond  to a ·'worst case  scenario", since when players  have  the 
option of silence (or of complete randomization between messages)  no  one will se nd 
a message that yields an expected utility less than the "no information'' scenario. 
Taking  the  worst-case  scenario  tirst, and  recalling  that  F was  detined  as  the 
prior probability (assumed equal  for  ali  groups) of meeting a neighbor. the  expected 
utility from  cooperating, when  there  is  a subjective  probability  a that the  opponent 
defects, is 57 
EU ( C la  )  =  ( 1 - a ) R + aS  ( 1.1 2) 
The expected utility from defecting is 
EU ( D la  )  =  ( 1  - a ) T + a P - F · 1\.  (1.1 3) 
Subtracting ( 1.1 3) from ( 1.12), we find  that cooperation is rational as long as 
K  > Jo: ,:,.  =7[(1 -a)(T-R)+a(l'- . '> )]  ( 1.14) 
This expression shows that the "threshold  of indiftèrence'" value the normative 
incentive  must surpass  in  order to generate cooperation depends,  in  general, on the 
expected play of the opponent.  Admitting that ail  agents are symmetric,  suppose,  for 
instance, that everyone would  cooperate against a completely unknown (for instance, 
·'babb1ing," or simply unobservable) other.  This  implies that a = 0, so it  requires that 
K > (T- R)IF- the normative  incentive  not to cheat, weighted by the probability that 
it applies, must be greater than the material incentive to do so. 
On the other hand, suppose babbl  ing leads to  defection. Th  en a= 1, so  ( 1.1 4) 
implies that K < (P - S)l F.  Notice  that these conditions need not ·'match up".  1  f (T-
R) >  (P - S)  (i.e.,  Q >  0, or strategie quasi-complementarity),  then  for F K  in  the 
interval  between  them,  actions  become  strategie  complements,  so  that  there  are 
multiple pure-strategy  equilibria  without  communication.  Players will  cooperate  in 
cases where they think it  is expected, and will defect when they think that is expected. 
If the inequality is reversed, i.e., Q  < 0, then the condition that (T- R) < FK < 
(P- S)  implies  that actions are strategie substitutes  at the utility  leve!, so  that there 
exists  only a mixed-strategy  (though potentially degenerate  at  a= 1) equil ibriurn 
without messages, with pro babil ity of cooperation 
s - ,. +  ,  .. . f,:  ( 1. 1  5) 
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ln  summary,  if  Q  >  0,  then  there  will  always  be  a  range  of normative 
parameters  such  that  in  the  utility-denominated  game  actions  are  strategie 
complements;  if Q < 0, the  utility-denominated  game  will  have a region of strategie 
substitutabi lity.  If  Q =  0,  th en  the  material  incentives  do  not  depend  on  the 
opponent's  play,  and  players  will  defect  if  and  only  if 
K < (T-R)IF. 
lncidentally, consider what  happens as  one becomes  more certain  that  one is 
faced  with  a  friend,  that  is,  as  F  rises  towards  1.  This  reduces  the  threshold  for 
rational cooperation in  ( 1.14), and  also the  mixed-strategy equilibrium  probability in 
( 1.15).  The  first  effect reflects the fact  that the  normative incentive weighs heavier 
when  it  has a higher probability of binding;  this translates  into the  second  by tilting 
the  threshold  of  indifference  between  actions  towards  cooperation.  Another 
consequence  of  an  increase  in  F  is  a  widening  of  the  range  of  strategie 
complementarity or substitution, when  Q -:t  O.  When  tàced with a sure  friend,  one can 
simply eliminate  Fin the  formulas above.  For  the  results that  follow, 1 wi ll  parallel 
( 1.4) by assuming (P- S) < FK  < (T- R). 
1.4.3  Equilibrium  results 
Formally, consider the equilibrium candidate: 
•  Each group sends a distinct message in the communication stage 
•  Posterior beliefs, conditional on an observed  message. are degenerate on 
the group that sends that message  in  equilibrium 
•  For  any message  not assigned  to  any group  (otT-equilibrium  play.  or 
·'silence"), posterior beliefs are evenly distributed across ali  groups. 59 
•  Players cooperate in the PD game if and ont y if each receives a message 
sent by a neighbor in equilibrium. 
Severa!  comments  about  this  potential  equilibrium  are  in  order.  First,  the 
distinct messages sent  may  not  be  unique.  Depending on the total set of available 
messages,  there  may  be arbitrarily  many ways  for each group  to  identi fy  itself.  ln 
other words,  the function mapping messages to types need not be bijective.  HO\N ever 
it  is  without  loss  of  generality  to  redefine  messages  so  th at  it  is. 
23  Second,  the 
condition that "silence" is  met with a uniform  belief ac ross  types can be jus  ti fied by 
the symmetry of groups.  If we  relax  the assumption that ali  groups are symmetric, 
this  part  of the  equilibrium  !oses  sorne  of  its  plausibility.  Finally,  white  the 
assumption that the normative  incentive binds only with  group  members is enough to 
en  sure  th at  players  will  defect  along  the  equ  i  1  ibrium  pa th  if they  me  et  someone 
claiming to  be a stranger, the last equilibrium  condition also says that players will 
defect if met with "silence", which requires a si  ightly stronger parametric constraint. 
Notice  that since any group  message will  lead someone to cooperate, which in 
turn  raises the monetary payoffa player receives  regardless ofher action, .. silence'' is 
13  l also skirt again the "incssential" multiplicity of cqu il ibria,  which comcs from  the fact that thcrc is 
no "natural language·•  imposcd. The set of messages is qui te arbitrary:  any  message could  a priori  be 
chosen to designate any group. This means that any scparating equil ibrium  wc  dcscribc is actually a 
family of n1 permutations on the signais sent. This may  be representative  of the arbitrary  nature of 
many  group  affi liation signais - the colorcd handkerchiefs used by  L.A.  gang mcmbcrs in  the  1980s 
and  1990s,  for  example.  However,  there are many other cases where ce1 1ain  signal choiccs  arc made 
sa lient  by  institutional detail  outside  the  structure of the  interaction.  For  instance, being a  Mac  or 
Linux cnthusiast is not arbitrary,  but  rather influenced  by  the profcssional and  rccreational uses  the 
computer is putto.  In  these  cases, the signal - perhaps a penguin  stickcr on a backpack - is ··choscn" 
as  a signal of a certain  social affi liation in  a relatively non-arbitrary way  (although the pcnguin  itsclf 
arguably remains arbitrary).  Without this ki nd of guidance  it is difficult to sce how a numbcr of groups 
of any significant  size could  realistically coordinate on fu ll separation. ln the  formai devclopment 1 
will  not co nec rn  my  self with  thcsc problcms. A separa  ting cquilibrium will  assume su mc  inst itutional 
mcchanism for determining exactly which group signais whieh message. 60 
never  an  optimal strategy.  Thus  any  deviation that  led  to a  higher  utility than the 
equilibrium  would  have  to  involve an explicitly deceptive strategy, for example the 
announcement  of  a  group  membership  other  than  one's  own.  The  equilibrium 
therefore  holds  as  long  as  no  type  has  can  expect  a  higher  utility  by  sending  a 
message used by sorne other type. 
The intuition for the equilibrium is the fo llowing.  Deviation will  be believed in 
the  equilibrium,  so  each  individual  has  a  chance  to  "trick"  her  opponent  by 
announcing a different  group  from her own. This  kind  of deviation has  costs and 
benefits. To  clarify each, consider the  figure below. The true type is noted i and  the 
declared type is noted m. The vertices and edges of the graph  induced by N have been 
suppressed,  but  the neighborhoods of the true and  announced types are indicated by 
ovals. 
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Figure 1.2  Message m different from true group affi liation i. 
By declaring himself to be of group  m, individual i faces the fo llowing results.  Other 
opponents in regions wi ll  believe (erroneously)  that i is a neighbor and thus they wi ll 
cooperate with  i.  Player i, by contrast,  bel ieves (  correctly) th at they are strangers. and - ---- ------ - -
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can therefore defect, earning the  highest possible payoff and  feeling no disutility  for 
doing  so.  This  is  the  benefit  of  deviation,  and  clearly  depends  on  the  specifie 
deviation undertaken.  On  the other hand, individuals from region l will  (erroneously) 
believe  that i is a stranger, and  will  therefore defect.  According to  the equilibrium, i 
will  return this favor, also defecting, even though he (correctly) believes individuals 1 
to be  neighbors. Thus he loses  the cooperative  monetary payoff, and  also  feels the 
psychological burden of defecting against friends. The equilibrium  will  stand if the 
benefit of deviation is outweighed by the cost. 
Formally,  the equilibrium utility 
V" = N 1r cc + ( 1  - N ) 1r " "  = (  1 + r )  1r ,.,. + ( t + s ) ;r " "  ( 1.1 6) 
must  be  greater  than the  deviation  utility  for ali  messages  111  di fferent  from  that 
prescribed for one"s own group by the equilibrium. 
V" = max [r(m) JT,.,. + I( JT 1"' - K) + sJT 1w  + IJT 111 , ] 
/111- / 
( 1.17) 
Subtracting ( 1.1 7) from ( 1.1 6) to  ftnd  the net benetït of following the equil ibrium.  we 
ti nd 
V,. : - v,,  =  1 ( 111 .  ) ( ;r ,., . - JT ,,  + K ) + s ( 111 .  )  ( JT ,,,,  - JT ,,. )  ( 1.1 8) 
for the 111 • that maximizes ( 1.17). lt is enough easy to show that, when ali  groups have 
the symmetric neighborhoods, the probability of meeting an individual 1 is the same 
as the probabi 1ity of meeting an  individual s. Their value will depend on the deviation 
message  m.  lntuitively,  we can say  that  the  "farther·· the  message is  from the true 62 
group, the larger these values wi ll  be
24
.  Defining a function d(m) as that distance, and 
another function  çb(d)  as the value that /-and by extensions- take for a distance d, 
we can re-write the net benefit of non-deviation as a function of the distance between 
the true group and the announced group, 
( 1.19) 
The function  rp  is non-negative, since  it  is a probability.  lt  is also  increasing in  d. The 
term  in  square  brackets  we  recognize  as  the  condition  for  cooperating with  a sure 
friend.  If  it  is  positive,  then  the  material  benefit  of defection  in  the  PD  game  is 
outweighed  by  the  normative  cost  of cheating  a  neighbor.  Therefore,  expression 
( 1.19)  tells  us that, as  long  as  it  is  worth cooperating with  a friend,  it  is also  worth 
announcing your true group affiliation  in  simultaneous announcements.  Not only that, 
but the  farther away from  the  truth  is the deviation considered  to  be.  the worse  it will 
seem by comparison. This is summarized below. 
Proposition 2:  Costless signaling can generale positive cooperation rates by 
enabling coordination with otherwise-unobservable group members. 
An Example: 
Consider a set of five  equally sized groups A to  E,  matched  to play a PD game 
with the payoff matrix below. 
Table l.l  Example payoffbi-matrix 
c  D 
c  8  Il 
8  0 
D 
0  5 
1  1  5 
24 This  distance  can  be  more  formally  defined  in  graph-thcoretic  tcrms as  the  minimum  number  of 
ncighbors required to pass from  vertex i to vertex m of the graph th at the ncighborhoods inducc on  G. 63 
Suppose their neighborhood structure is ring-shaped, so  in  addition to its own 
members,  each group  is neighbors with  two  others.  ln  Figure  1.3, arrows  represent 
the neighbor relationship, and the dashed shape is B's neighborhood. 
'  '  '  ' 
'  '  '  ' 
E 
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'  '  ' 
---------------------
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Figure 1.3  Diagram of the discrete case 
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Under these assumptions, Q =  2, and  N, the probability of meeting a neighbor 
with  independent draws, is 0.6
25
.  For simplicity, suppose the messages are A to F.  in a 
language where each group  is "supposed  ..  to identify itself with  its own letter and  the 
letter F represents silence. Consider tirst what happens if everyone remains si  lent. ln 
this case,  if there  is cooperation, then credible  messages  can only reduce  players· 
utility, and thus clearly cannot be part of any equilibrium. since for the equilibrium to 
stand, we  require  non-cooperation without signais.  Applying expression  ( 1.1 4).  we 
tind that this implies 
25  Again. this holds asymptotically. 1  5 
K  < -(Jr00 - " en )= -(5-0) 
N  3 
25 
K  < -
3 
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( 1.20) 
This  means,  with  dollar-valued  payofts,  that  the  equilibrium  will  requtre 
cooperation with group members to  be worth  less than $25/3 =  $8.34, which  seems a 
conservative assumption. Turning to  the  equilibrium  utility,  the  value of the  tenn  of 
(1.19)  in  square  brackets  is  [Il -8 + K]  =  3 + K, so  the  equilibrium  wi ll  hold  for 
those who have 3 < K < 25/3. Note that 1  =  s =  0.2  in this example. More specitically, 
there are three kinds of message  possible: players may declare  their true  group; they 
may declare to  be a neighbor; or they may declare to  be a stranger. The symmetry of 
the  group arrangement implies that it does not matter which  neighbor or stranger you 
choose. The expected utility in each case is the following 
34 
U,.,,. =  Nff,.,. + (1- N )!["" = -
5 
1  2  2  .HJ-21(  u  = - ![ .  +-![  +-(ff  1() ----
\' l /'tlllg  5  ( (  5  /l(  5  /)/)  - - 5 
( 1.2 1  ) 
As  noted  above,  as  long  as  K >  3,  these  uti lities  are  decreasing  in  the  distance 
between  the  true and  declared group  membership. There will  be  an  '·extra" message 
in  the  equilibrium  that will  not  be  reached  with  positive  probability.  and  to which 
Bayes' Rule can therefore not be applied. A convenient and  intuitive  response to this 
will be to assign equal probability to each group off the equilibrium path. following a 
message ofF. Convenient  because,  given the result  above,  it  contirms that  anyone 
who chooses F wi ll  be  met with  defection  in  the  PD stage, which  minimizes the  risk 65 
that  anyone  will  choose  that  deviation.  Intuitive  because  the  basic  symmetry  of ali 
groups leaves no reason to assume one is more likely than another to  keep si  lent. 
1.4.4  Extension to sequential messages 
One  limitation  of the  applicability of the  mode!  above  to  social  interactions  is  the 
simultaneous  nature  of  the  communication.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  messages 
which  are  chosen  before the  interaction  (a style of dress,  for  example), and  cannat 
therefore be changed. However, in  many cases one  message  is  sent  before  the  other. 
For  instance, the  salesman  at  the  door  with  whom  this  paper  opens  observes  the 
signais  of  the  resident's  parental  status  before  displaying  his  own.  Intuitive 
consideration  of this  example  suggests  that  he  may  imitate  the  resident  in  order  to 
benefit  from  a social  proximity that is,  in  fact, not ali  that  important to him. lndeed. 
this  ·'parroting"  behavior  seems  a  plausible  enough  social  phenomenon  that  it  is 
worth brietly expanding the scope of the mode!- and empirical veritication to follow 
- in order to incorporate it. 
Suppose, then, that the players send  their messages one after the other, and  that 
the  second  sender  (he)  can  observe  the  message  sent  by  the  first  (she).  before 
choosing  what  to  say  in  reply.  In  this case,  if the  second  message  sender believes 
(somewhat naively) that the first will cooperate with those who claim  to be neighbors. 
and  defect  on  others,  then  his  incentives  are  clear:  always  send  a  message 
corresponding  to  one  of the  first  sender's neighbors.  This  message  will  be truthful 
whenever the pair are,  in  fact, neighbors, and  will  be deceptive  in ali other cases. This 
belief is  naïve,  however, because  the  first  sender, understanding that  everyvne will 
claim  to  be  one  of  her  neighbors,  will  treat  the  message  received  as  utterly 
uninfonnative. Since it was  required above that players without any information will 
always defect  in  the subsequent  PD  game.  such seems to  be  the  inevitable result for 
the  first message sender.  Furthermore,  invoking the assumption that pride is stronger 
than  guilt,  even  a  second-sender  who  is  a  true  neighbor  will  defect.  under  the 
certainty  that  defection  awaits  from  the  first.  Thus  cooperation  does  not  seem  to 66 
survive sequential messages. ln terms ofthe messages sent,  the  fact  that they  remain 
uninterpreted means that there  is  no reason  to send  one more  than another.  However, 
in  a context  where  messages  have  literai  (or  at  least conventional)  meanings,  the 
"naïve" strategy of one's own type may be  focal  wou  Id "formative'· be  better?  for the 
first sender, and  imitation of it by the second sender. 
1.5  Experimental Procedures 
1.5.1  Empirical background: 
For  nearly  40  years  social  psychologists  and  other  social  scientists  have  run 
experiments testing the  strength of in-group bias.  Many of these  follow  the  minimal 
group paradigm (MPG),  first  elaborated  by Tajifel  et al.  (1971).  ln  the  MPG,  in-
group  bias  is  demonstrated  in  completely arbitrary  groups,  which are  themselves 
artifacts  of the  experimental  procedure.  The  procedure  for  inducing  the  group 
membership  varies  with  the  study.  Pinter  (2006)  provides a survey  and  a  test  of 
different  protocols.  The  method employed here  reflects  his results.  The subsequent 
literature  is  vast.  largely  trying  to  investigate  the  determinants  and  scope  of this 
phenomenon.  ln the process the phenomenon itsel  f has been  fou nd  highly robust. Part 
of the  interest in  the current project was an additional  replication of the  effect, under 
conditions of ''diffuse'' groups and  imperfect information on whether one is in  fact 
playing against an in-group or an out-group member. 
1.5.2  Hypotheses and treatments 
The  theoretical mode!  above  presents severa! empirical  predictions concerning how 
information  about  group  membership  wi ll  affect  behavior.  For  some  range  of 
parameter values, in  particular, one should see that players 
•  Do  not  cooperate  if they  do  not  know  the  group  membership  of their  co-
player,  or  if they  know  that  their  co-player  is  not  a  member  of their 
neighborhood 67 
•  Cooperate  if they  know  (exogenously)  that their  co-player is a  member of 
their neighborhood 
•  When  given  the  opportunity,  send  ''truthful''  messages,  which  correctly 
identify their group 
•  Coopera te if the  ir co-player sends them a signal showing neighbor statu s. 
ln  addition,  we saw above  that  in  a sequential  information setting,  in  which one 
player (a  leader) sends a message  first, and the other (the  fo llower) replies  with a 
message  only  after  having  seen  that  sent  by  the  leader,  then  messages  become 
meaningless.  Given the prediction above about  non-cooperation without  in formation. 
we can therefore now add another prediction: Player should also 
•  Not cooperate when information is passed sequentially, 
And  followers may weil 
•  Imitate the leaders with  their messages when messages are sequential. 
These predictions are tested in the experiment using the fo llowing four treatments. 
Tl: observable  groups.  Experimenters inform  subjects of the group  membership  of 
their co-player. This treatment establishes the in-group  bias. 
T2:  no group  information. Subjects  play  the game .. blind"  as  to whether their  co-
player  comes  from the  same  neighborhood  or  not. This  treatment  establishes  the 
ben  ch  mark of uncooperative action in the PD ga me. 
T3:  simultaneous  cheap  talk.  Experimenters  allow  subjects  to  send  a  "message'' 
consisting of one group  identification to  each other  be fore playing the game. 8oth 
players decide  which  message to  send  before seeing which  was  sent  by the other.  A 
·'truthful'' message will be  one where the  group  identitication sent  in the  message  is 
the  same as  the  group  to  which  the  player has  been  allocated. This treatment shows 68 
whether such signaling is credible (i.e.,  people  send  truthful  messages), and  whether 
it  is believed (the in-group bias is maintained when the messages are "cheap talk .. ). 
T4:  sequential  cheap  talk.  This  treatment  is  essentially  a  robustness  check.  One 
subject (a follower) sees the other's (the initiator's)  message before sending her own. 
Both  messages  are  seen  before  the  game  is  played. ln  this case,  the  madel  predicts 
that the  initiator's message should  be  truthful, and  the  followers·  should  be  truthful 
only if the  groups actually match. The  follower's message.  in  fact.  should  al ways  be 
from the same team as the initiator's. 
1.5.2. 1 Hypotheses: 
These  predictions translate  into  severa!  null  hypotheses  about  the  data  that emerge 
from  the  treatments.  The  variables  of interest  are:  the  cooperation  rates  p,'  and 
p ;~  which wi ll  be defined as the proportion of subjects who choose (A)  in  treatment  T, 
conditional  on  being  matched  with  (N)eighbors  and  with  (S)trangers.  respectively; 
and  v/  the  aggregate  rate  at  which  players  send  truthful  messages,  by  role  type 
(in itiator and  follower).  ln T3, ali types  wi ll  be considered to be  initiators, since there 
are no followers. The specifie hypotheses are as  fo llows: 
H  1:  p,'  >  p;' : The overall  cooperation rate  is greater when  matched  with  neighbors 
(in-group bias) 
H2:  p,'  = p,'  for X= S.  N:  The cooperation  rate  in Tl  is the same as  in TJ (cred ible 
messages),  conditional  on meeting an in-group member (or someone who claims  to 
be one) 
H3:  r ~ =  p ,' = p;'  :  lnitiators should  ignore the  messages of followers,  and  play as  if no 
information  were  transmitted.  Followers,  knowing  this,  will  also  be 
uncooperative. 
H4:  vJ";' > vl": players  send  truthful  messages  in  T3,  and  fo llowers  do  not  send 
truthful messages in T4 69 
1.5.3  Specifie methodology 
Subjects were  recruited  using  the  ORSEE  system  (Greiner, 2004)  by the  CIRANO 
Experimental Economies  laboratory.  The  total  sample  size  was  11 6 subjects,  in  6 
sessions  of 20  subjects  each  between  November  9  and  November  20,  2010
26
. 
Descriptive statistics concerning basic demographies are shown  in the table below. 
T  bi  l 2  a  e  D  emograp  f  h  ICS  0  t  e samp e 
mean  N  mtn  max 
Gender  .5  116  0 (F)  1 (M) 
Age  26.8087  115  18  58 
lt has often been found that subjects of different academie backgrounds respond 
to  experimental  manipulations  differently, particularly  in  cases  of so-called  ·'mixed 
motive  ..  games,  where  individual  welfare  considerations  are  at  odds  with  social 
eftlciency or  fairness  concerns.  Since the  set  up  in  the  current study  is  of this kind, 
the relative frequency of the various fields of study are presented below. Because this 
information was co llected anonymously  by the host laboratory, it cannot be  matched 
to  individual  subjects. Therefore  1 cannot control  in  the  results  for  any  effects these 
majors  may  have  on  behavior.  However, it  can  be  seen  in  Table  1.3 that just over 
50%  of  the  sample  came  from  science,  mathematics,  engineering  business 
a  dm in istrati on  and  eco nom ics.  which  have  be en  fou nd  to  be have  more  .. sel fish  ly" -
that  is, more  in  li ne with  the dictates of individual rationality- than  other disciplines 
(Lopez-Perez and Spiegelman, f01thcoming). 
~r, Thcre wcre actually 7 sessions run  at the laboratory. However. duc to a programming crror, the data 
in one session had to be discarded. Appcndix Y gives  more  information  about the problcms  with this 
data. 70 
Table 1.3  Distribution of fields of study 
Field of study  Freq.  Percent  Cu m. 
Non-university/undeclared  16  13.79  13.79 
Business and economies  35  30.17  43.97 
Science math and engineering  24  20.69  64.66 
Other social science  Il  9.48  74.14 
Languages, literature, humanities  9  7.76  81.90 
Health and medicine  9  7.76  89.66 
Applied language skills  4  3.45  93.10 
Law  4  3.45  96.55 
Music  4  3.45  100.00 
The structure of the  experiment was  within-subjects.  Each subject participated 
tn  each  of 4  treatments,  differing  in  the  match  of  the  other  player  and  the 
informational  content.  The  arder  of the  treatments  varied  somewhat,  but  was  not 
random.  This  probably  resulted  in  sorne  arder  effect  in  the  results,  which  are 
discussed  below.  However,  the  within-subjects  design  means that sorne  individual 
effects can  be control led for - we see sorne counterpositives that wou ld  not otherwise 
have  been  possible.  The  Cl  RANO  laboratory  is  computerized;  each  subject  was 
seated  at  a  visually  isolated  computer  terminal.  Experimental  instructions  were 
provided  via a PowerPoint  presentation with  pre-recorded  voice  track  for  consistent 
presentation
27
,  and  the  treatments  were  programmed  and  conducted  with  z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). 
1.5.3. 1 Group assignment 
Computers were assigned to groups exogenously to establish the desired distribution. 
Each session, there  were  four computers assigned  to  each  of 5 groups
28
. On  entering 
17  For this and othcr tips on the  practicalities of running an cxperiment, 1 am indcbtcd to Jim  Englc-
Warnick. 
2x The  final session had only  16  subjects;  in  this case,  there were  3 subjccts assigncd to cach  of 4 
groups,  and 4 subjects assigned to  the fi fth. The last seat was  randomly assigned, which should  induce 
symmctric  priors  on  the  subjects  about  the  distribution.  This  is  the  strategically  important 
consideration. 71 
the  laboratory, subjects drew cards informing them of which computer to sit  at; this 
was  the source of the random group  assignment  for each subject.  For concreteness. 
the  groups were  identified  by  pictures of the  monkeys  in  Figure  1.4,  below. The 
names  were selected  so  that each monkey would  have  a color  and  another, species-
related  uncommon word  in  its name
29
. 
Figure 1.4  Group  identitiers. 
Neighborhoods  were  imposed  on the  groups,  so  that  each was  in  the  same 
neighborhood as  2 other groups;  that is,  N;  =  0.6  for ali  groups i. Subjects were told 
that each monkey-group  was  in  "a team, orfa111ily, or neighborhood' with  two other 
groups. These  terms were used with  emphasis,  and  interchangeably throughout  the 
instructions.  During  the  experimental  treatments.  the  term  team  was  retained. 
Subjects were repeatedly reminded of the ir own group  membership, as  we il  as of the 
other groups who were on their team. 
1.5.3.2  Payment 
Subjects were introduced to the particular  PD bi-matrix ti·01n Table 1.4, which is the 
game played experimentally. The payoffs are denominated in dollars. 
~
9 The method of image selection was somewhat involved.  See Appendix 3 for more details. 72 
T  bi  14  a  e  p  ff  f  ayo  s  rom th  .  t  fon.  e m erac 1 
Column  A  B 
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9  Il 
A  9  0 
B 
0  5 
Il  5 
1.5 .3 .3  Sequence of events. 
On  entering the  experimental  laboratory, subjects signed  an  informed  consent  form, 
and  then  watched a  12-minute presentation, introducing them  to  (a)  the  nature of the 
groups and  (b)  the  interaction  structure. Subjects  privately  answered  questions  to 
make sure  they  had  understood  bath  aspects of the  experimental design. Since  the 
number of plays  was small  (each subject played each treatment only once,  for  a total 
of 4  games),  the  instructional  presentation went  into  some  detail concerning  the 
nature  of the  PD  game. The  term inology during  the  experimental sessions and  the 
instruction period was  kept as  morally  neutra!  as  possible:  choices were consistently 
identitïed sim ply as  A or B.  However, it  was  pointed out  that if they chose the same 
options,  players received the same payoff, and  that if they chose di tferent options.  the 
player  who  chose  B got $1 1 - the  highest possible payoff - which  the player  who 
chose A got $0 - the  lowest possible payoff. To make sure that play was  not clouded 
by  incomprehension, it  was even pointed out that playing B would  always earn  more 
money than  playing A,  but that  if bath play A,  each gets a higher payoff than  if both 
play B. 
Following  the  instructional  presentation,  subjects  played  four  rounds  of the 
game, under informational conditions Tl  to T4.  As mentioned above, the arder of the 
treatments  was  varied  somewhat  across  sessions.  but  was  not  random.  Table  1.5. 
below. shows the breakdown of treatment orders. 73 
Table 1.5  Order of  the treatments 
Freq 
Order  (#  sessions  In  the 
data) 
TI-T2-T3-T4  4 
T2-TI-T3-T4  1 
T3-TI-T2-T4  1 
lt will  be observed that T4  was al ways  last.  Because of the  sequential nature of 
the  interaction, this  treatment took  the  longest to  complete,  and  was  arguably most 
complex to  perform. ln order to  keep attention focused and  make sure the  tasks were 
clear, subjects  therefore  started  the  session with  relatively quick,  easy  treatments. 
Preliminary  analysis  of the  data  indicated  order  effects  (similar  to  the  decay  of 
overcontribution  in  public  goods games, e.g.  Burlando and  Guala  2002,  (Nirel  and 
Gorfine  2003)),  which  was  the  reasoning  behind  the  variation  in  the  tina!  two 
sessions
30
. 
After the  games, one  round  was  selected  at  random  for  payment.  Finally, a 
short  questionnaire  was  distributed,  among  other  things.  to  ask  about  subjects' 
motivation for their choices. 
1  .6  Data and  results 
ln  this section  1 describe  the  empirical  results of the analysis.  First 1 will  detail  the 
effects of the  treatments on cooperation rates  ( H I-H3  ). A  ft er  th  at  1 wi Il  i  nvestigate 
the patterns of messages across and within treatments (H4). 
1.6.1  Cooperation 
Table  1.6  shows the mean cooperation  rates, pooled across ali  treatments.  according 
to  whether or  not  the  information that  passed suggested that the  players came from 
the same neighborhood. 
30 The panel nature of the data allows me to statistically control for timing cffects to some cxtcnt. 74 
T  bi  16  a  e  p  1 d  1  f,  oo  e  resu ts  or cooperation as a  f  ·  hbor status.  unctton o  netgl 
Choose cooperative strategy 
number (J:>_ercent) 
No  Y  es  Total 
Y  es  134  (60.4)  88  (39.6)  222  ( 1  00) 
Sa me  No  90  (73.2)  33  (26.8)  123  ( l 00)  neighborhood 
No  info  83  (72.2)  32  (27.8)  115  ( 1  00) 
Total  307  (66.8)  153  (33 .3)  460  ( l 00) 
!Note: Table reports frequency (percentage), rounded  to signiticant 
digits. 
Table  1.6  shows  that  overall,  39.6  percent  of  those  who  saw  information 
suggesting  that  they  come  from  the  same  neighborhood  cooperated,  whi1e  26.8 
percent of those who saw sorne  information  suggesting that they did  not  come from 
the  same  neighborhood  as  the  opponent  cooperated.  Whi te  perhaps  not  huge  in 
absolute terms, this difference is statistically signiticant (Pearson chi-square d.f. =  1, 
p =  0.017; Mann-Whitney test z = -2.38; p = 0.0 17). This contirms (t'ails to reject) the 
hypothesis H 1: the  data  replicates the  phenomenon of in-group bias, even though (a) 
groups were diffuse and  (b)  in  many cases,  the  information about group  status was 
''cheap."  It  is  also  striking how  similar  the overall  results were  between those  who 
'·knew'· they were  not  on  the  same  team  (second  row  of Table  3.3), and  those  who 
siniply didn't know (T2,  third row). Table 3.3  shows that 73.17% of  the former chose 
the  uncooperative  strategy,  whi te  72. 17 percent  of the  latter did. Unsurprisingly.  a 
Mann-Whitney  test  faits  to  reject the  equality hypothesis  (p  =  0.863). Finally. note 
that the overall  average cooperation rate of 33.26  percent  is  not extraordinarily high 
or  low, considering that there  were  no  opportunities  to  make  explicit  promises,  and 
the  weighting  of the  sample  towards  '"math  and  science"  types.  (Recall  that  Sally 
( 1995) found  rates ranging from  5% to 96%). 75 
However, pooled results are not the primary interest. The primary interest of  the 
mode!  is to  see whether cheap-talk signais of group affi liation are credible. Table  1.7 
gives an impression. 
T  bi  17  a  e  n-groUQ coogerat10n rates m eac h treatment. 
Mann-Whitney  Mann-Whitney 
Treatment  N (in-group) 
In-group 
),  p, 
tooperation rate 
Ho: =Tl  Ho: = T2 
T 1: Observable  84  0.464  0.006 
T2:  Blind  116  0.278  0.006 
T3:  Simultaneous 74  0.419  0.568  0.046 
T4:  Sequential  64  0.28 1  0.024  0.966 
Total  338  0.396 
!Note:  ln ail  trcatments except T2. N refcrs to  the number ofsubjects who had sorne  in l(>rmation  that  their 
match was  !rom the same ncighborhood. 
The data  in  this table is  restricted to  subjects whose  information was such that 
they were playing a member of the ir own neighborhood,  when  such information was 
available. For the round  where it was  not (T2,  blind), the entire sample is used. Recall 
that the observable and  blind  treatments serve  as  benchmarks  tor the maximum  and 
minimum  possible information, respectively.  lt  was  hypothesized that cooperation in 
T3  would  be  the  same as  that  in  T 1 (H2)  and  that cooperation in  T2  would  be  the 
same as  in  T4  (H3).  The  Mann-Whitney tests  are  far from  rejecting this hypothesis. 
The  additional hypothesis suggested  by  a Homo  economicus mode!, that cheap  talk 
shou ld  be  meaningless and  therefore that cooperation rates should  be  the same  in  ali 
treatments,  is  rejected. In  effect  we  see  two  "kinds" of treatment.  ln  treatments T 1 
and  T3, the  in-group cooperation rate  was  relatively  high. ln  treatments  T2  and  T4, 
the cooperation rate  (in-group  for T4; overall  for  T2) was  relatively low.  Treatments 
of the  same  "kind"  are  statistically  indistinguishable  from  each  other;  however. 
treatments of different kinds are significantly different. This can  be taken as evidence 76 
that (a) messages have an effect if they are credible; (b) not ail messages are credible; 
(c) sorne cheap messages are credible. 
So far, the hypotheses presented have ail been confinned by the data. Looking a 
little deeper into the cooperation rates reveals sorne complexities. however. Table 1.8 
expands on Table  1. 7 to  show both in-group and out-group cooperation rates in  each 
treatment.  ln  T2  (blind),  again,  overall  rates  are  presented,  since  there  was  no 
information  about the  group  match. The  final column  presents the  difference in  the 
cooperation rates, and a p-value for a Mann-Whitney test of equality. 
T  bi  1 8  a  e  c  ooperat10n rates b  0  1  >y  m-group1out-group status  111  eac h treatment. 
Treatment  Type  N  mean  Difference 
(p) 
a. Observable  lngroup  84  0.464 
Outgroup  32  0.406  0.056 
Total  116  0..1-18  (0.5795) 
b.  Blind  lngroup  -
Outgroup  -
Total  116  0.276 
c.  ln  group  74  0.419 
Simultaneous 
Outgroup  42  0.238  0.181 
Total  116  0.357  (0.0512)' 
d.  Sequential  ln group  65  0.292 
Outgroup  51  0.196  0.096 
Total  116  0.25  (0.2369) 
e. Total  ln  group  223  0.399 
Outgroup  125  0.264  0.136 
Total  3./8  0.332  (0.0 114)'* 
Note:  Di!Tcrcnccs  in  cooperation  rates  arc  accompanicd  by Mann-Whitney p-Yalucs.  ln  the  hlind 
trcatmcnt there 11as  no  in lürmation on  in- 1·crsus out-g_roup  matching:  the  '"total"".!n klrmation  in 
panel  e.  thus rclèrs to  the  othcr three  treatmcnts only.  signi  li ca nt  at  10% levcl:  signi licant at 
5% le1el. 
Inspecting  Table  I .8,  we  see  that  in  each  treatment,  the  direction  of the 
difference  in  cooperation rates  is  as  predicted  by  H 1 (i.e.,  more  cooperation  when 
faced  with  a group  member).  The conundrum  of Table  1.8  resides  in  Panel  a  .. the 
observable  treatment  (T 1  ).  According  to  the  predictions  from  the  mode!  the 77 
information should  be most reliable in  this  case,  and  so  a greater effect of in-group 
status expected. On the contrary, this treatment had the closest results between in- and 
out-group matches.  Likely not coincidentally,  it also had the highest cooperation rates 
overall, particularly among out-group  members.  lndeed, the anomalous entry in  the 
table  appears to be out-group  cooperation rates  with observable groups.  This result 
appears to be in  conflict with  in-group  bias.  ln  the case where the group  knowledge 
was sure, there was no difference between in-group and out-group matches! 
There are  at !east three departures of the current  experimental design  from the 
canonical minimal group  paradigm that might, alone or  in  combination.  contribute  to 
this result.  First, it could  be that the MGP simply does  not generalize  to overlapping 
groups.  Second,  it  could  be  that  endogenous  group  identification  weakens  the 
credibility  too  much  for  the  phenomenon  to  hold. These  are  key  features  of the 
underlying mode!, and  if they  were the source  of the anomaly, that would  make the 
paradigm unsuitable to testing the theory. However, it seems safe to minimize the risk 
from these  factors.  Mainly,  this is due to the fact  that the anomaly occurred  in one 
treatment. whi le both of the factors above were present  throughout the study. 1  ndeed. 
the anomalous treatment  was  the on  ly one with exogenous group  identification! A 
third, and more  incidental, departure from the canonical design involves  the level of 
'·anthromorphism'' in  the group  identifïers.  Often groups are  identifïed by preference 
for  paintings,  or  by  random  draw  of a  color  of card.  Here,  the  identifiers  were 
monkeys with faces  that do  not escape the adjective ··cute".  lt may also  be  important 
th at to  reca ll  from  Table 2 that in  4 out of 6 sessions,  the  observable treatment (T 1) 
came  tirst.  One  might weil conjecture that,  particularly in early rounds,  before  the 
(relatively  complex)  group  structure  had  been  assimilated.  simply  observing  that 
one's "opponenC  was  a cute  monkey  would  be  enough  to  reduce  social  distance 
between any individuals. This effect, if present, might drown out the  in-group bias, at 
!east until  sufficient repetition had reinforced the group structure. The result would be 
a sort of ti me-trend, where  the in-group bias would grow stronger over the course of 78 
play. A panel  regression using the  round  ( 1 to 4, regardless of the treatment) as  the 
time variable  and  an individual random effects variable by subject should  ti lter out 
this time-trend. A random-effects estimation is preferable to a tixed-effects estimation 
for at !east two  reasons. First,  if there  is  little correlation between the explanatory 
variables,  the  random-effects measure  is  more efficient, and  second,  tixed-effects 
models  are  inconsistent  in  a  maximum-likelihood  estimation  framework,  which 
means  they  cannot  be  applied  to  the  standard  estimation  techniques  for  discrete 
choice data (Greene, 2003). By design, an experimental framework seeks to minimize 
the correlation among explanatory variables.  Finally, a Hausman test comparing the 
estimates  from  linear (OLS)  tixed- and  random-eftècts  regressions  utterly  faits  to 
reject the hypothesis of equality  (p  =  0.967 1  ), which in  the linear case is taken to be 
evidence  that  random-effects  is  legitimate.  Thus  in  Table  1.9,  below,  1 report the 
results  of three  random-effects  probit  estimations,  regressmg  the  probability  of 
cooperation on an indicator for being matched with someone from the same team, as 
weil  as dummies  tor treatments Tl, T3  and T4.  Since  there  was no team infonnation 
in  T2,  this  treatment  was  dropped  from  the  regression.  ln  regression  1,  T4  was 
dropped for the comparison point; in  regression 2 and 3, Tl was dropped. 
Table 1.9  Probit regression results 
Regression  1: T4 omitted  Regression 2: T 1 omittcd  Regression J: Interactions 
Coef.  (SE)  p  Coei'.  (SE)  p  Cod .  (SE)  p 
Matehed  with 
0.455  0.199  0.022  0.455  0.199  0.022  ().067  0.347  (l.X47  tcam member 
T 1 (  obscrvab le)  0.749  0.214  0.000  -o mi tted- -omitted-
T3 (simultane  ous)  0.436  0.209  0.037  -0.313  0.197  0.11 2  -1 .023  0.414  0.014 
T4 (sequentia  1)  -o mi tted- -0.749  0.2 14  0.000  -0.942  0.3XX  0.015 
T3xteam  mat  ch  1.024  0.5 11  0.044 
T4xteam mat  ch  0.26X  0.4X6  0.5X2 
Note: random  -etTects probit regressions of cooperation on dummics lor team-match  and  two  of the  three 
periods wher  e such in l(lrmation was available.  For cach regression. ,V =  345  in  a balanced panel  of 11 5 
individuals o ver 3 periods. 
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The first two  regressions yield  severa! important  points.  First, matching with  a 
team-member is,  overall, a significant  positive  force  in  promoting cooperation (p  = 
0.022). Further, while compared  to T4  (panel (a)),  both  Tl and  T3  had significant. 
positive  effects  (p  =  0.000  and  0.003,  respective! y),  compared  to  T 1,  T3  is 
insignificant (p = 0. 11 2), but T4 has a significant negative effect (p = 0.025). This can 
be  interpreted  to  mean  that  there  is  no  significant  di fference  between  the 
cooperativeness  in  observable  and  simultaneous  treatments,  but  that  both  are 
signi ficantly more effective than the sequential treatment  in engendering cooperation. 
Regression 3 adds more detail  to this picture.  There the  insignificant  base  etfect of 
team matching (p  =  0.847)  illustrates  again  that  in the comparison treatment  (T l), 
there was  no effect. The  significant  negative direct effects of T3  (p  =  0.0 14) and  T4 
(p  =  0.0 15)  show  that  those  who  did  not  match  cooperated  much  less  in  those 
treatments. However, the significant positive  interaction for team matching in T3  (p  = 
0.044)  shows  that  in  that  treatment,  those  who  did  match  cooperated.  lndeed, 
magnitude  of the  coefficients  of the  direct  and  interacted  eftècts  in  T3  sum  to 
essentially zero,  showing that those  who met  neighbors in  T3  cooperated essentially 
at the same level as the comparison treatment (T 1  ).  Meanwhile.  the interaction on T4 
is not signiticant  (p  =  0.582),  showing that meeting a neighbor had no etfect there. 
Th us, except for the lingering anomal  y of indiscriminate cooperation in T 1, these data 
support  the  model  predictions.  Moreover.  the  regression  lends  weight  to  the 
conjecture  that  the cuteness  of  the  monkeys  swamped  the  group  bias  in  the  tïrst 
round. 
1.6.2  Message choice 
A further aspect predicted by the mode! concerns the truthtùlness of messages.  lt was 
predicted  that  in  T3  (simultaneous messages), the  monkey  sent would  correspond to 
the  actual  group membership  of the message sender. T4,  by contrast, makes  no such 
prediction.  A  plausible conjecture, based  on  a naïve  interpretation  of the  interaction 
that may become focal  in  the '·babbling" sequential design predicts that  first  movers 80 
may  announce  their  true  group,  perhaps  due  to  some  kind  of  (unmodeled)  lie 
aversion,  and  subsequently  ignore second-mover messages.  The  naïve  prediction of 
the effects is that ali  second-movers should announce a group  in  the same team  as the 
tirst-mover's announcement;  those  who  are  actually  in  the  same  group  will  tell  the 
truth, and those in a different group will  lie. 
In the data, lies  are  common.  There seems  to  be  a "baseline" lie  rate  of about 
50%.  This  may  be  linked  to  another  phenomenon,  which  is  an  apparent  strong 
idiosyncratic  tendency  for  individuals to  lie  or tell  the  truth  in  ali  treatments.  For 
instance, Table  8 shows  the  bivariate breakdown  of individuals'  lie  decisions  in  T3 
and T4. We see th at more th an half of those who told the tru th  in T3 a Iso did so in T4, 
wh ile nearly 78% ofthose who  lied  in T3  also  lied  in T4.  A Chi-square test (d.f.  =  1) 
yields a p-value of 0.0000, indicating that indeed  individuals T3  and T4  lie decisions 
were not independently made. 
T  bi  1 10  L.  h  d  a  e  te  rates across t  e message roun  s 
T4Lie 
T3Lie  no  y  es  Total 
31.  26  57  no  54.4  45.6  100 
13.  46  59 
y  es  22.0  78.0  100 
Total  44.  72  116 
37.9  62.0  100 
Note:  Frequency and  row percents shown.  Rows: 
message  in  T3  corresponded  to  true  monkey; 
Columns:  message  in  T4  corresponded  to  true 
mon  key 
However.  there is  also  an  unequivocal  increase  in  the  lie  rate  from  T3 to  T4. 
Table  7 shows  that  the  overall  rates  are  50.86%  (T3)  versus 62.07%  (T4), which 
represents  a  nearly  24%  increase  over  the  baseline  leve!,  and  is  a  significant 
difference (paired t-test of equality t = -2. 11 , p = 0.037). And despite the idiosyncratic 81 
tendencies  mentioned  above,  it  can  be  seen  from  Table  8 that  twice  as  many  (26 
subjects) lied  in  T4  but not T3  as  lied  in  T3  but  not T4 (13  subjects). This difference 
permits a sign test of the  hypothesis that the average change  in  behavior was  zero, 
yielding a marginally significant p-value of 0.053, lending modest initial support  to 
H4.  White  the  significance  of  this  result  is  not  stellar,  recall  that  in  T4  there  is 
actually no  prediction  that players should  lie; the  strict theory predicts  pure  babble, 
which  might  as  weil  take  the  form  of truth  as  anything.  Consider  the  naïve 
interpretation conjectured  above,  however.  This predicts that  second-movers should 
lie  more  than  first  movers,  since  they  have  a  clear  (though  still  not  exactly 
equilibrium)  incentive  to  imitate  the  first-mover.  Repeating  the  two-way  table 
exercise from Table 8 by first- or second-mover status reveals the  highly suggestive 
tàct  that, while  first-movers  tended  to  reproduce  their T3  messages  (Fisher's exact 
test  p-value  against  independence  =  0.001 ),  second-movers  T4  messages  were 
statistically  unrelated  to  their  T3  messages  (p  =  0.260). The second-movers  were 
apparently  motivated by sorne  other  factor  beyond  the  ''inertia"  that  T3  messages 
show.  What was causing the second-movers to change  the  way they had  played from 
T3? Had  they simply been  babbling randomly, one would expect that they would end 
up  in  the  first player's team about 60% of the time, since neighborhoods occupy 60 of 
the social space. ln  fact, nearly 76% of pairs (88  out of 1  16)  in  T4  matched  teams,  a 
significantly  higher  value  (two-sided  binomial sign test  p =  0.000).  1 take  this as 
evidence that people were  in  tàct playing the naïve strategy conjectured,  which  means 
that they were using their messages in  something other than a ·'babbling" manner. 
Additional evidence consistent with  this conjecture concerns the  prediction that 
not ali second-players had an incentive to  lie. even by the naïve strategy. Specitically, 
second-movers  who  found  that  the  first  mover  announced  a  team  member  could 
imitate that player without  lying. Table  1.11  therefore shows the  average  lie rate  for 
first  and second message senders. depending on  whether the  message  from  the other 
came  from  the  cooperation  zone.  Notice  that  the  first  sender  had  not  yet  seen  the 82 
message when  this choice was  made,  so  there  is no surprise that these numbers are 
similar, and statistically indistinguishable from the baseline lie rate. Similarly, second 
senders who see a first sender's message from their own team lie at the baseline rate. 
However, those who receive a stranger's message  lie weil  over the baseline rate, at 
81 .8%.  Despite  the  small samples  that  remain  from this  splitting  of the  group,  a 
Mann-Whitney  test of the difference  in  second-mover messages shows a significant 
difference (p =  0.0071 ). 
T  bi  1 11  a  e  b  d  1 e ra es  'Y  move or  er an  d f  t  t  h  1rs -movers  eam mac 
First movers lie rate (N)  Second movers lie rate (N) 
Other claimed to be  0.67 ( 18)  0.81 (33) 
offteam 
Other claimed to be  0.52 (40)  0.48 (25) 
on team 
Total  0.57 (58)  0.67 (58) 
1.7  Conclusion 
This  paper  has  presented a  theoretical madel of social distance  that  generates  in-
group  bias  based on an action-oriented  normative  incentive. This work  bridges  the 
gap  between two existing  literatures.  On  the one  hand,  it  relates  to  studies  on the 
etTects of social distance.  which generally highlight the cooperative  impulse  any two 
people  might share when they become "personalized".  On the other, it  uses the social 
distance  concept  to generate  etTects  of in-group  bias, which study how  people are 
discriminately,  or selectively cooperative  towards  those  with  whom they  tèel they 
share some common characteristics. This madel is presented in two  forms. The first is 
in  continuous  space.  and  finds  a  ·'cooperation  zone''  such  that  any  individual 
cooperates in  a one-shot prisoners· dilemma game if he  is  convinced the other player 
cornes  from  a  social  location  within  the  zone. This  in  turn  supports  a  Bayesian 
equilibrium  in  which  individuals  costlessly,  yet  credibly,  disclose  their  true social 
location  in  a  simultaneous-messages  game.  The  second  form,  easier  to  apply  to 83 
common situations, starts with the cooperation zones as overlapping groups, or teams, 
and derives similar results. 1 then briefly demonstrate how the cooperative cheap talk 
equilibrium  does  not survive  the  relaxation of simultaneity in  messages.  When one 
player  sends a message first, and  the  other replies,  then  it  is always  in  the second 
sender's interest to deviate  from the "honest" equilibrium and claim to be from within 
the  first sender's team. Knowing this, the first sender will  not put any credibility in 
the  message. The  mode! therefore  makes  no  predictions about  the  messages  sent. 
however 1 conjecture  a particular deviation as  a plausible,  though somewhat ·'naïve" 
behavioral pattern. 
Following this,  1 describe  an experiment  carried out  to test certain  predictions 
the mode!  makes. The experiment generalizes the minimal group  paradigm (MGP) to 
a case  with  endogenous group  identi tiers and  overlapping groups. The  results are, 
broadly consistent with the theory.  ln  particular, 1 tind that evidence that a match with 
a social  neighbor raises  cooperation rates  when messages are simultaneous.  but  not 
when  they  are sequential.  ln  addition, the overall  cooperation rates  with  sequential 
messages are the same as those with exogenous identification. Cooperation rates with 
sequential  messages are significantly lower, but are not significantly different  from 
rates  when there is no information at ali.  Also  in  fine with  the theory,  1 tind  that the 
rate of deceptive  messages  is signiticantly higher in  the sequential treatment  than in 
the  simultaneous.  an effect largely due to second-movers imitating the team offered 
by  the  first-mover.  Ali  this  seems  to  suggest  - as  the  theory  predicts  - that 
simultaneous messages  are credible. while sequential messages  are a kind  of naïve 
.. babble". 
The  greatest  departure  from  the  theoretical  predictions  is  that  when  group 
identifiers are  exogenously credible,  the  case arguably most  comparable to  standard 
MGP studies,  the in-group bias  does  not manifest.  Given the robustness  of in-group 
bias as an empirical phenomenon. it seems sensible to  look for causes of this effect in 
the  peculiarities of the  current design.  Three  main  departures from  the  canonic MGP 84 
design were discussed. Two of these (endogenous credibility of the  group signal and 
overlapping groups) are  key to  the theory that undergirds the experiment. One hopes, 
therefore, that  the  fault  does  not  lie  there.  Fortunately, these  apply  to  ali  rounds, 
including those where the  in-group bias was not found.  lndeed, the endogeneity of  the 
group  identification does not apply to the treatment where the effect was the weakest! 
1 therefore  conclude  that  these  are  not  at  fault.  An  additional,  and  more  incidental, 
difference concerned  the  degree  of personification  of the  group  identitier.  Standard 
MGP  procedures  have  subjects  randomly  allotted  to  groups  based  on  relatively 
impersonal  markers (Pinter and  Green wald 201 0).  ln the current study, the  identifiers 
shown  in  Figure  1.4  were  chosen with  an  aim  to compensate  for  the  more  abstract 
groups with  more concrete images.  However, it  may  have occurred  that  in  so doing, 
the images initially reduced the perceived social distance between ali groups. ("We' re 
ali  just monkeys, after  ali!'')  lt  may  be  conjectured  that  some  time  and  experience 
with  the  imposed  group  structure  was  required  to  overcome  this  initial  induced 
cooperativeness.  ln  addition, despite  the  alterations  in  the  order  of treatments,  they 
remain  significantly  correlated;  Tl  was  in  the  tirst  round  in  80  of  the  116 
observations.  Spearman's  rho  is  0.586  (p  =  0.000).  Thus  the  bulk  of the  time  of 
diminished  group  identification would  have  occurred  in  Tl, which would  generate 
just the results obtained. 
This scenario is, of course,  surmise.  However,  as  Sherlock Holmes  would  say. 
it  tits  the  tàcts  available.  When  more  facts  become  available.  we  shall  have  ample 
time to  revise the theory.  Follow-up experiments to the one described above could  be 
conceived.  Three  particular  changes  1 would  envisage  would  be  as  follows.  First, 
replace monkeys with  simple solid  colors. These colors could  be arranged  in  a wheel 
such  that  primaries (red. yellow.  blue) are  in  the same team  as the  mixed colors they 
comprise. For example.  red  would  be  in  the  same  coloras orange  and  purple. Thus 
mixed  colors  would  be  in  the  same  team  as  the  primaries  of which  they  are 
composed; orange wou ld  be  in  the same team  as  red  and  ye llow.  Each neighborhood 85 
wou Id  therefore be equal  to  half the  total  social space. The second change wou Id  be 
to  include  an  explicit  "empty  signal".  Since  these  are  dominated  strategies  in  the 
theory, they were excluded from  the experiment. However, it  may be worth  including 
them.  Finally,  1 would  change  the  payoff  structure  to  make  Q =  0,  for  better 
approximation of  the continuous version of  the model. 
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APPENDICE A:  IDIOSYNCRATIC K 
Suppose  people  are  heterogeneous  regard  to  their  sensitivity  to  the  guilt 
normative  incentive, K.  Thus  there  may  be  non-zero  probabilities that an opponent 
would,  for  instance, defect with  a sure  friend,  or cooperate against a  full  mix.  This 
then  induces a probability that  a given, randomly selected  neighbor  wi ll  cooperate, 
function  of the  distribution  of the  normative  sensitivity  and  the  strength  of  the 
material  incentives  that  have  to  be  overcome.  The  probability  corresponds  to  the 
proportion of the population whose normative sensitivity ex.ceeds a given threshold. 
Thus  we  see  that the  threshold  cost of cheating required  to  ensure cooperation 
falls  as  the  information  about  the  neighbor  status  of the  opponent  improves. 
Expression ( 1.1 4)  implies  that a  player  tàcing  a  known  neighbor  must,  to  ensure 
rational cooperation, have a cost satisfying 
1\  >  1\ ;,,..," =  a ( Jr ne  - Jr, ,  ) + ( 1 - a ) (  JT "" - JT , .,,  )  (A 1) 
1 wi ll  assume that K distributes  randomly  in  the population.  with  support  on 
sorne non-negative  interval ofthe realline and continuously increasing CDF  ~K). 
Denoting  the  perceived  probability  that  the  opponent  wi ll  cooperate  as  a, 
equation (A 1) implies that players should cooperate with neighbors whenever 
Thus. those individuals wi ll  not cheat whose cost satisfies 90 
K  >  K. =  ( 1l 00  - 71"1'1,)-a Q .  (A2) 
where  Q =  :rrcc - :rrDc  - :rrco  + :rroo  is  a kind  of strategie  quasi-complementarit/
1
• 
Notice that this also  implicitly defines  a as  1 - tx.._K*).  For  instance, if K is unifonn 
between K. and  /; , then an  interior a will be equal to 
( 7r 111;  - 7r n> ) - K 
a=  (A3) 
assuming the denominator is non-zero. 
·
11  Notice that as Q riscs. the threshold  lcvcl of cast that cnsurcs cooperation tàlls. More gcnerally,  if Q 
=  0, then ffcc  - tTvc. the  net cost of cooperation  if my opponcnt coopera  tes,  is the same  as  ITm  - rr1m. 
the  net  cast of cooperation if my  opponent defccts.  Defection  in  this case  increases  my score  by the 
samc  amount,  rcgardlcss  of whethcr or not  my  opponent  also  defects.  The  actions of other  players 
affect only  the  le, el  of the  payaiT prolïle,  not  the  .. marginal" (more  preeisely.  incrementai) cost and 
bene11t  of my  own actions.  If this difference  is positive, by contrast, thal  means thal  my opponent's 
defection  hUI1s mc  more  if 1 coopcrate  than  if 1 defect.  So  if 1 expect the opponent  to defect.  this 
pushes  mc  towards defection mysclf.  If 1 cxpcct  the opponent to  cooperate,  thcn  the  same  argument 
pushes  me  towards  cooperation.  Regardlcss,  it should  be  weil  noted  that  defection  is  a  dominant 
strategy. lt is for this reason that 1 cali Q ··quasi" complemcntarity. APPENDICE B: MONKEY IMAGE SELECTlON 
The group images used were selected from  internet sites by the experimenter on 
the  basis  of trying  to  find  faces  that  were  both  roughly equal  in  attractiveness, and 
also  distinctive  enough  to  make  recognizable  groups.  However,  in  a pilot  run  with 
just over  100  col lege  students,  it  appeared  that there  were  significant  disparities  in 
people's preferences for  the  monkeys.  Students were  asked  to "vote  for  a monkey". 
via  a  Web-based  intertàce,  without  further  explanation.  Out  of 1  18  students,  84 
replied with  a vote.  A full  40% (34  votes) of the sample  voted  for  one  mon key,  and 
another garnered a meager 5% (  4 votes). Unsurprisingly, a Chi-square goodness of fit 
test (DF =  4) returns a statistic of 34.2, with a p-value ofO.OOO. 
lt  seemed  that  assigning  subjects  to  groups  that  had  such  a  heterogeneous 
appeal  could only lead to confounds in  the  resulting behavioral patterns. To solve the 
problem,  a  larger  group  of monkeys  was  selected  and  redistributed  to  the  same 
sample.  Individuals  were  directed  to  eliminate  monkeys. and  return  a  subset  they 
''liked." A single  vote  was  then  distributed equally among the  chosen images. If an 
individual  returned  4  images,  for  example,  each  received  a weighted  vote  of 0.25. 
Images  were  then  compared  by  the  total  ·'weight" of the  votes  they  received.  This 
procedure  is  somewhat ad hoc;  however,  for  the  tive  monkeys  included  it  yielded 
statistically  indistinguishable  results  in  terms  of numbers of votes  (Chi-Sq  =  2.770, 
OF= 4.  P-Yalue  = 0.597), and  as  can  be  seen  below,  the  distribution  of weighted 
second-round votes among the monkeys in  both rounds  is  visually very simi lar to  the 
number of votes they received  in the  first  round, thus  it seems to yield similar results 
to a direct vote. 92 
1 
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Figure 8.1  Distribution of votes  for the five original! y selected monkeys in  two 
voting procedures. 
Again.  there  were significant  disparities  in  the measured appreciation  for the 
different  monkey  images.  The  monkey  images  chosen  in  the  end  represent  the 
"middle of the road··: they  were neither in  the most favored nor the least-tàvored·
12
. 
The  following graph shows  the  monkeys  ordered  by  vote  weighting.  The  selected 
monkeys were numbers 4, 8,  10, 12 and  13. 
32  lncidentally,  the same  image that won 40% of the first-round votes also had the highest weight  in the 
second round. 5 
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7 
Figure B.2 
boxes. 
n 
2 
-----------·---------; 
93 
Weights for larger group of monkeys 
-
r-
-
- - -
r- r-
r-
n n n 
5  1  6  11  8  12  10  3  13  4  9  14 
IUJII\t: y s 
Weight  of votes  for  full  set  of monkeys;  chosen  five  illustrated  in 
Monkey 3 was not selected  because it is quite different-looking from  the others, 
in that  it  has  more  background, you can  see  one  hand, and  it  is eating  something. 
Monkey 4 was selected over monkey  Il because  Il again had quite different  lighting, 
and  a different  kind  of expression. The tùll  set  of monkeys  is  available  from  the 
author on request.  lt  may  be  noted that the  chi-square goodness of fit  test for equal 
proportions on  the  number of votes each of these monkeys  yields a statistic of 0.286 
(d.f. = 4, p-value = 0.99 1). CHAPITRE II 
WHY  DO PEOPLE TELL TH E TRUTH? EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE  FOR 
PURE LIE AVERSION
1 
Abstract:  Recent  experimental literature shows that truth-telling is not always 
motivated by pecun iary motives, and  severa! alternative  motivations have  been 
proposed. HO\vever. the relative  importance of motivations behind  lie aversion 
in  any  given  context  is  sti Il  not  total! y  clear.  This  paper  investigates  the 
relevance  of pure lie-aversion. that is, a dislike  for lies  independently of their 
consequences.  We  propose  a  very  simple  design  where  pure  lie  aversion 
predicts  positive  truth-telling.  Other motives  considered  in  the  literature,  by 
contrast, predict zero truth-telling. Thus we  interpret the finding that more than 
a third of the subjects tell the truth as evidence for pure lie-aversion. Our design 
also  eliminates  confounds with  another motivation (a  desire to act as  others 
expect us to act) not frequently considered but  consistent with  much existing 
evidence. We also  observe that subjects who tell  the truth  are more likely to 
believe that others wi ll  tell  the truth as weil. 
94 
Résumé: Une littérature expérimentale récente montre que les  gens s'abstiennent 
souvent de mentir quand  les  incitations  monétaires  les  poussent  dans 1  'autre  sens. 
Parmi  plusieurs motivations possibles  pour cet excédent d'honnêteté, nous isolons 
de  manière  expérimentale  une  aversion  pure  au  mensonge.  c'est-à-dire  une 
désutilité de l'acte de mentir, indépendamment  des conséquences. Nous trouvons 
que plus d'un  tiers des  258  sujets résiste à la tentation de mentir.  Qui  plus est, les 
sujets qui disent la vérité sont plus portés à croire que les autres la diront aussi. 
1  Chapter  co-authored  with  Raul  Lopez-Perez.  Thus  the  first-person  plural  pronoun  will  be  used 
throughout. 95 
2. 1  Introduction 
ln  many important  economie  settings.  people  may increase  their  expected  material 
gain  by  providing  information  that  they  believe  to  be  false  - in  short.  by  lying. 
Immediate  examples  include  accounting,  auditing,  insurance.  job interviews.  labor 
negotiations, regulatory hearings, and  tax compliance.  Based on  the  standard  Homo 
economicus  assumption  that  ali  agents  are  self-interested  money  maximizers. 
economie  theory  predicts  that  people  will  always  respond  to  these  situations 
mendaciously.  Much  of the  mechanism  design  and  Principal-Agent  literature  is 
indeed  aimed  precisely  at  avoiding  this  result.  However.  a  recent  experimental 
literature  shows  that  people  often  tell  the  truth  in  severa!  cases  where  the  theory 
would  not  predict  il.  The  broad  research  question  this paper  addresses  is:  Why do 
they do  that? One potential  motivation  for  honesty that has  attracted attention in  the 
literature  is pure lie-aversion, that  is, the idea  that  people suffer a utility cost  when 
they  tell  a  lie  (e.g.,  Ellingsen  and  Johannesson,  2004;  Kartik,  2009).  Intuitively. 
people care about  social  nonns or ethical  principles that  forbid  lying, such  as  those 
based on religions like Christianity and  Islam, and  fee!  bad  if they utter a lie.è ln  this 
paper,  we  investigate  experimentally  the  extent  to  which  people are  motivated  by 
pure 1  ie-aversion. 
Experimental  methods are  ideal  to explore the  relevance of lie-aversion. The 
existence of truthfulness  seems to falsify  the Homo economicus assumption in  some 
situations, but  more controlled decision  contexts are  required  to further discriminate 
between  potential  motivations  for honesty. For  instance, an  altruistic  person  might 
tell  the truth  not  because  she  values honesty per se,  but  because she  believes that a 
deceived co-player could make a hannful choice. More subtly, communication might 
reduce  social  distance,  and  that  could  in  turn  reinforce  players'  altruistic  feelings 
2 
Ellingsen and Johannesson  (2004)  and  Gneezy  (2005)  review  some psychological  literature on  lie-
aversion. Gneezy  (2005)  also  considers the  views  of sorne  classical  philosophers on  the morality of 
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(Bohnet  and  Frey.  1999).  thus  fostering  truth-telling.  Similarly.  open-form 
communication might  create some sort of social identity (Orbeil  et al., 1990, Buchan 
et al., 2006) and  thus again foster altruism. 
Apart  of altruism.  another  potentially  important  factor  that  might  affect 
honesty  is  guilt-aversion.  We  note  in  this respect  that  guilt  is  multitàrious  in  the 
psychological literature (Baumeister et al..  1995; Gore and  Harvey. 1995; Tangney & 
Dearing,  2002; Tilghman-Osborne et al.,  201 0):  It  may  be caused  by  impersonal 
transgressions, hanning another person, trust/oath  violation, or more generally by the 
acknowledgement  of a  wrongful  commission  or  omission  of acts.  ln  our  paper, 
(payoff:based)  guilt-aversion refers to the  idea, first  introduced  in  Dufwenberg and 
Gneezy  (2000).  and  more formally elaborated  in  Battigalli  and  Dufwenberg  (2007, 
2009), that people want their co-player to get the payoffthat (they think)  she expects. 
and  suffer  a  utility  cost  when  she  does  not.  This  phenomenon  can  clearly  be 
influenced  by  communication  whenever  that  affects  beliefs  about  the  co-player"s 
expectations - the  so-called "second-order expectations."  For  instance,  models of 
guilt-aversion offer an explanation for costly truth-telling  in  settings  where the  lie 
increases  the  divergence  between  the  co-player·s  (expected) expectations  and  her 
actual  payoffs.  Such a hypothesis has  been object of experiments including Charness 
and Dufwenberg (2006), and has received some verification. 
Alternatively.  one can think of other specifications for gui tt-aversion, such as 
what we cali here act-based gui ft-aversion, that is, the theory that people like to act as 
others expect them to.  ln  pa11icular, a message sender likes to tell  the truth  when she 
believes  that  the message  receiver(s)  expect  it.
3  White this theory  has  not  received 
3 We  stress  that  the  crucial difference  between  pure  lie-aversion  and  guilt-aversion  is that the latter 
posits a  relation between heliefs  and  the activation  of the bad  feelings, whereas  pure  lie-aversion 
assumes that the bad feelings are activated simply by uttering a lie. The name given to such feelings, in 
contrast,  is largely  immaterial for  the distinction. Pure  lie-aversion  does not rule  out  that  the  bad 
feelings are what psychologists cali guilt. 
----·  ----·--------
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much  attention  111  the  literature  (see  Peeters  et  al.,  2007  for  an  exception).  it  is 
potentially important  because  it  is consistent  with  much experimental evidence  and 
with  behavioral patterns studied in  psychology.  For instance, Rosenthal (2003.  p.151) 
asserts  the  existence  of  '·hundreds  of studies  [  demonstrating]  th at  one  persan· s 
expectations for the behavior of another pers  on can actually affect th at other person  ·  s 
behavior", even when those expectations are not made explicit. 
Our experimental  design allows  us to discriminate between pure lie-aversion 
and  the previously mentioned motivations, including both  versions of guilt-aversion, 
an issue that previous studies  have  not addressed. We  consider two  treatments of a 
very simple, one-shot game where one player must send  a (truthful  or false) message 
to another one.  Act-based guilt-aversion predicts a positive  but different  rate oftruth-
telling across treatments. whereas pure lie-aversion predicts the same positive  rate in 
both  treatments. Altruism and  payoff-based guilt-aversion predict zero truth-telling. 
ln  both  treatments,  furthermore,  we  measure  first and  second-arder  beliefs  about 
truth-telling. which should be correlated with behavior according to act-based guilt. 
Overall, 38.76 percent of the subjects choose to tell  the tru th  in  our study, but 
there is not a significant  di fference  in  the rate of truth-telling across  treatments.  Our 
results therefore suggest that  pure  lie-aversion is a significant  force  behind  honesty. 
whereas act-based guilt-aversion is not, at !east in  this context.  Yet we do tind  that 
first- and  second-arder  beliefs  co-vary  significantly  with  behavior.  For  instance. 
subjects who tell  the truth in  our  study are significantly more likely to believe  that 
others  will  tell  the  truth  as  weil. This  suggests  a  need  to  enrich  the assumptions 
surrounding  the the01·y  of lie-aversion (as  suggested  in  Bicchieri, 2005;  Erat  and 
Gneezy, 2009; or L6pez-Pérez, 20 1  0). 
---------- - -----------------------
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Our  study contributes  to  an  already  large  experimental  literature examining 
deception  and  honesty.  reviewed extensively  in  the  next section.
4  lt  is  most  closely 
related  to  Peeters  et  al.  (2007).  Fischbacher  and  Heusi  (2008).  Erat  and  Gneezy 
(2009), and  Sanchez-Pagés  and  Vorsatz  (2009), which  provide  ev idence  consistent 
with  the  existence of lie-averse  agents.  controlling  for  severa( potential  confounds. 
Our paper provides additional evidence in  tine with  lie-aversion and complements the 
previous literature  with  a design that  can  discriminate  between lie-aversion  and  act-
based  guilt,
5 controlling moreover for the  effect  of altruism, social  distance.  social 
identity, and  payoff-based gui tt-aversion on truth-telling. 
Following the literature  review. we  formally describe act-based guilt-aversion 
in  section  3.  Section  4 describes our  experimental  design  and  procedures.  Section  5 
describes the results from our experiment and section 6 concludes. 
2.2  Related  literature 
Our main  research  goal  is to investigate the relevance of pure  lie-aversion, preventing 
any  confounds  with  other  potential  motivators  of honesty.  Although  the  focus  of 
previous experimental  studies on  deception  and  honesty differs slightly from  ours,  a 
detailed  review  of such  literature  can  help  to  clarify what  we  already  know  on this 
issue and moreover i  llustrate the nu merous motivations that can subtly affect honesty, 
in  particular act-based guilt-aversion.
6 
4 lt is also worth noting that a substantial litcraturc in social dilemmas and coordination games over the 
past 30 years has found that costlcss, non-binding communication is a robustly effective force affecting 
strategie behavior (sec the survcys in  Ledyard, 1995; Sally, 1995; and Crawford. 1998). 
5 Peeters et al.  (2007) run  an ex periment with a sender-receiver ga me played  over 100 rounds with  rc-
matching,  and  analyze  the  performance  or  a  mode!  or  "consequentialistic  preferences  ..  ,,·ith 
characteristics  similar  to  what  we  denominate  here  act-based  guilt-aversion,  and  another  of 
··deontological  preferences'· similar to  pure lie-aversion.  Although some results tend  to !end  weight to 
the  idea  of act-based guilt-aversion, a  test  of such madel  in  the  repeated  sender-receiver  game  is 
hindered by the fact that it prcdicts multiple equilibria.  In the conclusion, wc discuss how some of our 
results could  help to undcrstand dynamic play in  repeated games like theirs. 
6 Our main focus will be on studics that spccifically investigate lying and honesty, but it  is worth 
noting at the outset that a substantial litcraturc in social dilemmas and coordination games over the 99 
Gneezy  (2005) considers three  sender-receiver  games  conceptually similar to 
those  in Crawford  and  Sobel ( 1982). One player (the receiver)  must choose between 
two  allocations  of money  (A  and  B)  for herself  and  another player  (the sender). 
Allocation A gives  more money  to the receiver than does  allocation B. whereas the 
opposite happens  for the sender.  However, only the sender knows  the true payoff 
constellation: the  receiver"s only guidance  is a  message  from  the sender. which is 
restricted to ·'Option A will  earn  you more money  than option B.'. (which is true)  or 
the opposite statement  (which is a  lie). Note that  the  receiver can never ascertain 
whether the other player lied or  even had an  incentive  to do so. Gneezy elicits the 
expectations of some senders and  finds that 82 percent  expect the receiver to fo llow 
the  ir message.  ! f any su ch sen  der wants to maxim ize  her monetary payoff,  therefore. 
he should  deceive  the receiver.  Y  et the rate of deception varied between  17  and  52 
percent  in  the three games.
7 
Severa! motivations could  arguably exp1ain  why sorne senders tell  the truth 
even  at  a cost.  First, pure lie-aversion is obviously consistent  with  this fact.  Second, 
altruism cou1d also  play a partial ro1 e. Since most senders in Gneezy (2005) expected 
messages to be trusted. lies were expected to reduce the co-player's payoff.  lt follows 
that  altruistic senders could  tell  the truth  in  order not to harm  the receiver.
8  Third, 
communication might reduce social distance among the subjects and  interact with the 
sender's altruistic concerns. The study by Frohlich et al.  (200 1) suggests one possible 
reason for this (see also  Bohnet and  Frey, 1999). They argue that subjects may have 
past 30 years has found  that costlcss. non-binding communication is a robustly effective  force affecting 
strategie behavior (see the surveys in Ledyard, 1995; Sally, 1995; and Crawford, 1998). 
7 The ga mes considcred by Gneezy vary the benefit of  deception (to the sen der, if  the message is 
followed) as wcll  as its harm (to the receiver); he generally finds that the rate of deception ri ses in  the 
first and fa lls in the second. Sce Hurkens and Kartik (2009) for some caveats to this finding 
x On the other hand, Gneezy compares behavior in his sender-receiver games with behavior in dictator 
games with the same payoff constellation. Significant changes in  behavior in this context indicate that 
truth-telling in the sender-rccei,·er games is not only due to the sender"s preference for a certain payofT 
distribution. 100 
doubts about  the  veracity of an experimental design if  it  presents a  high  leve! of 
anonymity  and  social  distance,  and  those  doubts  can  affect  their  behavior.  For 
instance. their data  suggests that altruism in  dictator games  is negatively affected  by 
doubts  about whether dictators are paired  with  real people.  After communicating in 
sender-receiver  gamcs. conversely.  senders  might  gain  in  confidence  that there  is 
another person on the "other end" of the  ir decisions.  and  that could  make them more 
altruistic.  Fourth.  for  act-based  guilt-aversion  we  recall  again  that  most  senders 
expected the rcceivcr to  believe the message sent.  Senders believed that the receiver 
expected truth-telling.  which by our  assumptions should  make them more  likely to 
tell  the truth. Fifih,  selfishness  could also  explain  part  of the truth-telling. since  18 
percent  of the  sendcrs  expccted the receiver  not to act as  recommended and  bence 
they  could  tell  the  truth  even  if  they  were  selfish.
9  Final/y.  payoff-based  guilt-
aversion might also explain  honesty,  provided that the sender has appropriate second-
arder payoff expectations.  ln  e1 Tect.  if the  sender believes  that the receiver expects a 
payoff larger  than the minimum  possi ble (recall  in  this respect that  the  receiver  is 
uninformed  about the payoff' constellation).  the sender is more  likely to tell  the truth 
in order not to disappoint her. 
Charness and  Dufwenberg (2006)  use  a simplified trust game with  a random 
shock  and  three  treatments:  ( 1)  No  pre-play  communication;  (2)  the  first  mover 
(investor)  can send  an open  message to the second  mover (trustee)  before the first 
move; (3) same as (2), but now the trustee  is the message sender.  Further, the authors 
elicit the investor's beliefs regarding the trustee·s behavior, and  the trustee's second-
arder  beliefs  in  this  respect.  Their  key  findings  are:  (a)  Compared  with  no 
communication. cooperation and overall  efficiency rise significantly when the trustee 
sends a message (treatment 3) but not when the investor sends the message (treatment 
2);  (b) investors anticipate these patterns,  and  trustees  anticipate this  anticipation by 
9 Sutter (2009) demonstrates that people actually follow this strategy to some extent. 101 
the investors;  (  c)  the  re is a correlation between cooperation by the trustee  and  her 
second-arder beliefs (i.e .. those  who think  that the investor expects cooperation are 
more  likely  to  actually  cooperate);  (d)  messages  coded  as  '"promises··  increase 
cooperation and efficiency more than other messages. 
What  theor·y  could  explain  these  results? Obviously.  the standard  madel of 
selfish players fails to predict cooperation in  any treatment.  As explained in  detail  in 
L6pez-Pérez (2010). pure lie-aversion predicts findings (a), (b). and  (d), although it  is 
ambiguous regarding point (c). As Charness  and  Dufwenberg (2006) note. however. 
lie-aversion could  ex plain  point  (  c)  if the assumption of a (1 àlse)  consensus effect is 
added, so that cooperative players tend to believe that other players are cooperative as 
weil.  ln  turn, payoff-based guilt-aversion can explain  results (a)  to (d) provided that 
in  the absence  of a promise to the contrary,  investors expect trustees to act selfishly. 
Note that since  the game is set up  so  thal lies, actions and  payoff-'s  are correlated. act-
based guilt has the same predictions as payoff-based guilt. 
ln  Vanberg (2008).  subjects  play  a  binary dictator game  with  a  choice  set 
similar to the trustee·s  in  Charness  and  Dufwenberg (2006).  Before  knowing their 
role (dictator/recipient), however.  subjects are  matched  in  pairs and  can  send  at most 
two  open-fonn  messages  to  the  co-player.  A  fterwards,  half  of the  pairs  are  re-
matched  and  the  subjects'  roles  are  determined.  Further,  dictators  are  informed 
whether  they  were  re-matched  (in  that  case,  they  can see  the  messages  sent  and 
received by their new co-players).  whereas recipients are not. Then dictators choose. 
Subjects play 8 rounds according to this protocol (they  are re-matched each round) 
with  no feedback, except  own payoff in  each  round. Recipient's first-order beliefs 
about  the  dictator's  choice  and  dictator's  second-arder  beliefs  are  elicited  in  an 
incentive-compatible manner. 
Consider  a  player  who  announces  during  the  communication  stage  that, 
provided that he  remains matched with  the other player and  becomes the dictator, he 
--- -- --
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will  make a generous choice.  If that player is sufficiently lie-averse.  such a promise 
should foster generous behavior if the proviso holds. but  not if he  is re-matched with 
another player.  to whom no such  promise was made.
10  lfthat player is (payoff) guilt-
averse.  in  contrast.  his generosity should  be  equally affected  by others·  promises  as 
by  his  own.  ln  eJTect, generosity should  depend  only on  second-order beliefs,  which 
are unaffected by the  re-rnatching because recipients do not know whether they  have 
been  re-matched. ln  contrast to this prediction.  re-matched  dictators facing  recipients 
who  had  received  a  promise  from  someone  el  se  had  higher  second-order 
expectations. but were not  more likely to act  generously than those  facing recipients 
who  had  not received such a promise.  ln  line with  lie-aversion too, dictators who 
prom ised  to  act  generously  were  sign  i  ficantly  more  generous  if they  were  not 
switched  than  if they  were re-matched  with  a recipient  who  had  received a promise 
from  another subject, even when  second-order beliefs were not significantly difTerent 
in both cases. 
As  in  the  previous studies,  pure  lie-aversion could  play a role in  explaining 
these  results,  but  there  are  many  other  potential  forces.  For  instance,  the 
communication  protocol uses open-fonn  messages, which  communicate  more  than 
intentions:  players can  transmit information about their persona! characteristics, their 
economie needs,  or simply make jokes.  This may create some  sort  of social  identity 
(Orbeil  et  al.,  1990;  Buchan  et  al.  2006)  and  highlight  or  increase  a  feeling  of 
sympathy or altruism.
11  If a dictator likes a person with whom she has communicated. 
10 Should a lie-averse player cvcr make such a promise in equilibrium? Y  es, but only in a conditional 
mann er, th at  is, only if the co-player makes the sa me promise as weil -a pro of of this is availablc from 
the authors. Note that an  unconditional promise imposes a cost and provides no benefit, as the game is 
not played rcpcatedly with the sa me co-player. 
11  In this respect, Charness and Dufwenberg (2009) use the same game as Charness and  Dufwenberg 
(2006), but with closed rather than open messages. More precisely, trustees may either send a promise 
to cooperate. or stay si lent. Maybe unsurprisingly. most subjects send a promise. Y  et  investors· 
behavior was not significantly different from the no-communication treatment in Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2006), wh ile the trustees who sent promises were only marginally more cooperative than 
those who did not.  Hence, this comparison across .\·tudies seems to point against both lie-aversion and 103 
therefore,  she  would  be  probably  more  1  ikely  to  make  a  prom1se.  th us  partially 
explaining  the  results.  ln  addition.  some  fonn  of reciprocity could  play a  rote.  as 
dictators  who are  not re-matched  probably  face  a  recipient  who prom ised  to  give 
money  before.  lt may  also  be  noted  that this experiment cannat distinguish between 
pure lie  aversion and  act-based  guilt aversion.  ln  effect,  a re-matched  dictator who 
had  promised  to be generous with someone efse does not lie if he is not generous with 
his final  co-player.  and  thus can feel  no  guilt  for  doing so:  act-based  guilt  aversion 
must also  predict less generosity  on  re-matching.  Finally, the  results are  at odds with 
the assumption that  aff players display payotf-based guilt-aversion. but could  still  be 
replicated if a fraction ofthe agents were guilt-averse and another, say,  lie-averse. 
ln  the  baseline treatment  of Fischbacher and  Heusi (2008),  subjects roll  a six-
sided  die.  and  are paid  according to  a self-report  of the number which  cames  up.
12 
White  the  researchers  cannat  discern  whether  any  specifie  individual  lied.  the 
aggregate  rate  of deception  can  be  estimated  based  on  di fferences  between  the 
observed and  expected  number of observations for  each report. assuming a fair  die. 
The authors  find  that not  ali  players  declare  the profit-maximizing  answer.  lndeed, 
some even  declare the  lowest-payoff outcome. Furthermore, among those  who  lie, 
some are "incomplete  liars:· reporting a value  higher than  that which they rolled, but 
which  does  not  maximize  payoff. These  results are  broadly  robust  to  tripling the 
stakes, adding externalities. repeated play, and double-blind anonymity. 
This study is comparable to  ours because  it  eliminates any effect of altruism, 
social  distance.  social identity.  and  payoff-based  guilt-aversion on  truth-telling.  Yet 
severa!  other  factors  apart  of pure  lie-aversion  could  play  a  role  in  the  decision 
guilt-aversion, while painting to the rolc  played by opcn-fom1 communication in enhancing social 
cooperation. 
12 The payofffrom a die roll of ( 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) is CHF( 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 0), respectively. Th us a report of 
"5" earns subjccts the most moncy. Notice th at no number should come up significantly more or Jess 
than one six th of the ti mc if evcryonc wc re truthful. 104 
whether to be  honest.  so  that the relevance  of this motive is somehow  unclear.  To 
start, participants in  this study send  a message to  the  experimenter when  they  report 
the  number.  and  act-based  guilt-aversion  predicts  that  the  expectations  of  the 
experimenter should  be  important  to  them.  Second. subjects were asked  to enter  the 
number that they had  thrown. so that a lie  involved (a)  making an  untrue statement. 
but  also  (b) cheating.  that  is. surreptitious violation  of a formai  rule.  and  also  (c) 
contravening  a  direct  instruction  from  an  authority  figure.  Any  of  these 
considerations cou  Id  foster honesty in  this context -e.g  ..  Mi lgram ( 1963)  famously 
showed people·s reluctance to do (c).  Finally,  subjects in  Fischbacher and  Heusi were 
told  that the  die-roll  was  designed  to determine how  much  they  would  be paid  for 
filling out a survey.  lt might be that some subjects feel  that it  is somehow "unfair'·  for 
the same task to be paid  diflerently to different  people.  1t  is not totally clear how this 
rule  could  affect  the resu lts.  lt could  push  up  the rate of lying, especially if people 
find 4 or 5 CHF a fair payment for the questionnaire. 
Erat  and  Gneezy (2009), used a game whose the basic structure of the  game 
1 s  similar  to  that  in  Gneezy  (2005).  1-!owever,  the  design  includes  nine  different 
games to cover severa! different  varieties of lie:  altruistic white  lies,  which  hurt  the 
sender and  help  the  receiver; Pareto white  lies, which  help  both parties; and  selfish 
black  lies, which help  the sender and  hurt  the receiver.  Most relevant  for  our  study, 
the authors find  sorne  subjects refrain  from  lying even  when  it  results in  an  increase 
in  both  parties'  payoffs  (Pareto  white lies). This  lends strong support  to  pure  lie-
aversion. Since subjects' expectations were not measured, however, it  is also possible 
that act-based guilt-aversion was driving the results. 
Peeters  et  al.  (2007)  study  a sender-receiver  game  played  over  1  00  rounds 
with  re-matching. In  some  rounds, the receiver has an  option to sanction the sender, 
reducing  both  players'  payoffs  to  zero  rather  than  accepting  the  resultant  payoff. 
Although  the  standard  equilibrium  with  selfish players  involves  randomization  by 105 
both  player ~;  and  no sanctions. the authors find  that sorne  players tell  the  truth  more 
than  predicted. These  players also tended to trust messages,  and  sanction those  who 
lie  more often. The  authors study the  performance of a mode!  of "consequentialistic 
preferences·'  with  characteristics  sim ilar  to  what  we  term  here  act-based  guilt-
aversJOn.  and  another  model  of ··deontological  preferences··  similar  to  pure  lie-
aversion.  Some  of their  results tend  to  lend  weight  to the  idea  of act-based  guilt-
aversion.  although  the  model of Peerters et  al.  predicts  multiple  equilibria  in  the 
sender-receiver game (including the standard  one).
13 
Finally. Sanchez-Pagés  and  Vorsatz (2009)  consider a sender-receiver game 
where the  sender can tell  the truth. lie or rernain  silent (in  that case. she  pays  a small 
cost).  ln  this manner, the authors discriminatc  between a preference  for truth-telling 
(i.e.,  getting  a  utility  payoff if one  tells  the  truth)  and  pure  lie-aversion  (which 
predicts  silence  under certain  equilibrium  conditions).
14  The  game  is  played  fifty 
times (with  re-matching and  change or rotes); the  authors report  that senders tell  the 
truth  more often  than  predicted  by a standard  mode!  of selfish players,  and  that the 
rate ofchoice of silence is significantly  l a~ ·ger than zero. White this latter result points 
again  to  the  impotiance  of lie-aversion, the relevance  of this motive  is unclear, as 
other motivations like act-based gui  tt-aversion cou Id also play a rote. 
ln  summary,  white  the  existing  literature  has  significantly  improved  our 
understanding of the incentives behind  truth-tclling.  some uncertainties  remain.  The 
relevance of pure lie-aversion is still  unclear because  in previous studies other factors 
could have affected honesty as weil, like the  interaction between communication and 
13  In the conclusion, wc discuss how somc of our results could help to understand dynamic play  in 
repeated games like this. 
14  Our experimental design cannot distinguish between these two closely related motives, and we  leave 
this for fw1her research. Y  et. as we suggest in the conclusion, a small  variation of our design could 
allow us to do so. 
1 
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altruism.  payofT-bascd. and act-based  guilt-aversion. In  what  follows.  we  propose  a 
design to investigate pure  lie-aversion that eliminates potential confounds. 
2.3  Act-Based Guilt-Aversion 
Consider an  extensive-fonn  two-player  game
15  with  players A and  B.  and  let xA (z) 
denote A· s monetary payoff at  terminal node z.  At some point  in  the game.  suppose 
that A has an opportunity to communicate something to  8, and may tell  the truth (i.e .. 
send  a message  consistent  with  her  beliefs)  or lie (send  a message  inconsistent  with 
her beliefs).  Let l(z) denote an  indicator taking value  1 at terminal node zif  A lied  in 
the  history of z. and  value 0 otherwise.  Suppose  further  that at any  terminal node  z. 
player 8 has beliefs about  the probability that A has told  a lie in  the history of z,  and 
let  J.l  (z)  denote A  ·s second-arder beliefs  about  B's beliefs.  That  is. A thinks  that 8 
thinks that  A has  lied  with  probability /-1 (z).  Finally,  let  GA(z) = max [0.  l(z)- ,u(z)] 
denote  the intensity of A  ·s guilt  .  This  set ur is partially inspired in  Charness  and 
Dufwenberg (2006). To formalize the  idea  that  people  dislike feeling guilty,  player 
A's  preferences  ,..  arc  defined  over the  set of vectors  [xA(z),  GA(z)].  and  satisfy 
rationality,  plus two axioms. The first  is a monotonicity axiom: other things equal, 
people prefer more money to less: 
Axiom  Gl  (monotonicity):  Given  GA(z)  =  GA (z'), [xA(z), GA (z)]  ,..  [xA (z'). 
GA(z')] ifxA(z) > xA (z'). 
The  second  axiom  is a continuity hypothesis.  Intuitively, this states  that  an 
increase  in gu ilt can be compensated by a sum  11 ofmoney, which  is a function oftwo 
factors: 
15  We focus on  the two-player case for simplicity;  the ideas would generalize easily. 
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Axiom  G2  (continuity):  For  any  xA and  any  GA <  G*A there  exists  some 
positive amount ofmoney t-,.  which  depends on  xA  and  (G*A- GA ).  such that [xA . GA ] 
We  make  tvvo  remarks. First.  f',  (-) can be different for  each player A. ln  fact 
we  will  assume  in  Section  3,  when  discussing  our  experimental  game.  that  there 
exists some measure of A-players for  any possible  value of 6.  (we do not need to  be 
precise regarding the distribution of players). Second, if we add itionally posit that the 
function t-,.  (-) strictly increases with  the  difference  (G* A -GA ), axioms  1 and  2 imply 
the  principle of act-based guilt-aversion. That  is,  a greater deviation  from  what one 
thinks was expected evokes stronger feelings of  gui lt: 
It  is worthwhile  to  underline some differences  between (a)  act-based and  (b) 
payoff-based  guilt-aversion  (as  in  Charness  and  Dufwenberg, 2006).  To  start, the 
expectations in theory (b) are about B 's payoff\·, while  in theory (a) they are about A ·s 
actions. Note also that in  payoff-based guilt-aversion the lie  itself is not normative. A 
lie can  increase. decrease,  or  leave guilt unchanged, depending on  how  it  affects the 
payoff expectations; in  act-based guilt-aversion.  in contrast. the lie itself is normative: 
a player feels  guilty for  lying  regardless of the  payoffeffect. albeit  less guilty as she 
thinks that the expectations that she will  lie will  grow. These ideas can  be thought of 
as  incorporating the  principle  of so-ca lled  psychological game theory, that  second 
order  beliefs  enter  directly  into  the  utility  function,  into  other,  more  traditional 
preferences. Theory (b)  is  like  a "psychologised" altruism,  in  which  A cares  about 
B's payoff to  the extent that  (A thinks)  8  expects to geta high  payoff. Theory (a)  is 
like a "psychologised'' lie-aversion, in  which  A intrinsically cares about lying to 8, to 
the  extent  that (A  thinks) 8  expects A not  to.  To  finish, we  can  also  compare  act-
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based guilt  and pure lie-aversion. With our  previous notation,  lie-aversion assumes 
that  preferences depend  on  vectors [xA (z).  l(z)l. and  posit a dislike  for  lies  (that is. 
l(z)= 1  ), other things  equal.  Therefore.  the  main  difference  between act-based guilt 
and  lie-averse  preferences  is that the latter do not depend  on the agenf s beliefs, but 
only on whether he/shc lies. 
2.4  Experimental Design and Procedures 
Our design uses a very simple. one-shot  game with two  players (A  and B).  Player A 
privately observes a random signal on the computer screen (more precisely.  a green 
or a blue circle)  and must then  choose  a message  for  player B.  Two  messages are 
always  possible: "The green  circle  has  appeared'' or ·'The blue circle has  appeared''. 
Monetary  payon·s  are  as tè)llows:  A gets  15 Euros  if he announces the green circle 
and  14  if he announces the blue one. v,·hereas  B al  ways  gets  10 Euros.  Note  three 
things:  (i)  A 's  payoff depends  on the  message  sent.  not  on the  realization of the 
signal, (ii)  A tàces a dilemma  between  honesty  and  material interest  if the signal 
happens to  be blue. as te lling the  truth  is then costly,  and (iii) B does not observe the 
realization  of  the  random  signal  and  hence  cannat  verify  whether  the  message 
received  is  false  or  true.  but  does  know  the payoff set.
16  The experiment has  two 
treatments  (High and  Low); they  di ffer only  in  the probability of the  blue  circle, 
which  is  0.25  in  Low.  and  0.75  in  High  (this  probability  is  always  common 
knowledge in the corresponding treatment). 
We  conducted  20  computerized  sessions  ( 10  H  igh  and  10  Low)  at  the 
Universidad  Autônoma de Madrid.  with a total of258 participants. The sessions were 
1 ~ This distinguishcs our study from  ·'deception games" (e.g. Gneezy. 2005). in which the receivcr does 
not  know  the payoff set.  ln  thosc  studies, the  receivcrs·  ignorance  eliminatcs  the  concern  that  the 
sender·s  decision  is  inllucnccd  by  his  knowledge  that  the  receiver  knows  whether  the  action  \l'as 
harmful,  leaving the harm  intact.  In  our study, this concern  does  not arise because the  receiver is not 
harmed by  the scnder's choicc. Furthermore.  the receiver·s knowledge of the sender's incentives plays 
an  integral part  in  the experimental treatments, as these  incentives induce the expectations we  attempt 
to manipulatc with our (High and Law) trcatments. dcscribed bclow. 
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conducted  in  two  waves. the tirst (  106 subjects) in  November 2010, the  second  ( 152 
subjects)  between  September and  October 20 Il . The software used for our  sessions 
was z-Tree (Fischbacher.  2007). Participants were students from  different disciplines. 
and  the distribution of disciplines  was similar  in  both  treatments (Chi-square(7)  == 
7.583; p ==  0.37 1).
17  Participants were not students of the  experimenters.  After being 
seated  at  a  visually  isolated  computer terminal,  each  participant  received  written 
instructions  that  described  the  game  (see  Appendix  1 ).  Subjects  could  read  the 
instructions at their own pace  and  we  answered their questions in  private. We used 
neutra!  language  and  avoided terms such as  "lie".  Understanding of the  rules  was 
checked with  a control questionnaire that ali  subjects had to answer correctly before 
they could start making choices. 
The  instructions  attempted  to  diminish  potential  demand  effects  or  other 
confounds. For instance, we stated that this was  an experiment  on decision-making 
and  that "'there are no tricky questions, you must simply choose as you prefer". A 
potential  motivation by any subject  to  behave  so  as to  ·pJease'  the experimenter, 
therefore, arguably put no constraints on her choice. Additionally,  the instructions did 
not contain  any indication to be truthful.  Finally,  we speculated that subjects might 
tell  the truth  not because  they dislike lies,  but to increase the aggregate rate of truth-
telling in  our study.  Subjects might  think that a low rate oftruth-telling, if published, 
cou Id  have detrimental effects on the credibility of messages in  our society (a public 
good), and  hence the efficacy of communication. To reduce this potential effect.  we 
informed  subjects  that their session was part  of a  large  study with  more than  40 
17 This is important  becausc.  as we  show in a short note  accompanying this paper (Lapez-Pérez and 
Spiegelman; 20 Il).  there cxists  a correlation between  honest behavior and the subject"s discipline. 
Since we  have a similar distribution of disciplines in both  treatments, we can be sure that any potential 
difference  in  bcha1·ior across treatmcnts is not due to dif!èrences in  the subjects" studies. We further 
note that therc werc not significant  differences  across  trcatments in  the average  values  for political 
position (p = 0.683; Mann-Whitney test), gcnder (p = 0.452), or religiosity (p = O . 165). - -----------
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participants.  ln this manner. they could  ascertain  that any individual choice was going 
to have a small effect on the aggregatc. 
Participants  were  anonymously  matched  in  pairs.  Before  their  roles  (A/8) 
were  randomly determined. ali  chose  as  if they had role  A.  Since  the B-players are 
totally  passive. this cannot  affect  their  choices  afterwards.
18  We  used  the  strategy 
method  to elicit  the decision:  thal  is. before  knowing  the  actual realization  of the 
random  signal.  sub,iects  indicated  what  message  they  wou ld  send  for  each 
contingency  (b lue/g reen).
1 '~  This  method  max imizes  the  amount  of data  gathered. 
provides  information  which  tàcilitates  the  test  of the  theories,  and  pennits  the 
elicitation  of subjects·  beliers  in  a  manner  thal  facilitales  comparisons  across 
treatments. 
We elicited  two beliefs from  ali  subjects immediately after they had  indicated 
the messages they wou  Id send. First, we asked each subject to estimate the percentage 
of ali  subjects who  chose to send  the  message "green" when the signal  was blue- in 
other words. their  expcctations about  deception  when  the signal was  blue. We  will 
refer to this number in what follo\· V S as a subject's first-order belief. Second. we asked 
each  subject  to  estimate  the  average  percentage  estimated  by  ali  subjects  in  the 
previous question.  We cali  this estimation a subject's second-arder belief- according 
to act-based guilt.  this belier should  be correlated with  A's decision.
20  Both first and 
1 ~ One cou Id  think  of an alternative design  in  which the A-players send messages to  the experimenter. 
and  bence  there  is no need for the 8-players. ln  this case,  however. act-based  guilt  predicts that the 
subjects'  second  order  beliers  about  the  expcrimenter's  expectations  should  al'fect  their  decision. 
Controlling for  such  bclicfs could  be difficult.  ln addition, the  degree (and  relevance) of lie-aversion 
could depend  on the status of the recipient. 
19 In principle, the stratcgy method might induce different behavior than the specific-responsc mcthod, 
where participants know  the realization of the  signal.  We have  run  a control treatment to  check  for 
possible effects of the strategy  method, and  as  wc discuss la  ter, we observe  no significant effect. We 
also note thal Brandts and  Charness (2009) rcview the experimental studies thal use bath methods and 
find  no treatment differences in  most of them. 
20 More precisely, act-based guilt predicts a correlation between (i) A's choice and (ii) A's beliefabout 
s·s  belie!'  about  A  ·s  choicc:  EA[Enlsignal = blue  1  message  = "green"]]  = Pr[blue  1  "green"]  in III 
second-arder beliefs  were  elicited  in an  incentive-compatible  manner.  as  we  paid  3 
Euros when  the absolute  error was  Jess than  or equal  to 5 percentage  points.
21  Since 
beliefs  were  mcntioned  after  subjects  had made their  choices.  the belief elicitation 
could  not  aftt~c t  them.  Only after bcliefs  were  elicited.  one subject in  each pair  was 
randomly selected as the real  A.  the other as  B. The co lor of the circle was generated 
based on the relevant probabilities (High or LO\· V),  the actual A-player infonned of  the 
color.  and  the  message  previously  selected  by  A  sent  to  B.  At  the  end  of  the 
experiment.  subjects  answered  a  brief questionnaire  which  included  some  socio-
demographic information and  a question about their reasons for  their message choice 
when  the circle was  blue.  Su.bjects  were paid  in  private by an assistant  who was  not 
intonned about the details of the  experiment.  Each session lasted approximately 40 
minutes. and subjects earned on average  12.70 Euros. 
2.4.1  Discussion 
The goal of  our design is to investi gate the releva nee of pure lie-aversion, el  iminating 
confounds  from  other  motives.  and  in  particular  controlling  for  act-based  guilt-
aversion.  To  understand this,  it  is convenient  to mention the predictions by severa! 
relevant  utility  theories.  First.  it  is  clear  that  a  selfish  player  A  wou ld  always 
announce  ·green·  in  any  treatment.  Second.  the same  prediction  is  shared  by any 
theory  assuming  that  people are  altruistic or that communication  affects  altruism. 
although for a diffèrent  reason. A  ltruism can  redu ce 1  ies if they are expected to harm 
the  receiver if trusted,  but  in  our  design B  ·  s payoff is  not affected  by A' s choice, so 
that there is  no altruistic reason ever to announce  'blue'. Third.  note  also  that truth-
telling cannat  be  motivated  by inequity aversion as  in  Fehr  and  Schmidt  (1999) or 
equilibrium . Sincc subjects do not know with whom they wi ll  be paired, the average percentage asked 
in  this  questicn prm·ides  a measure of Pr(green·•  1 blue].  which  will  eOJTelate with  (ii),  and  henee 
should also correlate with (i), according to the theory. 
21  First-order (sccond-01·dcr)  bcliefs were pa id only if the subject was la ter selected into rote B (A).  Wc 
did this in  arder to  a  void  payoff asymmetries. Our belief-elicitation protocol is simple and  rather easy 
to describe in  instructions. and  is not  marred by any hcdging problem. 11 2 
Bolton and  Ockenfels (2000). as  these models assume  that aversion to advantageous 
inequity is never so  strong that A-players would  'hurt"  themselves  to reduce  it, thus 
choosing (A. B) payotTallocation (14.  10) instead of (I S,  10).  Fourth, payoff-based 
guilt-aversion  as  in  Charness  and  Dufwenberg  (2006)  cannat  explain  any  "blue'' 
messages either.  This is bccause  it  is common knowledge  that B  's payoff is constant 
across messages. as arc. therefore. A  's second-order expectations. 
Consider now  lie-aversion. Clearly, a lie-averse player will tell  the truth  in any 
treatment i.e ..  announce 'blue·  ('green')  if the signal is blue (green)  if the utility cost 
of lying is large enough. Given the payoff' constellation in  our study. it  seems safe to 
assume  that  this  will  be  the  case  for  some  types.
22  Further,  the  probability  of 
appearance  of the blue  signal is irrelevant  for a lie-averse  player.  so  that this theory 
makes the fo llmving prediction: 
Prediction  LA  (lie-aversion): The  rate  of truth-telling (and  bence  also  of 
lying) will  be the same across treatments. 
With respect to act-based guilt, we  can apply axioms  1 and  2 introduced in 
Section 2.  Let pn  denote the probability  of a blue signal and  consider an A-player 
who observes  the green signa l.  From axiom 1 and  the definition of GA (z),  it  is clear 
that such player will  never lie,  i.e ..  announce  'blue', as he can get a higher payoff 
and suffer no guilt  by telling the truth.  lt fo llows  that  message 'blue' will  always  be 
trusted, so that the second-order beliefafter sending message 'blue' is J..l  u =O.  For an 
A-player who observes the blue signal.  in  turn, let p G denote the second-order belief 
that  A has  lied  if she announces  ·green'. Taking  into account p 
8  =  0 and  axiom  2, 
and  assuming that there exists some  measure  of A-players  for  any  possible value of 
22 If  the cost oftelling the truth was higher.  some lie-averse types could decide not to tell the truth. We 
would be unable, thercforc, to provide an accuratc estimation of the percentage of  subjects who dis like 
lies -i.e., of the rclevance of pure lie-aversion. 11 3 
6.,  it  fo li O \\ ~ .  that for  any  JI() there is a strictly positive  fraction/of  A-players that will 
say  ·green·  when  the  signal  is  blue  (i.e ..  lie).  By  Bayes·  theorem.  therefore.  the 
chance that message ·green·  is a lie is 
( 1.4) 
This  has  to coïncide with  JI  <i  if beliefs are consistent.  Since  this conditional 
probability depends positively on pn,  it  fo llows that people should expect more lies as 
fJB rises. This will  reduce the guilt associated  with  lying, and therefore increase the lie 
rate.23  A  simple  example  0 f  a  perfect  Bayesian  equilibrium  that  implements  this 
phenomenon can be found  in  Appendix Il. The general prediction is the following: 
Prediction  ABGA  (act-based  guilt-aversion): The rate of truth-telling will 
be  positive in both  treatments.  but  1 0\· Ver in  treatment  High; in  other words.  the High 
treatment will display the highest rate of lying. 
Therc are twn  intuitions behind this result: (i) lying by A is more likely if she 
believes that B expects a lie with  high probability, and (ii)  B expects a lie with  higher 
probability  in  High  becausc  the  blue  signal  is  more  likely  in  that treatment,  and 
therefore there are more occasions to get a larger payoff by lying after the blue signal 
(recall that lies are only predicted when the signal is blue;  otherwise they are costly). 
Since sender  in this theory tend to do what receivers expect them to do, a decrease  in 
truth-telling fo llows. ln  summary, a constant  rate across treatments allows us to reject 
act-based guilt  as  an  incentive  in this context.  and moreover provides  by elimination 
of other factors an estimation of  the rclevance of lie-aversion. 
23 Notice that(will thcrcforc change as weil.  This will  have a complementary effect, as ( 1) also ri ses in 
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2.5  Resu lts 
Player A has four possi ble pure strategies  in the game. Denoting them as the message 
sent  upon  seeing a  green (G)  and  blue  (B) circle.  respectively.  they  are:  .. payoff 
maximizing··  (G.  G);  .. honesr·  (G.  B):  .. mythomaniac··  (B.  G);  and  ''payoff 
minimizing  ..  (8, 8 ).  Table  1 indicates  the percentage  of subjects who  played each 
strategy  in  each treatment (High/Low). and  in  agg rega t e.
2 ~ Note that we  could  obtain 
this information because  we  used the strategy method in  the experiment.  As  we  can 
see,  the mos  frequent choices in  both treatments correspond  to strategies (G. G)  and 
(G. B), wh  ile other strategies are much less frequently chosen.
25 
Table 2.1  Percentage of  choice of each strategy in each treatment 
Strategies 
Treatmcnt  (G. G)  (G, B)  (B, G)  (8, B)  Total 
High  47.0 %  39.4%  2.27%  11 .4%  100% 
Low  54.8 %  38.1 %  2.38%  4.76%  100% 
Aggreg_ ate  50.8%  38.8%  2.33%  8.14%  100% 
Note: N =  132 and 126  in trcallllCill lligh and  l.o\1. rcsrcctivch. 
Our design includes  two  controls to discriminate between lie-aversion and  act-
based guilt.  For the first control, let.f{S)T denote the frequency of choice of strategy S 
in  treatment T (T  ==  H.  L).  According to  act-based  guilt only strategies (G,  G)  or (G, 
B) should be chosen. and  moreover (Prediction ABGA), the nu l!  hypothesisj{G, G) 11 
::::;  j{G, G) 1 should be rejected in favor of the alternative _f{G,  G)H >  j{G, G)L.  As 
Table 1 indicates. this will  not be possible.  Pure  lie-aversion, in contrast, predicts no 
24  We pool the data  from the two waves of subjeets (November 2010 and September-October 20 Il), as 
they  are  statistically  identical  in terms  or their  strategy  choices.  A Chi-square analysis of the joint 
distribution fails to rejcct  independence (d.f.  = 3; stat = 2.637; p-value = 0.451) 
2
'  None  of the theories  so  far  eonsidered in  this paper can explain  why  some small fractions  of the 
subjects  chose  the  payoff  minimizing  stratcgy  (8,  8)  or  the  mythomaniac  one  (8,  G)  in  both 
treatments.  We discuss this issue  later. 11 5 
difference  in the rate of choice of  the strategies (G. G) or (G. B) across treatments.  As 
observed.  no difference  is found and a Mann-Whitney test fails to reject hypothesesf 
(G.  G)H  =f(G. G)t (p  > 0.2). andf(G, 8 )11  =f(G, 8 )1.  (p  > 0.8).  Similar results 
follow  from a Chi-square ana  1  y  sis if we  restrict attention to the strategies  (G.  G) and 
(G. B), the only two  predicted by our  theories;
26 the Pearson Chi-Square statistic is 
0.495 (DF =  1. p-value = 0.482), while Fisher·s Exact test yields a p-value of0.509. 
As  a second  control.  we  can use  the subjects'  first and  second-order beliefs 
about deception. To  analyze  this issue from a theoretical point  of view.  we  start  by 
assuming that  beliets correctly anticipate behavior.  as  usual  in  equilibrium  analysis. 
Since act-based  guilt predicts a higher rate ofchoice of(G, G)  in  the High treatment. 
it  correspondingly predicts highcr expcctations of deception  in  that treatment.  Lie-
aversion,  in  contrast.  predicts  no  difference  in  behavior  and  therefore.  in  beliets 
across  treatments.  Table  2.2  reports data  about  subjects'  average  beliefs  in  each 
treatment  and  in  aggregate;  these  are  remarkably  constant  at  around  70%. 
Unsurprisingly.  a Mann-Whitney  test indicates that neither tïrst-order (p = 0.81) nor 
second-order (p = 0.97) bcliefs are signifïcant1y different across treatments.
27
.  Hence, 
the evidence  seems inconsistent  with act-based  guilt-aversion  and  more in  line with 
lie-aversion. 
Table 2.2  ptton 111  each treatment  Average beliefs about dece  · 
Treatment  Total 
High 
1 
Low  (N=258) 
(N= 132)  (N=l26) 
26 A Chi-square analysis of Table  1 is  invalid because the cxpccted counts of the payoffminimizers arc 
too low. 
27 Similar tests a  iso  rcveal that the two waves of subjccts are identical on first-order expectations (p = 
0.838) and second-ordcr cxpcctations (p = 0.990). 
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Mean  Mean  Mean 
(S.E.)  (S.E.)  (S.E.) 
Average  fi rst-order bel  iefs  70  69  70 
(2.50)  (2.6 1)  ( 1.80) 
Average second-order beliefs  70  71  70 
(2.28)  (2 .30)  ( 1.62) 
Note: S.E. = Standard errm ni' the mean.  M.:ans ha\C he.:n roundcd ln lwo signilicanl  digits. First-ordcr hclicls 
rc flcct thc answer ln th <:  que,;tion: "Hhat perœ ntage u(subjects \l'ill send the green message un S!!eing th!!  blue 
li[Zht:' ..  Second-ordcr  helicE;  relk ct  the  ans\\ cr  ln  the  question  "/J'hat  \l'ill  bi'  the  arerag!!  ansll'er  lU  the 
questiun a hure:' .. 
What  if we drop the standard  assumption that priors (i.e., beliefs) are common 
and  conect,  and  assume  instead  that  players  have  heterogeneous priors  and  play 
optimally given  their own  priors?  ln this case, act-based guilt  predicts that player A  ·s 
decision to lie aftcr the  blue signal should  depend  positively on his beliefthat the co-
player expects him to  lie. According  to this theOI-y, therefore,  a participant  in  any 
treatment who  reports a high  second-order  belief about deception is more likely to 
send message 'green· atter the blue signal.  Our data in  Table 2.3 are emphatically in 
line  with  this:  Pooled across  treatments, subjects who planned  to send  the message 
·green' when  the circle was blue had on average a second-order belief of deception of 
81.5 percem; the value for subjects who sent message 'blue·  was 58.1  percent.n  This 
difference  is  significant  (Mann-Wh itney  p  <  0.0001 );  interestingly,  second-order 
beliefs are a iso significantly more dispersed (variance ratio test p < 0.0001 ). 
T  bi  2 3  a  e  s  ummary statistics on secon  d  d  bl' f b  -or  er  e 1 e s,  > y strategy. 
Behavior  N  Mean  SE 
Honest (G.B)  100  59  2.69 
Minimizer (B,B)  21  53  6.32 
2 ~  Note weil  that the first pcrcentage  refers to the subjects choosing eithcr  (G,  G) or (8, G), 
whereas the second one rcfcrs to the subjccts playing cithcr (G, 8) or (8, 8). 
~----------- ----------~--- ---~-------------117 
Blue message m·era/1  121  58  2.-18 
Maximizer (G.G)  131  82  1.58 
Mythomaniac (B.G)  6  59  10.78 
Green me.1.wge overa/1  137  81  1.62 
Total  258  70  1.62 
Figure 2. 1 provides  further  illustration of the correlation between beliefs  and 
behavior.  Each  circle  (squared)  point  in  this  fi gure  represents  a  subject  who  sent 
message  ·blue· ("green') a  ft  er the blue signa  1 in  our treatments,  placed according to 
her second- and  first-order beliefs. We can see  that the subjects choosing message 
'green'  arc hig hly concentrated  in  the upper  end  of the scale,  that  is,  second-order 
beliefs  significantly predict the decision  to lie after the blue signal. 
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Figure 2.1  Beliefs on choosing each message after the blue signal 
In  addition, Figure  2. 1 also  shows by  means of two  regressions !ines  that  first 
and second-order beliefs are correlated for each group of agents.  Since we saw before 
that second-order beliefs are  correlated with  the  decision  to  lie, it follows  that first-
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order beliefs are also  correlated  with  the  decision  to  lie. That  is, people who  expect 
many  subjects  to  lie  are  ill~o  more  likely  to  lie.  For  instance,  pooled  across 
treatments, subjects  who chose the strategies (G,  8) and (G, G) respectively expected 
that  54  and  84  percent  of the  participants  would  lie. This  is  again  a  significant 
difference; Mann-Whitney test, p < 0.0001.  ln  summary, therefore, our data indicates 
a clear correlation  between  beliefs and  behavior (see also  Lundquist et  al., 2009  on 
this),  but fïrst-order beliefs already capture this  relation, and  second-order beliefs do 
not appear to provide much more  insight. 
lt  is  worthwhilc  to  note  that.  white a relation  between  beliefs and  behavior is 
predicted  by act-based  guilt-aversion.  it  is not  incompatible with  pure  lie-aversion. 
simply because the latter theory makes no defïnite prediction  in  this respect once one 
allows for heterogencous beliefs between players.  However, our results suggest that a 
theory of lie-aversion might be complemented with  some assumptions in this respect. 
For  instance.  in  a conte:xt  of' heterogeneous priors, the data are  consistent  with  the 
idea  that  people are  averse to  break  norms of honesty,  particularly if  they  do  not 
expect others to break  thosc  norms. i.e.,  to lie  (Bicchieri, 2005; L6pez-Pérez, 201 0; 
Cialdini. Reno. and  Kallgren.  1990).
29 
ln  mak ing the  suggestion  that  lie-aversion and  honest behavior  interact with 
first-order beliefs, we  are  weil  aware of two caveats.  First, even  if the conjecture  is 
correct, the measured  association  may  not  be  valid.  Participants  in  our  experiment 
stated  their  beliefs  after choosing  their  actions.  and  if those  who  lied  themselves 
would ·'prefer to believe·' that others were lying, too, then they might come to believe 
such thing in order to (unconsciously) avoid cognitive dissonance. Note however that 
this eftèct should  be at  !east attenuated  by the payment for accurate beliefs. Second, 
the association between  honesty and  stated beliefs is vulnerable to the now  relatively 
29  If this wcre truc, our design  cou Id undcrcstimate the relevance  of pure lie-aversion. In  effect, some 
people cou Id bC'  l i c-ave r~c but lie  in our cxperiment  bccause they expect most others to  lie as weil. 
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well-known ar  gu  ment  about  the  (la Ise)  consensus effect  (  e.g.  Ross  et  al..  1  977). 
According to thi  hypothesis.  people project their own behavior. attitudes and  beliefs 
onto ethers. tending to overestimate the extent to which ethers act and think the same 
way they do. Th  us subjects who do not  lie tend to think others don  "t  lie either, and  by 
extension that others expect them not to lie.  Hence the beliefs do not drive  the action: 
rather.  somc  persona!  charactcristic  is  driving  both  the  beliefs  and  the  action. 
generating a spurious relationship. ln this respect.  the strong correlation between first 
and  second-order beliefs  (Spearman  ·s p =  0.827.  p-value < 0.0001) shown in  Figure 
2. 1 is consistent  with  the consensus etTect.
3u Further research should  clarify whether 
the relation between honest behavior and  beliefs isjust a result ofthis effect, or due to 
an interaction betwcen lie-aversion and  beliefs. 
We continue  by  arguing that the results mentioned in  this section are not an 
artifact of the use of the strategy method.  Recall  in  this respect  that subjects in  the 
H  igh and  Low  trealments  had to  indicate  the  message  to  be  sent  in  any  possible 
contingency;  i.e.,  they  made  hypothetical decisions  for  both  circle  colors  before 
discovering  the  truc  color  or the  circle.  Given  the  hypothetical  nature  of these 
decisions,  one mighl argue that emotions like guilt are less vivid  in  this case, and  thal 
could  have  an effect on  behavior.  To  check  for  this,  we  ran a  control treatment 
without the strate  gy method, which coincided with  our  H  igh treatment  in  everything 
except that subjects made their choice after seeing the randomly selected circle color 
in their screens. <::nd  thal beliefs about deception were conditional on hav ing seen the 
blue  signal.  We  focused on the  High  treatment  simply because  lies  are most likely 
when the signal is blue:  reca ll  also that we found  previously no significant behavioral 
differences across lreatmcnts. 
30 Y  et we note that  second-arder cxpcctations shom?d a "regression towards the mean: · Thus. subjcets 
with  very high  fir ,;t-ordcr cxpcctations  had second-arder expectations systematica lly  lower than the 
first,  whilc  subjccts with  cxccptionally  low  first-ordcr  expectations "recognized''  that  others \l·ould 
guess highcr than they. This is reflected in a regression slopc significantly different from  1 (p < 0.005) 120 
A total of 40 subjects participated  in  this control treatment, and  the distribution 
of gender  and  major  was  similar  to  our  two  other  treatments.  ln  effect, a  Mann-
Whitney test of the hypothesis of  equal gender distributions yields a p-value of 0.700, 
wh ile  Fisher's exact test of the equality of the major distributions yields a p-value of 
O. 796. Our  main  results  in  this  section  are  replicated. First,  among  the  30  subjects 
who  saw  the  blue circle  in  their screens,  40  percent sent the truthful  message  'blue'. 
This  is  not  significantly  different  than  the  analogous  rate  in  the  High  treatment 
(Mann-Whitney  p =  0.909). We  also  observe a correlation  between  honest behavior 
and beliefs. Subjects who sent a fa Ise 'green' message reported both  first and second-
arder  beliefs  of deception  that  were  significantly  higher  than  those  reported  by 
subjects who  chose to  send  a truthful  'blue'  message  (first order:  p < 0.00 1; second 
order: p < 0.005). Table 4 shows subjects' average beliefs about deception depending 
on  history  of play  (i.e.  the  color  of the  circle  observed,  and  the  message  sent 
afterwards).  First and  second-order expectations were  again  strongly  correlated  (r  = 
O.  786, p < 0.0001 ). 
T  bi  2 4  a  e  A verage b  1"  f  d ..  e 1 e s, con  1t10na  on  f  1  1 story o  p ay 
Circle color  Average beliefs 
Message sent  Mann-Whitney p 
Green  Blue 
fi rst -order  90  58  0.0008 
Blue  second-arder  90  63  0.0010 
N  18  12 
fi rst -order  81  52  0.087 
Green  second-order  81  68  0.290 
N  8  2 
Note:  Mann-Whitney test of equality of beliets ac ross messages sent. 
We  finish  this section with a brief discussion of the  behavior of the  8.14% of 
subjects who  chose  the  'minimizing·  strategy  (B,  B).  One  potential explanation  of 
this  behavior is  th at  th ose subjects were  trying to  avoid  the  receiver' s suspicion  th at 
they  might  be  lying,  perhaps because they expect that such  a suspicion  would  bring 121 
disapproval  (on  disapproval-aversion,  see  L6pez-Pérez  and  Yorsatz,  201 0).  Sorne 
evidence  points  in  this tine. First, this theory  predicts that  choice  (B, B) should  be 
more  frequent  in  the  High  treatment.  Since the  blue  (green) message  is likely to be 
trusted  in  the  High (Low) treatment, disapproval-averse agents should  choose (B. B) 
in  High  and  (G, G)  in  Low.  lndeed,  the  only significant  effect  that  the  different 
treatments  seem  to  have  induced  is  a  (marginal)  difference  in  the  mini rn ization 
behavior (Mann-Whitney test; p-value =  0.053). Second, we asked the subjects at the 
end  of the  experiment to  write  an  open-form  reason for their  message choice  if the 
circ le  was blue.  Frequent! y,  the justifications of those subjects choosing strategy  (B, 
B)  made  reference either to the  probability of the  blue signal or to the  B-party. For 
instance, one  subject choosing (B,  B)  in  treatment  High justified sending the blue 
message after the  blue signal  in  the following manner: "The color was  actually blue 
and  moreover  the  blue  circle  had  a  likelihood  of  appearance  of  75%  so  that 
participant B would consider me  sincere  with  75% of probability".  Other examples 
included "the  blue circle was  the most likely to appear'' [from treatment  High],  and 
"since the  green  circle  is  most  likely to appear,  B would  very likely think  that the 
green circle  would  appear"  [from  someone choosing strategy  (G,  G)  in  treatment 
Low]. 
2.6  Conclusion 
This  paper  reports  the  results  from an experiment  investigating whether pure  lie-
aversion affects truth-telling.  Our design allows  us to discriminate between this and 
other potential motivations for truth-telling that have been considered in the literature. 
Participants  in  our  design know  that uttering a  lie  will  increase  their  own money 
payoff and  at the same  time will  intlict  no  harm  on  anybody, or  atfect  anyone·s 
payoff expectations.  Further, they  are isolated from each other: They  do not  know 
anything about their co-player and their decisions are anonymous.  As a result, nobody 
should  tell  the  truth  in our  setting  for  altruism  or  to  shape  the  receiver's  payoff 
expectations. In  contrast, people could tell  the  truth  if they dislike  lies.  We  consider 122 
two  variants of this  idea: (i)  Pure  lie-aversion  and  (ii)  act-based  guilt-aversion. The 
first pred icts truth-telling if  the cost is low, irrespective of  other variables. The second 
one  implies that  people  will  tell  the  truth  if it  is not very  costly and  moreover they 
believe that others  expect truth-telling from them. Our two treatments  permit us to 
discriminate between these motivations. 
Our main  results  are  the  following:  ( 1) Overall, nearly 40%  of the  subjects 
choose  the  strategy  consistent  with  pure  lie-aversion;  (2)  we  tind  no  significant 
evidence  for  act-based guilt  aversion;  (3)  there  is a correlation between  beliefs and 
honest behavior, so  that people telling the  truth expect a higher  fraction of others to 
tell  the  truth  as  weil.  These  results suggest that  pure  lie-aversion is a  widespread 
motive, possibly  influenced  by beliefs  (as  suggested by Bicchieri, 2005), and  have 
implications  tor  understanding  behavior.  For  instance,  surveys  are  often  used  to 
explore societal trends, and questionnaires are also employed  in  experiments (such  as 
the  current one,  for  example). Responders often get no reward  tor  their answers,  so 
that one  could  expect them  to answer in  a random  manner and  hence  consider their 
answers  as  simply 'hot air'. Yet  our  study suggests that sorne responders might  tell 
the truth even if they suffer a small  cost, so  that truth-telling should arguably be more 
pronounced  if it  involves no cast (as  in  most surveys,  if not ali).  Of course,  other 
factors may affect responses.  A desire  tor privacy or an aversion to  disapproval  from 
the  people  running the survey may lead  to  biased  responses to sensitive questions. ln 
addition, respondents may not  perfectly recall  the  information the questions  require. 
For  instance,  the  reasons  that  subjects  give  to  justi fy  past  decisions  may  be 
psychologically distinct from  their motivations at the  moment of action.  While these 
factors should not be  ignored, our results suggest at least that a complete disregard for 
surveys or questionnaires is not warranted. 
Our  results  might  help  to  understand  previous  experimental  results.  For 
instance, Peeters et al. (2007) note  in a repeated game that sorne subjects tell the truth 123 
m  most  rounds  but  not  always,  which  seems  inconsistent  with  pure  lie-aversion. 
However, if the  behavior of the  lie-averse types depends on their  first-order beliefs 
and  these beliefs  change with  repetition, we  could  observe  some  lie-averse  players 
who  change  their  behavior accordingly.  Finally,  our  results  might  also  provide  a 
benchmark  for  new  experiments.  ln  this  respect,  we  propose  three  questions with 
which  we  hope  to  suggest  future  experiments.  First,  how  strong  is  lie-aversion? 
Truth-telling in  our  study was  cheap Uust  1 Euro), would  it  decrease  radically if its 
cost increases to, say,  5 Euros? Second, do people dislike tel  ling lies or do they enjoy 
telling the  truth  (Sanchez-Pagés  and  Vorsatz, 2009)? One can distinguish between 
these  accounts  in  a slight  variation of our  basic game where player A also  has  the 
option to remain si  lent, in  which case she gets 15 Euros (B always gets 1  0).  When the 
circle  is  blue,  a  lie-averse  player  would  maximize  her  utility  choosing  silence, 
whereas  a player who (sufficiently) enjoys  telling the truth  would  choose  the 'blue' 
message.  Third,  neuro-economic  research  (  e.g.  Zak,  20 1  1;  Sommer  et  al,  20 1  0) 
suggests that moral cognition contains emotional (quick,  instinctive  and cn1de), as 
weil  as  reasoned (slow, deliberative and  sophisticated) components.  lt  is conceivable 
that these  components  manifest  themselves  as  different  kinds of "other-regarding'· 
preference.  For instance, the aversion to lying seems instinctive and emotional.  which 
could explain  its prevalence. On the other hand. theories such as guilt aversion, which 
require  sorne  interpretation  of the  co-player's  expectations,  may  be  part  of the 
reasoned  moral arsenal.  One could  hence  think that such ·reasoned'  factors  have  an 
effect only if conveniently primed by the context. 
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APPEN DICE C 
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Thank  you very much for  participating in this experiment, which is  financed  by  a 
research fund. Our aim  is to study how people make decisions.  ln  total, more than 40 
people will  participate in this study,  in severa! sessions. There are no tricky questions, 
you must simply choose as  you prefer.  At the end of the experiment, you will  be paid 
sorne money;  the precise  amount  will  depend  on chance  and your  decisions during 
the ex periment.  lt  is very important  that you do not  talk  to  any other participant.  1  f 
you do not fo llow this rule we will  have to exclude you from the experiment and you 
will  not earn  any money. If you have questions, please  raise  your hand  and  we  will 
assist you. 
Description of the Ex peri ment 
ln  this experiment there  are  two  types  of participants  (A  and  8). The  basic 
task of each  A is  choosing a message for  B.  More precise!  y,  tm,vards  the end of the 
experiment, A's computer will  randomly reveal  either a blue circle or a green one-
the  probability  of a  blue  circle  is  [75%  in  the  High  treatment,  25%  in  the  Low 128 
treatment].  A will  observe  the  circle  in  the  screen  and  then  send  to  B one  of the 
following two messages: (i) 'the blue circle has appeared', or (ii)  'the green circ le has 
appeared'.  Payoffs  are  as  follows: A will  always  get  14  Euros  if he/she  announces 
that the  blue circle appeared and  15  Euros if he/she  announces green. The payoff of 
any B is  10  Euros in  any case.  We remark that B will  not observe  the colour selected 
by the computer, but only receive A's message. 
Since  we  want  to  know  the  message  that  you would  send  in  any possible 
contingency,  we  will  proceed according to the  following  protoco l.  To start, each of 
you will  choose as ifyou were an A-participant. ln addition, before  knowing the color 
(blue/green) selected by the computer, you must indicate the message that you would 
send toBin two possible cases: (a) if the blue circle were selected and (b) if the green 
circle were  selected. Afterwards, each  of you will  complete a short  and  anonymous 
questionnaire. Only then  will  your actual type  be randomly determined (A  or B with 
probability  50%  each)  and  revealed  to  you. Moreover,  each A-participant  wi ll  be 
randomly matched with a different 8-participant.  If you happen to be  A, you will  see 
the  co lor of the  circle  in  the  screen, and  your corresponding message will  be sent  to 
B.  If you are  chosen  to  be B, you will  receive  the  message  chosen by  A,  and  your 
previous responses  to  (a)  and  (b) will  have no effect.  Note  we il  that  you wi ll  never 
know  the  type  of any  other  participant, nor will  any other participant  get to know 
your type. The decisions in  this experiment are anonymous, that is,  no  participant wi ll 
ever know  which participant made which choice.  For this  reason, no  participant wi ll 
know the  identity of the person with whom he/she is paired. 
The  experiment  will  end  with  another  short  and  anonymous questionnaire. 
Y  our payment will  be made  in  private in  an  adjoining office by an assistant  unrelated 
to  this study. This assistant will  only  know  your  final payoff in  this experiment, but 
not what you actually chose in the experiment. 
- - 1 - ----------
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Before we start  the  experiment,  please  answer the  following  questions.  Raise 
your hand when you are done so that we can verify the answers. 
ln a hypothetical example, assume  that the computer selects color ______  _ 
(choose  either  'green'  or  'blue'  to  construct  your  own  example), and  that  A had 
decided  in  that  case  to  send  message  _ ____________ _ _  _ 
(choose either 'green appeared' or 'blue appeared' to construct your own example). 
For this hypothetical example, answer the following questions, 
•  What would A's payoffbe? __  _ 
•  What would B's payoffbe? _ ___  _ 
•  What would A's payoffbe,  ifshe/he had chosen the other message? _ __  _ 
•  What  would  B's  payoff  be,  if  A  had  chosen  the  other  message? 
ln addition: 
•  Will  Bever know the color that actually appeared?  Y  es  No 
•  A  fier your type has  been determined and  provided th at you are of type A. can 
you change your prior choices?  Y  es  No 
•  Can A ever affect B's balance?  Y  es 
•  Can B ev er affect A' s balance?  Y  es 
•  Do A's choices affect A's balance?  Y es 
No 
No 
No 
•  What is the probability that the circle is blue-colored? _ _ __  _ 130 
APPENDICE D 
EXAMPLE EQUILIBRIUM 
Suppose  that utility can  be described by the  function U =x- y max[O, 1-J h, where 
x is the monetary payoff, 1 is an  indicator for lying,  JL  0  is as defined in  Section 2, and 
y  is  an  idiosyncratic  sensitivity  parameter  randomly  distributed  over  sorne  non-
negative interval according to a cumulative density tùnction F.  A simple extension of 
the  PBE concept  requires player A to maximize utility  given beliefs. and  that A use 
Bayes'  rule,  where  possible,  to  define  player  B's (second-order) expected  beliefs. 
Predictions are as follows. First, never lie when the circle is green. Second, since  the 
monetary gain  from lying is  1 in  our  game,  it  fo llows  that A will  lie on seeing the 
blue circle  if y< Il( 1 - ,LP) =y. Thus, as  long as  the support of y includes this value, 
Bayes'  rule  will  always be  defined. The  fraction  of A-players who will  lie can be 
written as( = F( y *). Combining this with (1.4)  in  Section 3 implicitly detinesfas an 
increasing function of PB·  For  instance,  if y distributes  uniformly on [0, r], tor r 
sufficiently large,  then an interior solution will satisfy /  = 
1
- Pu  , which rises 
r (  1 - ' ) u ) - f?" 
with PB· lt  may  be  interesting to note that under the (restrictive)  assumptions above. 
the previous expression permits  one to estimate the upper bound  of the distribution, 
r. The value off  can  be estimated from the data, and PB is  imposed  in  the treatment. 
The estimate will  be 
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(Dl) 
wheref(G,G) is the proportion ofthe sample that chose that strategy.  Based on 
our  (High,  Low)  lie  rates  of (0.54386,  0.58974), we  can  calculate estimates of the 
upper bound of  4.84 and 2.03, respectively. Since the assignment to these groups was 
random, such a large difference in preferences seems unlikely. We therefore take this 
as  evidence  rejecting the  model.  Of course,  we  cannot determine  whether  it  is act-
based guilt, the distribution of y,  or the simple formulation of our utility function  that 
is to blame for the rejection. 
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CHAPITRE III 
THE BLIND AND THE BLINKERED: 
WHEN SELF-DECEPTION FRAMES MORAL CHOICE 
Abstract: This paper models the organizational effects of one kind of rule-following 
behavior. The mode!  features a behavioral (moral)  rule  prescribing costly effort, but 
to  an  extent that is a matter of sorne  uncertainty.  An  lncumbent (she)  is  informed of 
the  salience  of the  rule,  and  an  uninformed  Entrant  (he),  must  try  to  learn  from 
observing the lncumbent's choices. The lncumbent has no incentive to manipulate the 
information  that  the  Entrant  receives.  However,  she  may  try  to  sel/deceive  in  a 
manner modeled as a signaling game she plays against herself.  For the  lncumbent, the 
mode!  generates distorted  signais,  with  the  leve!  of distortion  increasing  with  moral 
sense.  Analysis  of the  Entrant  compares  the  case  in  which  he  must  rely  on  the 
Incumbent's "words" - that is, the message she sends to herse!  f- with  th at  in  which 
he  must  rely  on  her  '·actions"  - the  effort  leve!  furnished,  and  that  where  he  has 
access  to  both  indicators.  Words  are  found  to  give  more  precise  information than 
actions,  but  less  than  both  together.  Further,  Entrant  effort  will  be  positively 
correlated  with  the  lncumbent's  moral  sense  whenever  effort  is  observable.  but 
negatively correlated when only messages are observable. 
Résumé: Ce papier modélise les effets organisationnels d'un comportement 
caractérisé par une adhésion aux règles. Le modèle contient une règle 
comportementale (dite « morale »), qui  prescrit de  l'effort coûteux, mais jusqu'à un 
point qui n'est pas connu avec certitude, a priori. Un « ancien » (lncwnbent) est 
informé de l'importance de la règle tandis qu'un « nouveau » (Entrant), non  informé. 
doit essayer d'apprendre en observant les choix de l'ancien. Celui-ci ne veut pas 
manipuler l'information que  le nouveau reçoit. Or, il  peut essayer des 'aveugler d'une 
manière modélisée par un jeu de signal qu' il joue contre lui-même. Le modèle génère 
des distorsions de signaux qui augmentent avec la sensibilité morale. L'analyse du 
nouveau nous porte à comparer les cas où (a)  il  observe les « mots » de  l'ancien- son 
message du jeu de signal-, (b)  il  voit ses« actes » - le  niveau d'effort fourni- et (c)  il 
voit  les deux.  Les mots donnent de l'information plus précise que les actes. De plus, 
l'effort du nouveau sera en corrélation positive avec  la sensibilité morale de l'ancien 
dans tous les cas où l'effort est observable, mais en corrélation négative quand le 
nouveau ne voit que des messages. l, 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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3.1  Introduction 
ln  many social situations, including the workplace, clubs, buses, elevators and  the  in-
laws'  house,  people  learn  about the  norms  of appropriate  behaviour  not just from 
explicit,  formai  direction, but also  from  simply watching what  other people say and 
do. We  may have general  ideas about the  kind of behaviour that  is  accepted since  in 
any  culture  there  are  principles  which  transcend  any  given  situation  and  can  be 
applied  with  sorne  confidence  to  new  contexts.  However,  there  is  also  substantial 
variation  in  the  leve!  of acceptable behaviour across individual circumstances, and  it 
is natural to try to  pick up elues asto when one may  use one's fingers when eating, or 
what kind  of attitude  to  take  with  regards  to  a person  making  a toast, by  means  of 
surreptitious  gleanings  from  other  individuals.  ln  a  potentially  more  serious  case, 
employees  in  an  organization may  be  faced  with  various  venal  temptations, ranging 
from  priva te  use of company vehicles to accepting bribes.  Particularly when  they are 
in  sorne  doubt  about  whether  or  not  these  practices  are  ·'acceptable",  they  may 
attempt to interpret others' behaviour to  form  their opinions, without explicitly asking 
for  direction.  However  common,  the  process  of using  elues  to  define  acceptable 
behaviour is  fraught with  peril.  ln  this  paper, 1 focus on  two specifie kinds of danger 
the potential leamer faces.  First, there is no guarantee that the person from  whom one 
takes  his  eues  actually  cares  much  for  the  rules  at  hand.  If we  admit that  there  are 
rules  which  are  sometimes important to  obey  for  their own sake, for  instance, stock 
analysts'  diligent reporting of the  status of client companies, then  it  is  possible that 
one may  learn the wrong thing from  watching an  unscrupulous analyst.  Furthermore, 
when  following  the  rules  for  the task  at  hand  is  also  costly  in  some  way, then  even 
those  (analysts)  who  intrinsically  care  for  the  rules  may  try  to  self-deceive, 134 
understating  their  importance  to  avoid  the  necessity  of full  compliance. This  self-
deception  may  contaminate  other individuals who  are  attempting  to  form  opinions 
based on watching the self-deceiver. 
For the purposes of this paper, l examine these phenomena in a relatively stark 
form.  A follower, called the Entrant (or he) in the mode!, learns about how  rigorously 
a  rule  must  be  followed  from  observing  the  leader,  called  the  lncumbent  (she), 
without that Incumbent actually aiming to  have such influence. There is  no  strategie 
interrelationship  in  the  payoffs  between  players  in  this  paper.  They  do  not  try  to 
influence one another's behaviour at a11
63
.  Nevertheless, in  equilibrium (sorne of)  the 
participants do manage to influence (sorne) others. The mechanism for this channel of 
influence  is  close  to  the  "herding"  behaviour  of Bikhchandani,  Hirshleifer  et  al. 
( 1992) (BHW).  But wh ile  the  basic Bayesian learning mechanism may  be  the  same, 
the  mode!  in  this  paper is  quite different from  the  BHW setup
64
.  For instance, BHW 
focuses  on  interactions between  identical  individuals, while 1 allow heterogeneity of 
type.  Moreover,  l allow  the  possibility  that  the  lncumbent may  attempt  to  deceive 
herself about  the  rigor  required.  To  illustrate  the  impact  of this  self deception, 
consider  the  comparison  with  effect  identified  as  ·'cascading•·  in  BHW.  ln  BHW, 
agents  sequentially  adopt  an  action  if it  seems  valuable,  and  reject  it  otherwise, 
having  observed  the  previous  decisions.  lndividuals  late  in  a  sequence  may  well 
ignore their own information if it  is  subject to  error, and contradicts the  bulk of what 
is  already accumulated. ln  the  situation in  the  mode!  presented here,  the  first mover 
may  distort  her  perceptions  to  yield  an  interpretation  different  from  the  truth.  For 
63  White  this  runs counter to a strong intuition about  social interactions that is without  doubt 
important ground  for  future research, we will  find  that the madel is complicated cnough for one papcr 
even in  this highly pared-down form. 
64 For instance, 1  drop the two arguably most central fcatures of the  ir madel: (a) a long sequence 
of players, (b) each of whom observes an i.i.d. signal.  These are not relevant  for my work, so 1 assume 
there are only 2 players. and only one observes the ··signal  ... 135 
example, she may try to  "convince herself' that  her chosen action  is  valuable where 
the evidence suggests it is not. 
Such  self-deception raises  two  important questions:  why, and  how?  Each  of 
these questions is  certainly involved, and a full  treatment is  left to  future  work. As a 
beginning to  understanding the  framework  for  these question, I explore the  idea  that 
there  is  a fundamental  ambiguity  about  the  context of the  in  which  these  question 
arise.  Prior  works  suggests  that  the  ambiguity  can  arise  from  severa!  sources. 
Bénabou (e.g., 2009) considers savoring utility, reflecting that the actual benefit of an 
action  is  uncertain  because  it  is  in  the  future.  Experiments  such  as  those  of Dana, 
Weber et al. (2007) and Haisley and Weber (2008) introduce uncertainty in the payoff 
constellations. They conclude that generally, the  more vivid or obvious the  evidence 
for  the  true  state  of the  world  is, the  harder  it  will  be  to  self-deceive  about  it.  The 
degree of precision in the  information is al  most certainly important in determining its 
vividness. Perfect  information  will  be  more  vivid  than  imperfect  information, and 
more  precise  imperfect  information  will  be  more  vivid  than  less  precise  imperfect 
infonnation. It may also be that there are some other qualities that affect the vividness 
of information.  ln the  mode!  below, I simplify these considerations, and consider two 
classes of information. "Vague" information is sufficiently imprecise, that individuals 
are able to self-deceive concerning it.  By contrast, I define ·'vivid" information as that 
which precludes self-deception. 
ln  addition  to  this  uncertainty, self-deception  requires  that  the  self deceiver 
have preferences over the  possible states of the  world. If we  allow any  benefit at  ali 
from  believing true propositions, then a persan will only  try  to  convince herself that 
state p is  really state not-p if she strictly prefers state not-p. In  the  madel below, this 
state-preference cornes from astate-contingent moral obligation that l cali  the .. Moral 136 
Compatibility  Constraint"  (MCC)
65
.  The  MCC  obliges  people  to  exert  a  leve!  of 
effort  (a  cost)  that  varies depending on  the  particular state.  For  instance,  stealing  is 
al ways wrong, but taking $100 le ft  in an automated tell er machine by sorne forgetful 
person  might  make  you  fee!  less  bad  than  taking  the  money  directly  out  of 
somebody's wallet. The aim of self-deception is essentially a relaxation of the  MCC. 
The  self deception  can  be  considered  a re-interpretation  of the  situation so  that  it 
requires a lower effort (cost).  ln the  mode! below, the deception is operationalised in 
a signalling game  that  the  self-deceiver plays  against herself.  The  interpretation  of 
this  "message"  is  the  "motivated  reasoning  process"  (Mele  1997)  by  which  she 
attempts  to  manipulate  her  beliefs. Her  actions  may  also  involve  sorne  observable 
behavior (rehearsing the desired beliefs,  for  instance) or the actions may  be hidden.  1 
thus  mode!  self-deception  as  an  intentional  action.  Such  a  strategy  should  be 
considered an  application of the  standard ·'as if' assumption.  Although many  actual 
processes of motivated reasoning are likely unconscious in  psychological experience, 
and  hence  seem  outside  the  bounds  of rationality,  for  the  purposes  of this  paper  l 
assume  that  these  processes  confonn  to  what  would  happen  if  she  intentionally 
manipulated her beliefs. 
A longstanding question in the study of sel [-deception con ce ms how a rational 
individual  may  both (as  self-deceiver) know  proposition p and  (as  self-deceived)  be 
fooled  into  thinking  something  different.  In  this  mode!,  1 address  this  issue  as  a 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)  in  which the  lncumbent acts  both  as  the  sender 
and receiver of a message. She sends herself a message determined by an equilibrium 
function,  and then  interprets  it  based on  the  kind  of actual  situation that  would  lead 
her to send that message. Thus self-deception succeeds only in  those cases where the 
65  The terminology is  an allusion  to the "lncentive Compatibility Constraint" (!CC)  \YCII known 
from  Principal-Agent problems. Just as  the !CC  is  a condition that "compels'' the  Agent to  carry  out 
the actions thal the Principal desires, so this is a condition that ·•compels'' the playcrs to obey the rule. l 
do not, however, explicitly mode! a Principal who establishes this constraint. 137 
equilibrium beliefs following reception of a message rn  are different from  the  state of 
the world which generates rn, which implies that self-deception requires sorne pooling 
of the  equilibrium  messages.  For  self-deception  to  occur  in  the  mode!,  it  must  be 
because the message elicited could have come from more than one observed salience. 
Otherwise,  even  distorted  messages  will  be  perfectly  decodable.  ln  Section  2  1 
establish the  extent to  and  conditions  under which  the  lncumbent succeeds  in  such 
self-deception. ln  Section 3 l extend the mode!  to  the  Entrant's rational  interpretation 
of the  lncumbent's observable  actions.  Section 4 offers  sorne  additional  discussion 
and Section 5 concludes. 
3.2  A mode! framework 
3.2.1  Preliminaries 
ln  this mode!,  two  players, an  lncumbent (she)  and an  Entrant (he)  face  a moral  rule 
of the  type '1ake due care" or "tell no  lies" or "read  the  papers you cite.'' The actual 
amount of care they take (Deffains and Fluet forthcoming), threshold "shade of gray'' 
of lie they tell (Erat and Gneezy 2009), or importance of the paper they merely accept 
from  a "reliable" reference list (Simkin and Roychowdhury 2003), is considered to be 
a continuous variable.  lt  is denoted e for "effort exerted",  and  takes non-negative  real 
values.  As  the  examples above  illustrate, this  effort  may have  sorne  external social 
value. However,  it  is  costly to exert.  For simplicity
66
,  1 assume that the  net marginal 
cost of effort is  linear, normalized  to  l. The  cost to  an individual  of exerting effort 
leve! e is e, and therefore the individually rationallevel of effort to exert isO. 
The  actual  leve!  of effort  exerted  is  determined  by  the  product  of two 
parameters. The first, y,  denotes the  individuals "moral  sense'' or  inherent sensitivity 
to the rule, and the second, CJ, denotes the general relevance of the rule to  the current 
66 This assumption will  necessarily shape the form  of the equilibrium  results.  Gcneralizations 
are to  other ·'weil  behaved'' li.mctions should yield qualitatively  similar  results,  but are  lel't  to  furthcr 
work. 138 
decision  context.  The  parameters  are  viewed  as  independent  random  variables 
distributing on known  functions  G(.)  and H(.),  respectively.  I will  generally  assume 
that both  are  uniform distributions. The support of G will  be [0/
1
]; for  H it  will  be 
[0, 1]. 
Contrary to the view developed in,  for  instance, Bénabou and Tiro le (20 1  0), I 
assume that y is vivid
67
- in other words, people are clear on the ir own moral position. 
No  self-deception  is  possible  with  regards  to  y.  In  the  mode!  presented  here,  the 
quality  of the  information  about  o- is  one  of the  main  differences  between  the 
Incumbent and  the  Entrant.  The  Incumbent  observes  o- as  "vague"  information; the 
Entrant does  not  observe  o- at  ail.  The  interpretation  of this  assomption  is that  the 
Incumbent has  more  experience  in  the  kind  of dilemma at  hand, and  thus  is able to 
better discriminate the  salience  of the  rule.  For  the  Entrant, ali  dilemmas look  the 
same
68
. Thus the  type of an  Incumbent is two-dimensional, taking values  in  f x[O, 1]. 
The Entrant's type, by contrast, is scalar. taking values in r. 
I stated  above  that  the  product of the  parameters  y and  o-determines  effort. 
However, it  will  be  noticed  that  y is the  only  one  that  is  known, in  general, with 
certainty.  The  information  that  players  have  with  respect  to  o- depends  upon  their 
type.  lncumbents have  perfect information  initially, but this  may  be  marred  by  their 
later  self-deception.  Entrants  have  no  information  initially  beyond  the  prior 
distribution H, and must form an opinion based on observing the  Incombent. I assume 
67  1 am  very receptive  to  the  contrai-y  vicw,  in  1 1 ·hich  .. self-image management"" is  a stratcgy  to 
provide evidence of  one's own good nature. My assumption, by contrast, mcans that people know what 
force  the rules  will  have  on  their behavior, when  the  time  to  act arrives.  This  is not  neccssarily  the 
same as their .. truc" nature. 
r.x  Compare  this  with  Shavell  (2002),  in  which  the  implication  of moral  rules  to  particular 
contexts is not always clear. 139 
that Entrants do  not  self-deceive
69
.  Rather, the  entrant uses  the  information that can 
be  extracted  from  the  Incumbent's choices  to  form  a  Bayesian  expectation  of the 
value of a, and this expectation th en multiplies with  y to determine effort.  70  Denoting 
the  final  expected  value  of a as  ,u(.), where  "." refers  to  "whatever  information  1s 
available to the player," the effort leve! chosen will  therefore take the  form 
e (Ji (.)) = E [ Œ 1·] y =  f.l (.)y  (3 .1) 
Expression (3 .1) corresponds to "moral dumbfounding" (Haidt 200 l)  si nee  it 
is a behavioural tendency that goes against the grain of natural desires, and  is what  l 
cali  the  "moral  compatibility constraint" (MCC). The  MCC  is  the  assumption  that 
gives players an  incentive to  try  to manipulate the ir interpretation of the salience of a 
clear  moral  rule.  Notice  also  that  as  y,  increases  the  incentive  increases.  The 
dependence  of incentive  on  y will  generate  a  s011ing  condition  comparable  to  the 
single-crossing condition. Although irrelevant for the  lncumbent, who observes y,  this 
sorting will have importance for  the Entrant, who does not. 
Psychological  studies  have  corroborated  the  intuition  that  manipulation  of 
beliefs  is  costly.  One  cannot simply  believe  whatever  one  wants. For  simplicity, 1 
posit  a (point)  "target  belief'71 called  m.  Consistent with  much  literature, 1 adopt a 
h
9 This is  done out of concern with tractability.  not realism. The  Entrant·s proccss of inference 
will be relatively involved; I leave to future research  the additional complexity of his self-deception. 
70 Throughout the paper 1 skirt  issues of the ··true .. normative importance of the moral  rule. and 
therefore  the  interpretation  of this differentiai effort  given  the same  moral rule remains a matter  of 
··persistent uncertainty  ...  Kant (2005)- sce a iso  Hausman and  McPherson ( 1993), White, (2004).  Van 
Staveren, (2007). This might suggest that the value of y reflccts the appropria te leve! of effort  for  that 
individual.  On  the other hand, it could also  be  that  individuals  of IO\Y moral  sense simply  don't care. 
and  so  exert  lcss  than  the .. appropriate"  leve!.  The difference  is largely immatcrial to  the  mode!: its 
relevance to  interpretations of the results will be commented, where appropria tc. 
71 This terminology  is seen in  the  literature  on moral rcasoning  to  reprcscnt  the belief that a 
person would like to  hold. See for instance De  Paul ( 1993 ). Rcflection may  upset this target belief, and 
the  person  may  rationally end up  believing something else,  but  the  target  is the  belief that.  for  one 
rcason or a balance  of reasons, seems preferable. In  the  present context.  it  represents the result of an 
arbitrage between the cost of  distorting the evidence and the cost of leaving the evidence intact. 140 
simple  cost  function,  assummg  the  costs  of rn  to  be  quadratic  in  the  distortion  it 
represents,  and  proportional  to  a constant  k,  which  I assume  to  be  the  same  for  ail 
players.  The  value  of k likely  encompasses  such  considerations  as  the  difficulty  in 
'·cooking the mental books" to direct one's attention away from  undesirable evidence, 
or sorne other motivated reasoning mechanism. 
These assumptions lead to a utility function that has the following form: 
k  l 
V=-e--(0'-m) 
2 
(3.2) 
where  e  will  be  determined  by  the  MCC  and  the  constraint  of Bayesian 
interpretation  shawn  in  (3.1 ).  Notice  that  the  single-crossing  property  applies,  as 
those who  observe a lower value of Œ have  a lower  marginal cost of distortion  for 
given  rn  <  Œ.  As  mentioned,  the  information  upon  which  e  is  based  depends  on 
whether  the  player  is  an  Incumbent  or  an  Entrant.  lt  is  further  determined  by  the 
equilibrium strategies played by lncumbents. 
The  structure  of the  game  is  as  follows.  First,  the  Incumbent  observes  a 
"signal," Œ,  and her own  y.  She then chooses a "message" rn  for herself, which may or 
may  not  be  observable  to  the  Entrant.  She  interprets  this  message  using a function 
that  constitutes the  beliefs of a  PBE. The  equilibrium strategies therefore determine 
the  expected  value  of  Œ  given  m,  which  together  with  y  then  determines  the 
lncumbent's  effort  according  to  (3. 1  ). Again.  the  effort  exerted  may  be  public  or 
private infonnation. 
The  Entrant.  having  observed  at  !east  one  of the  lncumbent's  choices 
(message or action), makes use  of the strategies specified by the  PBE  to  calculate an 
expected value  of Œ.  Together with  his  J't,  the  expected  value  of Œ determines  the 
Entrant's effort leve!. As mentioned, I assume that the does not  Entrant self-deceives. 
However, the information the Entrant can  observe varies over three cases.  Either the 141 
Entrant observes the message, rn, or the effort, e,  or both. The Entrant never observes 
either  (J'  or  the  lncumbent's  leve! of  y,  which  1 further  assume  to  be  completely 
independent from his own. The figure below illustrates the structure. 
Incumbent 
a) 
Observes a  Sends rn  Chooses e 
Observes  Chooscs e 
Entrant  both m and e 
Ineumbent 
Observes cr  Sends 111  Chooscs e 
b) 
Observes 111  Chooscs e 
Entrant 
lneumbent 
Observes a  Sends m  Chooses e 
c) 
Observes  e  Chooses e 
Entrant 
:'Ilote:  ln  panel (a),  the Entrant observes both m and the lncumbent' s e before ehoosing. ln  panel 
(b),  he  observes  only  m  and  in  panel (c)  he  observes  only  e. These  correspond  to  the  cases 
developed in Section 4, below. 
Figure 3.1  Timing of the game. 
Notice that the  strategie  interaction  is  entirely one-way  in  the  game, as  it  is, 
for  example,  in  BHW  or  Battaglini,  Bénabou  et  al.  (2005).  This  means  that  the 
decisions  for  the  players  can  be  calculated  forwards  in  time.  The  Incumbent's 
decisions  will  determine  the  Entrant's  reaction  but  the  Entrant's reaction  will  not 142 
affect the  lncumbent actions. To briefly preview  the  results,  1 report  the  following 
principal findings. The lncumbent's shows downward distortion in her messages (m < 
a)  with  a  partially-separating  equilibrium  structure  that, for  each  y,  is  essentially 
identical to  that observed by Kartik (2009), with a lower pool  and separation above a 
threshold  ay.  Higher  values  of y send  more  distorted  messages,  leading  to  larger 
pools,  and  bence  a  smaller  probability  of  separation. An  important  result  for  the 
results described  below concems the divergence between messages  and  signais. A 
higher-y lncumbent will send lower messages than a lower-y lncumbent for a given a, 
but will produce more effort. 
As  for  the  Entrant,  there  are  two  essential kinds of questions.  First  is  the 
question of contamination. How does the moral sense (and thus the self-deception) of 
the  lncumbent  affect  the  Entrant's  behavior?  ln  equilibrium  there  is  always  a 
correlation  between  the  lncumbent's  y  and  the  Entranfs  effort  in  equilibrium. 
lnterestingly,  however,  the  direction  of  the  correlation  changes  with  the  case 
considered.  When e is observable (Cases (a)  and  (c)  in  Fig. !).  the Entranfs effort  is 
positively correlated with the lncumbent's y,  and the correlation is stronger in case (a) 
than in case (c).  This is intuitive, since more  information (e and  111, rather than juste) 
is available.  This  correlation  can  be  interpreted  as  the  transmission  of a  kind  of 
organizational  culture.  When  only  m  is  observable,  by  contrast,  we  see  that  the 
Entrant's effort will actually fall  as )1  rises. This  is due to the fact that, for a given a, 
at higher ylncumbents send lower messages.  Even though the lncumbenfs lies do not 
always,  and  on  average  cannot,  foot herself,  they  propagate  throughout  the  less-
experienced  members of the group  (here represented by the  Entrant),  reducing the 
effort exerted. 
A second  kind of question concems the average, or overall  differences  in  the 
informational  cases  (a)  to  (c).  ln  terms  of the  effort  provided,  lncumbents  are 
··Bayesian self-deceivers," who  use ali the information available in their manipulated 143 
target  beliefs,  and  thus  on  average have  the  same  beliefs  they  would  have  without 
self-deception. Entrants,  in  tum,  have  no  vague  information, and  hence cannot self-
deceive at ali. On the other hand, while the average behavior is  the same in  ali  cases, 
the  beliefs  that  generate  it  are  not.  Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  Entrant's  posterior 
distribution of Œ is  more  dispersed in  the  partial  information cases  than  in  the  full 
information  case.  More  interesting,  the  posterior  distribution  of  Œ is  also  more 
dispersed in  the "actions", effort-only case than  in  the '·words" case. "Actions speak 
louder than words" is the saying, but words in this mode! speak more precisely. 
3.2.2  Analysis of the lncumbent 
The lncumbent's manipulation of beliefs corresponds to her interpretation of the rule. 
She would "prefer to  be lieve" that  a-is low, as  this  requires a lower leve!  of effort e 
given  y according to  the  MCC. The question  is  what doubts she will  be  able to  cast 
into her own mind as  to  the  importance of the  rule.  As  outlined above, 1 mode!  this 
manipulation as  an  intra-personal persuasion game. The lncumbent's decision  about 
the  rule has  two stages.  ln  the  first  stage, the  she observes  a- and chooses a message 
m( a) or  sim ply  m  from  [0, 1].  ln  supposing that  the  messages come  from  the  same 
interval as  the true values of a-,  the  game assumes that messages have  an  established 
literai  meaning.  This  is  the  same  tactic  used  in  Kartik (2009) and  Emons  and  Fluet 
(2009).  ln this last paper, the qualitative fonn  of the equilibrium strategy  is  different 
than  the  one  employed  here  because  the  message  space  there  is  unbounded.  A 
subsequent version  of the  mode!  with  natural  upper and  lower  bounds  to  the  state-
space (and hence also message-space), yields results very similar to those found here. 
In the second stage of the mode!, the  lncumbent no  longer has access to  Œ, but 
only  to  her message. However, she recognizes that she has the tendency to send m f. 
a-, and  is  Bayesian  enough  to  attempt  to  decipher  the  ''real"  meaning  behind  her 
message.  She therefore calculates a conditional expectation, which makes use  of the 
endogenous,  equilibrium  interpretation  function  based  on  Bayesian  reasoning, 144 
denoted p(m,y).  Stated differently, the  infonned player chooses a message for herself 
in an attempt to induce beliefs of a lower 0', but based on the knowledge that she will 
later interpret this  message according to  Bayes'  law (where that  is  possible) and  be 
forced by the MCC to play in accordance. 
If in  equilibrium observations of any  0' in  the (non-empty) set  2:
117  lead to  the 
message m, then 
t ::h(:: ) d:: 
t h(::)d:: 
(3.3) 
If 2:m  is  a singleton  (that  is, m(O')  is  invertible),  then  it  will  be  identical  to 
p(m,y).  ln this  case  l will  refer to  the  belief as  Ô'  ( m, y) . Further, because  l assume 
that  the  lncumbent retains  the  knowledge of y,  and  therefore  that  argument will  be 
constant across ali decisions any Incumbent might make,  1 will  simplify the  notation 
when  possible, writing  Ô'  ( m) . If 2:, is  empty for  any  m,  in  other words if there are 
messages that are  not  sent  in  equilibrium,  then  Bayes'  Rule is undetined  for  those 
messages, and beliefs are ambiguous, and  will  be  chosen  in  a manner respecting the 
equilibrium while striving to be '·sensible". 
The equilibrium 1 will  focus  on  has  two  parts, defined as  follows  by  a strictly 
monotonie function 
72 
m( 0') and a threshold 0'1, both of which depend on  y, 
,  (m(CT)  ifCT > O' 
m(CT) =i 
7 
l  0  otherwise 
(3.4) 
72 
This is the equivalent of the ··separating l'unction'' from  Kmtik (2009), and  I wi ll  occasionally 
rcfer to it by the same name. ------
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if Ill > 0 
(3.5) 
otherw ise 
Let us take the upper, interior case first. The strategy will be defined so that 
111  ( 0') =  arg ma x- yci ( 111)- ~(  u  - m) ~ 
Ill  2 
(3.6) 
Given  the  continuity of (3.2),  when  the  strategy  function  is monotonie  it  can 
readily be  shown
73  that it  must  also  be  continuous. As  a result, the  belief function  , 
â ( m) must also be continuous. Therefore we can take the first-order condition that 
k 
ci'(m) = -(u -m) for ali  O'Where m > 0 
y 
(3.7) 
Notice that the quadratic distortion cost structure implies that the second-arder 
conditions are satisfied. The monotonicity of the strate  gy  tùrther implies the existence 
of an  inverse  function,  which means the  inference will  be  exact:  à (  111 (a))= a  and 
expression (3.7) can be re-written 
k 
Œ'(m )=-(Œ(m)-m) 
y 
(3.8) 
The  idea that  in  any  separating  equilibrium  the  least-preferred  type  wi ll  be 
identified, and thus  have  no  incentive  to  distort- the  Riley  condition- in  this case 
implies a boundary condition of a( 1)  =  1.  The single-crossing  property (of the signal 
73  Any  strictly monotonie  strategy  results  in  an  invertible strategy  function.  This  mcans that 
p(m) is  dcgenerate on  some  singleton u for  ali  m.  Suppose a monotonie strategy  is  not  continuous. 
Th en there cxists a a 'such  that the  limit of the  strate gy  from  the le  ft is not the same as  the  li mit from 
the  right.  This means that a deviation fromm(u'- &)  to  m(u'  +&)for some arbitrarily small  positive & 
will cause an arbitrarily small change in J4m), but a discretely large change in (3.2), thcreby gcnerating 
an ··unraveling" deviation chain towards the lower-cost deviation. 
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distortion) then implies that an  observer detecting a lower cr will  respond with  lower 
messages. Such a property indicates the strategies will indeed be  monotonie. Further, 
because  (3.8)  must  hold  for  every  value  of m,  we  can  solve  it  as  a  differentiai 
equation for a globally optimal strategy function for the expected value of cr, given  m 
(Mailath 1987). The form of (3.8) implies an exponential-distortion solution, 
'  1 ~ 1 
â (m) =m+!_ +e'
1  C. 
k 
(3.9) 
where C is  the constant of integration.  Using the boundary condition  identified 
above then yields a closed-form interpretation function, 
y (  !:_(m - 1) Î 
â(m) =m+k l l-er  j  (3.1  0) 
Expression (3.1 0)  describes the  interpretation of a message. The message  sent 
will  be m( cr), its  inverse. Severa!  further use fui  features of the  relationship  described 
in  (3.1 0)  may be distinguished
74
.  First, we may verify the  monotonicty in  111. Second, 
ali  messages  are  understatements si  nee  for  ali  111  in  [0, 1  ], 111(cr)  :<::::  cr, with  equality 
ont y  at  cr=  1,  for  any  positive  values  of y.
75  Third,  any  observed  cr  less  th an  a 
threshold  cr0 =  y!k(l- e·kli) will  associate with  a negative m. This threshold  is greater 
than zero for any  value of y> 0, and  is increasing  in  that parameter, rising towards 1 
74 One point upon which 1 will  not ùwell  is  thal (3. 1  0) implies  that V decreases in  y and  Œ. This 
illustrates  what  Sen  ( 1976)  ca  lis  the  ·'counter-preferential''  nature  of  the  bchavioral  restriction. 
However,  1  cannot  make  any  actual  welfare  statcments  without  further  information  about  the 
normative value  of the rule itself  And this may  require a wider philosophical scope than 1 wish to  set 
in this paper. 
75  Strictly speaking,  these  properties  hold  in  the  range  of Œ E  [0, 1  ).  lt may  be  noticcd  that 
tcchnically,  (3. 1  0)  a Iso  admits  messages  greater  than  1.  but  is  invertible  only  on  (0,1 ).  Allowing 
.. neologisms" - messages  from outside [0.1 ],  wou  id result  in  a .. hyperbolic  ..  equilibrium  in the sense 
both of hyperbole and hyperbola.  which 1 investigatc no further here,  despite the ctymological intcrcst 
the two terms suggest. 147 
as  y goes to infinity
76
• This threshold limitation implies any  individual with  y> 0 will 
hit the bound offeasible messages for sorne  a > 0, and those with higher ywill hit the 
bound  at  a  larger  value  of a  than  those  with  lower.  Fourth,  if we  let  y vary, the 
interpretation  given  to  a particular  message  rises  with  r This  relationship  implies 
that,  given an  observed value of a,  the  equilibrium message  falls  in r reintroducing 
the  full  notation and  denoting derivatives with  subscripts, m2( a,  y)  < 0, or  in  words, 
higher-y Incumbents will respond to a given  a with  lower messages than will  lower-y 
Incumbents.  This  is  the  other sorting condition, and  can  be  interpreted  to  mean  that 
yis or the marginal incentive to lie. The condition is intuitive, since higher values of y 
are  constrained  to  exert  higher  levels  of effort.  Figure  3.2,  below, shows  how  the 
separating function  changes  as  y rises  in  comparison  to  k. lt can  be  seen  as  ''leve! 
curves"  in  (  a,m,y)-space,  rising  in  a  and  falling  in  m.  We  therefore  see  that  the 
relationship  is  quasi-convex:  the lower contour set of a given  value of y - the  set of 
(O",m) that imply sensitivity lower than  y- is a convex set. 
7~  In  the  limit  as  y goes  to  zero,  this  function  falls  to  m( a) =  a,  which  hits the  horizontal 
boundary only at O. m 
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Note:  (Dashed,  dot-dash, dot, sol  id) curves  show  strategies  as  ;1k riscs  through (0.1,  O.J, 0.5, 
O. 75) as  level-curves  in (  O',m,y)-space.  Figure plotted using Maple software. 
Figure 3.2  Separating function as ychanges. 
Summarizing the points so far, we have the following observation: 
Observation 1: The separatingjimction m(  a: y)  re present.\' a clown ward distortion in 
the  message  that  1ncumbents  report  ro  rhemselves.  and satisjies  the jàllowing 
properries 
a)  mis invertihle on [0, 1): also m(l)  =  1 
c)  For any y>  0,  rhere exists a 1 > o;1 > 0 such m(o;1,y)  =O. 149 
The  equilibrium  strategy  for  the  Incumbent  will  consist  of the  separating 
function implied by (3.1  0) for all  o- grea ter than a threshold 1 have called  O"y, and  m  = 
0,  otherwise.  Let  us  pass  now  to  the  second  part  of the  strategy  to  consider  the 
threshold O"y at which Incumbents switch to  rn =  O.  The interesting point 
77  he re  is  that, 
for ail y> 0,  O"r > o-0. To see that this must be so, consider the interpretation of  m  = O. 
Using the  notation from  (3.3),  Lm  is  not a singleton for  m  =  O. ln  particular, it  is  the 
intervall:0 =  [O,o-y ].  This means that the interpretation of a zero message will  be  less 
than  O"y.  If the  strategy  switched at  o-0,  then the  limit  of the  interpreted value of o-
given  m  as  rn  goes  to  zero,  which  is  o-0,  and  is  strictly  greater than  the  interpreted 
value of rn  =  O.  Naturally,  this  inequality  cannot stand  in  equilibrium. lt  will  lead 
marginal  individuals  who  saw  a  o- just  to  the  right  of o-0,  and  who  are  therefore 
prescribed an m > 0, which will  be perfectly decoded, to deviate and also choose m = 
O.  As  they  do  so  they  increase  O"y,  and  hence  the  interpreted  value  of the  zero-
message.  Also, as marginal o--types  deviate to  m =  0,  they  must deviate  farther  from 
their  optimal  message.  Thus  the  '·benefit"  of the  deviation  falls  and  the  ·'cost'' 
increases  as  O"y  rises. Eventually, either  ali  types  will  send  the  message  m  =  0,  in 
which case ,u(O)  is just the unconditional expectation of o-,  or there will  be sorne type 
who  finds  that  the  utility  from  devia ting  is  just equal  to  the  utility  of the  positive 
message.  For this  latter type, the  benefit of the  lower interpretation  is just balanced 
by the cost of the higher distortion. Figure 3.3, below, illustrates this  latter case. 
77  Just as the  separating  function is  like thal  in  Kartik. l2009). so  this ··bunching" phcnomenon 
is the same as  in that paper. A similar phenomenon can also be seen in,  for instance,  Bernhcim. ( 1994) 
and indeed is the same principle used to genera te the thresholds in Crawford. and Sobel ( 1982). 
l rn( a) 
................................................................  ~· ;;· 
p(O  1 y) 
Note:  The  highcst signal  Œ at which this lncumbcnt  will  separa tc  (a), and  the 
corrcsponding lowest positive message she will scnd (mr), are also notcd. 
Figure 3.3  Illustration of·'bunching." 
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The  threshold  value  of Œy will  be  where  the  point  of indifference  between 
sending the  separating message m( a) and  the  poo ling  message m =  O.  The ''benefif' 
side  of the  pooling decision  is  the  lower  interpretation  of the  salience, , u(O  1  y),  the 
"cost" side is the  larger distortion required. Re-introducing the explicit dependence of 
111  on  y, at the threshold itself, 
k  !  k  ) 
V  ( 111  ( Œ 
1
, y).  Œ 
1 
)  = - YŒ 7  - 2  (  Œ r  - m ( Œ 1 • y))  = - Y/-1  ( 0) - 2  Œ;  = V  ( 0.  Œ 7  )  ( 3. 1  1) 
Equation 2. 11  implicitly defi nes  a relationship between  111,  y and  a such  that 
(a)  for  a given  y,  only  signais  greater  than  CJ7  will  elicit  a  positive  message,  with 
messages  following  the  separating  function;  (b)  for  a given  Œy,  only  lncumbents  of 
type  less than  ywill  send  a positive message,  with the message sent  fal ling in  y,  (c) 
for  a  given  positive  message,  the  signal  must  have  been greater  than  Œ r,  and  the 
lncumbent's type Jess than y, again according to the separating function. 151 
Notice that since  Œ'y >  Œ'o  > 0,  ali  positive-r Incumbents will  necessarily have 
ranges  of Œ'  that  lead  to  the  message  rn  =  O.  The  ''corner solution" branch of the 
equilibrium a/ways exists.  The remaining question  is  therefore:  what values of rand 
Œ' that  will lead  Incumbents  to  play  the separating  function?  The answer,  detailed  in 
Appendix  A (Proposition  1  d),  is  the  ''interior solution ''  branch of the  equilibriwn 
existsfor lncumbents with  y< k.  This fact motivates the assumption later on (see note 
78,  below)  that  the  upper  bound  of the  distribution  of y,  which  I  have  called  Y', 
coïncides with k. 
A  final  point  is  required  to  fully  characterize  the  Incumbent's equilibrium 
strategy. Beliefs are weil defined by Bayes' Rule when m =  0, and  for any m > 0 sent 
in  equilibrium.  However,  the  fact  that  there  is  a  minimum  positive  acceptable 
message for any r > 0 implies th at, unless r =  0, (which happens with  measure 0, and 
in  which case e always equals zero, so  (3.2)  is optimized by  choosing m  =  Œ'), there 
will be sorne messages that are never chosen  in equilibrium, and  for which, therefore, 
Bayes'  Rule  does  not define beliefs.  1 assign  these  messages  the  beliefs  that  would 
correspond to  the  separating function. ln  other words, (3.1 0)  wi ll  supply  the  beliefs 
for  any  positive message  in  the  equilibrium, whether that  message  be  on  or off the 
equilibrium  path.  ln  fact,  this  was  implicit  in  condition  (3.11 ),  which  compared 
deviations  from  the  separating  function  to  zero  messages,  and  that  condition 
guarantees that the equilibrium is sequentially optimal. 
ln summary, then, we can state the  following Proposition: 
Proposition  1: A single-player equilibriwn of this mode/ exists,  dejined bv 
(3.4)  and (3.5),  where Œ'(m)  is dejined as  (3. 10) and m(Œ') is  its inverse.  and 
Œ'y is  as  determined  by  the  threshold  (3.11).  ln  this  equilibriwn,  the 
lncumbent will (a)  a/ways send a message /ess than the observed value of  a, 
except in  the  limiting  cases  when  Œ'  =  1 or  0;  (b)  nevertheless  be able to 152 
perfectly  decode  her  message,  and  be  forced  to  play  the  according  e. 
whenever the message is grea  ter than zero;  (c)  send a message of  m  =  0 (f 
and on/y if  a < ay-at this point she will be poo  ling with  other a-types who 
(would have) sent the same message, and so will play e =  ayy/2:  (d)  exhibit a 
threshold,  and hence a range of  separation,  that grows in  y  However on/y 
th ose with  y= 0 will never pool on m =  0, for any value of  a.  and on/y those 
with y< k will ever se  nd m > O. 
Caro/lary  1:  The effort leve! e(  a; y)  is strict/y  increasing in  the second argument, 
and non-decreasing in  thejirst. Furrher,  it  i.s  strict/y  increusing in  both arguments 
when  0' >  O'r  The message sent m(  a; y)  is non-decreasing in  thejirst argument and 
non-increasing in  the second.  Further,  il  is  strict/y increasing  (decreasing)  in  the 
.first (second) argument when it is greater than zero. 
Corollary  1 will  be very  important  in the  analysis of the  Entranfs problem.  It 
implies  that  there  is  an  important  qualitative  difference  between  the  two  kinds  of 
information that an  Entrant can  receive. ln  particular,  a higher m can  either mean  a 
higher a or a lower y,  wh ile a higher e means a higher a or a higher y. 
Before moving on  to the  Entrant's problem. 1 will add  a note on the  extent to 
which  self-deception  is  possible  in  this  mode!.  Proposition  1 states  that,  for  high-
salience situations, the  lncumbent will be  forced, despite her ·'protests" in  the  form  of 
downward-distorted messages,  to  recognize the  importance of the  rule  for  what  it  is, 
and  play  accordingly.  Thus  she  can  only  self-deceive  in  relatively  low-salience 
problems. In  addition,  however, it  states  that  ail  low-salience  situations are  treated 
identically, as having the salien ce expected conditional on  a < ay. This means that the 
effort provided in  very  low-salience situations, specifically, those  less  than  a ,v 12 in 
~ 1 
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the  unifonn-distribution  case,  will  be  treated  as  more  important  than  they  are.  We 
therefore  have  a  mode!  in  which  the  lncumbent  can  (a)  "make  mountains  out  of 
molehills", inflating the importance of inconsequential problems; (b) ''make molehills 
out of mountains," deflating the  importance of bigger problems; and  (c)  accept truly 
big problems for what they are. These results are summarized below: 
Proposition  2:  On  average,  lncumbents  playing  the  equilibrium  ji-om 
Proposition  1 will exert  "tao  much "  effort for /ow-sa/ience contexts  (a < 
E[  a  1 a < aj), and "not enough ., in higher-salience contexts ( E[  a  1 a <  a.J 
<  a  <  a). A Iso,  bath  ejfects  will  be stronger jàr lncumbents  with  higher 
values of  Yf. 
3.3  The Entrant 
1 now  consider the  second playern. For each  of the  three  cases  illustrated  in  Figure 
3.1, 1 will  address three  questions.  First, what is the  nature  of the  inference  that  the 
Entrant can make, given the infonnation at  his disposai? Second, what is the effect of 
a change  in  the  lncumbent's (unobserved) moral sense, n on  the  Entrant's behavior? 
The  answer  to  this  question  addresses  the  issue  of contamination,  or  hierarchical 
influence  within  the  organization, and  will  provide  the  content  of the  most of the 
propositions  in  the  section. The  question will  turn  on  the  cotTelation  between the 
Incumbent's  moral  sense  and  the  Entrant's  behavior.  For  example:  can  an 
organization  with  unusually  principled Incumbents expect  its Entrants  also  to show 
?K  In  this  section  1 maintain  another simplifying  assumption, namely  that  Y'  =  k.  As  noted 
above,  this  implies  that  (a)  ail  Incumbents except  the  highest  have  play  the  interior  branch of the 
cquilibrium  for  a  high enough,  and  (b) for any  a <  1, there  is a measure of lncumbents who  will 
respond to it with m= O.  This limits the generality  of the discussion, but the benefit in clearing away a 
··clutter of cases·· is worth  the cast. 154 
higher  levels  of effort?  The  third  question  is  what  the  nature  of the  Entrant's 
perception  of  the  salience,  after  observing  the  messages  and  signais  from  the 
lncumbent. 
To  begin.  recall that the  Entrant's payoffs are entirely separate  from  those of 
the  lncumbent.  The only channel  of influence between them  is  the  information  that 
the  lncumbent passes on to  the  Entrant, and the lncumbent has  no direct incentive to 
try  to  influence  the  Entrant's  behavior  with  this  information. This  is  why  l  can 
calculate  the  PBE  for  the  lncumbent  independently  of the  Entrant's decision, and 
need  not  readjust  it  to  take  account of this  reaction.  Further, l will  assume  that  the 
Entrant  does  not  self-deceive, and  forms  an  expectation  of Œ  based  on  observable 
choices by the  Incumbent. Thus the Entrant's problem is similar to that of"followers'· 
in  BHW. The  fact  that  he  does  not  observe  an  independent  signal  simplifies  the 
Entrant's decision,  and  yet  he  faces  a more  complex task  of interpretation  than  the 
agents  in  BHW.  Each distinct lncumbent will  respond  to  a given  Œdifferently. Thus 
there  are  an  infinite  number  of lncumbents  types  who  will  produce  any  given 
message  or  effort  leve!,  for  a  corresponding  interval  of different  saliences.  The 
Entrant's problem, upon observing a message or an  effort level,  is  to determine what 
the  salience "probably" is, based on (i) what type of lncumbent might have  sent that 
message  or exerted  that  effort,  and  (ii)  what  kind  of Œ  would  induce  her to  do  so. 
Thus the  Entrant will  generate the beliefs  in  his  PBE  about the  expected value of Œ 
based on Bayesian updating of the lncumbent's equilibrium play, given the observed 
behavior. The sequentially rational behavior will be defined as that constrained by the 
MCC,  given  the  equilibrium  beliefs.  ln  contrast  to  the  lncumbent.  the  Entrant's !55 
beliefs  are  always  defined  by  Bayes'  Rule
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,  so  no  off-path  beliefs  need  to  be 
specified. 
3.3.1  Case A:  mand e observable 
The  first  result  shows  that  observing  e  and  rn  together  is sufficient  to  inform  the 
Entrant as  fully  as  is  possible, once the original salience has been  overridden by  the 
lncumbent's message. 
Lem ma 1: if  the Entrant has access to  bath m ande, he can recover al! the 
information available to the Incumbent at the lime oj'action. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Stated  otherwise,  if the  Entrant  sees  a  positive  message  and  the  effort  that 
follows  it, then he will know exactly the  leve! of CJ that the  lncumbent saw originally 
(and  tried  unsuccessfully  to  dissimulate). If the  Entrant  sees  a zero-message along 
with  effort  by  the  Incumbent,  he  will  be  able  to  detennine  the  exact  threshold  CJ 
below which the true value must fall.  In bath cases, he has the exact same infonnation 
as  the  Incumbent. The  intuition  for  this result  hangs  on  the dual-sorting behavior of 
the  Incumbent.  Of ali  the  (  CJ,y)  Incumbents  who  might  send  a  given  (positive) 
message, each will follow  it with a different  leve! of effort, and the  higher the effort, 
the  higher  the  y.  Therefore,  observing  bath  the  message  and  the effort  allows  the 
Entrant  to  identify  precisely  the  Incumbent's  bivariate  type.  Similarly,  ail  the 
Incumbents with different  y will  follow  a message of m  =  0 with  different levels of 
70 
Although  each  y-type  of Incumbent  has  a  eut-off  point,  and  thus  puts  some  positive 
probability  mass  on  a  message  of zero,  and  has  some  range  of messages  which  are  not  sent  in 
equilibrium, from  the  Entranrs point ofview. ail  messages may  be seen  \Yith positive probability.  The 
Jo  west  message  an  Incumbent  will  send  was  defined  by  111( Œ y),  and  is positive  for  any  positive  y. 
However, the  limit of  cr_, as y fal ls to zero isO. Therefore for any positive value z of a, the re  is a value r 
of y such that  a,. < z;  thus  there  is  some  measure  of Incumbents  (specifically  G(v)),  who  wi ll  give 
scparating messages whcn  a = z. 156 
effort. However it is still true that the higher the effort, the higher the  y that must have 
induced  it.  Thus, observing the  effort  leve!  is  equivalent to  observing  y, and allows 
the Entrant to  in fer that a- < a-y. This implies that the Incumbent's value of y will have 
an  influence on  the  Entrant when m =  0,  if the  Entrant can observe both  m and  e.  In 
this  case,  for  any  given  a- a higher Incumbent's  value  of y will  raise  the  Entrant's 
effort leve!  too,  since the  Entrant will  make an  inference  from  a higher threshold  a-y. 
Since  a- and  y are independent, this relationship will  hold on  average across different 
a-,. These considerations pro vide the content of the next Proposition 
Proposition 3:  When  m ande are bath observable,  Entrant effàrt  will rise 
with y 1 given  o;  and fncumbents with high values of y will be more likely to 
have an ejfect on Entrant behavior th an th ose with law values of  y 
Proposition 3 addresses  the  hierarchical  influence  result  for  the  first  case  in 
Fig. 2.1.  Even  when  ali  the  information  is  available, there  is  still  some endogenous 
hierarchical influence. An  increase in  the  Incumbent's y will exert an  upward force on 
the  leve!  of effort exerted by  less-informed incurnbents  for  any  a- they  observe. This 
implies that across ail  the  possible encounters (!etting both  y and  a- vary), there  will 
be  some  correlation  of players'  effort  levels.  The  Incumbent  and  Entranfs  effort 
choices will not be conditionally independent. 
3.3.2  Case 8: m only observable 
When e is not observable, the Entrant can no  longer differentiate between the types of 
Incumbent  who  might  send  a  given  message.  Furthermore,  the  set  of different 
lncumbents who send a message will each do so having observed a different salience. 
Thus before we can address the questions of organizational or hierarchical  influence, 
we must describe how the  Entrant's interpretation of the  observed message proceeds. 
In  principle, it is  relatively straightforward. Any given message m will be  interpreted - -----
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as  an  average  of the  saliences  that  might  induce  an  lncumbent  to  send  m,  each 
weighted by the likelihood of meeting just the  11  who wou  id. 
To begin, consider the Entrant's interpretation of m =O. We saw above that ali 
Incumbents have a threshold  Œ,  below which they will  send a message of  111  =  O.  Put 
from  the  Entrant's perspective, this  means a message of 0 could  have been sent  by 
any  Incumbent. The assomption that Y'  =  k further implies  that it could conceivably 
been sent following any value of Œ. M o The lncumbent's expected value of Œ given 111  = 
0 and 11  was defined above as  J-L(O  1 11).  Th us, the  Entrant's expected value of Œ given 
only m =  0 will be an average over ali  the values of  ;.~0 1 11),  weighted proportionally 
to  the  probability that the  11  in  question sends  a message of O. It  can  be shown that 
this  average  is  less  than  the  unconditional expectation of Œ,  but  - at  !east  in  the 
uniforrn distribution case, grea ter than half that value. 
When m > 0, the compatible values of Œ become much  more restricted. First, 
the  fact  that ali  messages are  downward distortions implies  that the salience must be 
at !east as high as  the  message. Second, there is a Iso a highest  Œ compatible with any 
m, above which ail  incumbents either send a message higher than m, or send m =  O x
1
• 
This is the next result. 
Lemma 2:  For any message m such thal 0 < m <  /, there exists a Œ 111a.Jm)  < 
1 such thal m must have been  sent following a signa/from the interval {m. 
~.wx(m)}. 
Proof: See Appendix A 
xo More preciscly, this requires that 1  ~  k. 
"'  Again, relaxing the assumption that l'=  k would make this truc in  only two  of three cases, 
specifically where /'  ~  k. 
--- --- - - -
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Notice that this  result implies that the  posterior distribution of O" given only a 
message  rn  is  a strict subset of [0, 1]  for  any  m > 0,  otherwise  it  has  full  support on 
[0,1). Figure 3.4 shows the locus of  Oinax(m) as  yrises  from 0 to  k. A positive message 
must come from  a value of O" between the 45-degree li ne and the curve. For instance, 
the  double-headed  arrow  illustrates  that  a  message  of 0.33  is  compatible  with  O" 
between  0.33  and  about  0.7.  An  illustrative  strategy  (upper curve)  shows  how  the 
separating functions eut the locus from above. xz 
117  .1 
Range of O" compatible 
with rn= 0.33 
.,1 ······························ 
..............................................  ~ 
.  . 
-·---------·- 01  01  (>). 
'. 
c t' 
Note:  The range of possible a compatible with  111  = 0.33  is shown in  the Jouble-headed arrow. The full 
stratcgy- separating and pooling portions- for the highest compatible  y, in  this case  Ylu .1  =  0.5,  is also 
shown. Higher values of ywould result  in curves that eut the  locus at higher va lues of a, and  hencc arc 
not  compatible  with  the  message  m  =  0.33.  Graphie adaptcd  from an  implicit  plot of  the  original 
equations made with Pacifie Tech Graphing Calculator software. 
Figure 3.4  The locus of Oinax· 
~
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ln cases where 1 < k.  the upper limit of a would follow the  black eurve  up  to  the  maximal 
value of y, and then  fo llow a separating  function like the red curve beyond that. 159 
The expectation of a over this restricted set of possible values can be found by 
taking  an  average  over  the  n's compatible  with  it.  Notice  that  given  an  m,  the 
Incumbent for whom  a7 =  Œmax(m)  is  the  highest-y type who  will  send that message. 
This leve!  of y,  denoted  Ym,  can be  found  by  eliminating  a from  (3.2) and  (3.1  O)M 3. 
Thus, the expected salience will be 
where 
f  ~' (  m /r)  g ( r) dy 
E[ a  /m J  = â, (m) =  -"
0
-------
C (Y,., ) 
km l  Y  (  !_(m-i) Î 
Ym  =  =  m + -k "' l'- e r..  J 
2km- Y, 
(3.12) 
(3.13) 
and ,u(mir) is as in (3.10).  It can be shown that:  (a)  y,,,  increases in  m;  (b) y 0 = 0; (c)  y
1 
=  k.
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It is  also clear that  â,  will  rise  with m, both  because the  upper bound of the 
integral  rises, and  because  ali  types  who  do  not  send  a  zero  message  send  higher 
messages as  arises- that is, p(m) is an increasing function. This allows us to answer 
the hierarchical influence question. 
Proposition 4:  When  the Entrant observes on/y  m > 0, Entrant effort leve!s 
will fa!!  with  lncumbent  y for any  value of a;  and Incumbents  with  high 
values  al y will be less like!y  la  have an  eflect on  Entrant behavior !han 
those with law values of  y. 
xJ  This  Incumbent  is also  the  highest  who  will  send  any  positive  message  given a. ln  cases 
below where  this is the fact of interest, she  will  be denoted  Yu·  Notice also  that  her message, m
111
,,(a), 
the.lowcst positive message that will be sent following a. 
H
4 
If 1 < k, then there  wi ll  a case of some a for which there is no  ar  ln  the  reverse case, there 
wou Id be a positive probability mass of Incumbents for whom  a
7
=  l. 160 
Proof:  The  first  part  is  established  by  the  facts  that  (a)  higher  values  of n 
reduce the  message that the Incumbent sends, but  increase their effort for a given  cr, 
and  (b)  lower messages reduce the  Entrant's interpretation which reduces their effort 
levet.  For the second part, note that the higher the value of y,  the smaller the chance a 
priori of sending a positive message. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4  is  somewhat  counterintuitive.  ln  the  mode!,  lncumbents  with 
high  levels of y "talk a lot," sending themselves relatively low  positive messages for 
any  given  value  of cr.  However, they  fait  to  "walk  the  talk" because  they  perfectly 
decode positive messages and recover their initial beliefs. The  Entrants, on  the other 
hand, have a belief that monotonically increases with the (positive) message. Th us  for 
any  given  value  of cr, lower messages  will  correspond  to  higher  Incumbent  beliefs 
and  lower  Entrant  beliets.  lndependence  of the  variables  again  implies  that  effort 
levels will be negatively correlated overall. One interpretation is that "naïve" Entrants 
are  ·'taken  in"  by  the  lncumbents' empty talk. For  instance, suppose the  lncumbent 
tries  to  reduce  her exposure to  the  rule,  say, by  making sorne  comment in  the  lunch 
room  about how  ·'Byzantine  bureaucratie  rules  are  made  to  be  bent,  if not  broken:· 
Back  in  her office,  it  could be  that when  faced  with  the actual  rule  in  question,  the 
MCC will not  let her break it.  However, the Entrant who overheard her speaking goes 
back to his office feeling that he has actuallicense to do so. 
3.3.3  Case C: e only observable 
l tum  now  to  the  third  case,  in  which  the  messages  that  the  Incumbent  sends  (to 
herselt)  are  private, or perhaps even  subconscious. Once  again, the  first  question  to 
answer  is  the  nature of the  inference the  Entrant can make.  ln  this  case,  the  Entrant 
must  glean  what  information  he  can  from  observing  the  effort  leve!  that  the 
lncumbent exerts, although still with full  knowledge of the equilibrium she pla ys, and 
hence of  the possibility that the observed effort may weil be based on self-deception. 161 
To  begin,  recall  the  general  forrn  that  this  effort  will  take.  Just  as with  the 
messages, the  effort of each n will  be  discontinuous at  ay. For any  value  of a < ay, 
the effort leve! will be constant in  a, at a lev el of e =  y E[ a l a < a y], which is  ya/ 2 in 
the  uniforrn-distribution  case. Otherwise, the  effort  will  rise linearly  along the  ray 
from  the  origin of slope  f1· This  will  result  in  an upward-jump  discontinuity  in  the 
lncumbent's effort at  ay,  illustrated in  Figure 3.5, below. The  Entrant, however does 
not see this. From the  Entrant's perspective, a given leve! of effort e might be due to a 
(particular) Iow-a, high-y lncumbent who sent herself a message of m = 0, or it might 
be  any  one  of a continuum  of high-a,  low-y lncumbents who  sent  themselves  the 
equilibrium positive messages. 
..  ··· ········ 
......... ......... 
(a)  Message strategies  (b)  Effort strategies 
:"'ote:  Panel  (a)  shows that  ali  positive  messages  signi fy  a  value  of  a bctwccn "' and  some 
maximum, denoted a: ,,· By contrast, Panel (b)  effort  lcvels up  to ;',u(OJ ,J')  are compatible with 
any value of a. 
Figure 3.5  Strategies in m versus e 
Figure  3.5 illustra  tes the  phenomenon  that wh  ile zero-messages  are distinct 
from  positive messages  (panel  (a)), the effort  they  engender will  be the  same as  the 
effort  engendered by a continuum of other (y, a) combinations (panel (b  )).  Th us  any 
1 
1 
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effort leve!  that could conceivably be send after m =  0 is compatible with  the  entire 
support of a.  This is the content of Lemma 3. 
Lemma 3: Any e.lfort up to  /'12 is compatible with any salience in [0, /}. 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
This  fact  makes  finding  the  expected  value  of  Œ given  e,  ô-,  ..  surprisingly 
involved. lt will  be equal  to  a weighted average of (i)  the  expected value of a given 
that it  is grea ter than the minimum a that wou id lead any lncumbent to exert e after a 
positive  message (i.e., the  lighter part of figure  S(b),  below the curve),  and  (ii) the 
expected value of a given that it is less than the maximum  value that would  lead any 
lncumbent to  exert e after a zero-message (the darker part, above the curve).  8oth  of 
these values  clearly  increase as  e rises. However, so does the  weight  put  upon the 
latter,  lower  component.  Th us  the  sign  of the  derivative  ci;  (  e)  is  in  general 
ambiguous.  However, the following !emma can be proved for the curTent case 
Lem ma 4: The interpretation of  Œ given e increvses in e. 
Proof: see Appendix A. 
Lemma 4 is wholly  intuitive- one would expect  higher observed effort levels 
to suggest higher levels of a.  The fact that it  is  not as  obvious as  it  appears occurs 
because  the  Entrant cannat tell  high-a, low-y effort levels a  part  from the inverse,  in 
general.  Moreover, a high effort  leve!  is relatively more likely to come from a high-y 
lncumbent,  who  would  exert  high  effort  no  matter  a.  White  one  could  probably 
construct  ·'pathological"  utility  variants  that  would  reverse  the  result,  they  would 
have  to  differ  markedly  from  that  proposcd  in  equation  (3.2),  above.  With  this 
established, we can immediately adduce the following: 163 
Proposition 5:  When the Entrant obserl'es on/y the !ncumbent 's  effort leve!. 
Entrant effort will be positive/y correlated with the Incumbent 's Yt 
Proof:  When  }1  rises,  so  does  the  effort  leve!.  This  raises  the  Entrant's 
interpretation of a, and hence also his effort. Q.E.D. 
This  Proposition may correspond to  the  idea of a ·'culture of corruption'' (for 
low  values  of y),  or at  the  very  !east an  "organizational  culture".  ln  cases  where  an 
Entrant  happens  to  see  a high-y individual,  he  will  also  tend  to  make  higher  than 
average interpretations of the true salience. 
3.3.4  lnfonnativeness of the cases 
We can now turn briefly to  an overall comparison of the  information that the  Entrant 
receives  in  the  three  cases  above  (  diagrammed  in  Figure  3.1)  We  can  immediate! y 
take  it  that  case  A  is  the  most  informative,  since  it  provides  the  Entrant  with 
infonnative data  lacking  in  each of the other cases. Consider therefore  the  posterior 
distribution of beliefs in  cases  8  and  C,  for  a given ( y, a)  lncumbent. The  cri teri on  1 
will  use  for  this  comparison  is  the  celebrated  "garbling"  condition  of Blackwell 
( 1953).  lntuitively, this partial ordering of so-called "experiments". wh ich are abstract 
procedures  that  generate  uncertain  information  about  the  state  of the  world,  holds 
ex periment x to be more informative than ex periment y if the distribution of outcomes 
from y can be modeled as equal  to that of x. plus some ·'noise". The paper established 
an equivalence between this condition and the sufficiency of the statistic arising from 
x for the statistic arising from y. 
1 take  the  comparison  of the  message-only case  (8) and  the  effort-only case 
(C) in two parts, distinguishing (y,a) types that generate positive messages from those 
that  generate zero-messages.  If m =  0, beliefs  in  case 8  consist of an  average of ail 
the pooling intervals, each weighted by the probability that the  lncumbent to which  it 
corresponds sees a a low  enough to  generate the  zero-message.  As  long as /' ~  k, ------
164 
the resulting distribution places sorne positive weight on ali positive intervals of a in 
[0, 1].  ln  Case  C the  beliefs  combine (i)  a uniformly-likely region  corresponding  to 
the  unique  pooling  zone  that  would  induce  sorne  specifie  y (and  incidentally  the 
correct one) to exert the observed e after a zero-message, with (ii) ali  the values of a 
that would induce sorne Incumbent to exert e after sending a positive message. These 
come  from  an  interval  that  includes  a  =  1,  and  which  overlaps  with  the  poo ling 
interval.  Therefore  in  Case  C,  too, (y,a) combinations  leading  to  a message  of zero 
result  in  beliefs with  support on  the  full  interval of [0, 1].  From  this,  we  can  see  that 
the two cases cannot be compared. Notice that component (i) of the beliefs  in  case C 
is one of those which are combined to fonn the beliefs in Case B. As  far as  this goes, 
therefore,  Case  B ·'garbles"  the  information  in  Case  C,  and  is  therefore  a  clear 
example  of better  information.  However, the  region  (ii)  adds  noise  to  the  Case  C 
beliefs,  relative  to  wh at  is  fou nd  in  Case  B. This  is  because  the  (y, a)  combinations 
that  these  beliefs entertain result  in  positive  messages, and  are  given zero  weight  in 
the  beliefs  of Case  B. Thus  each  represents  a garbling  of parts of the  other, and 
overall they remain unordered by Blackwell. 
When  m  > 0,  more  can  be  said.  The  beliefs  in  Case  C are  the  same  as  they 
were  above,  since m remains  unobserved. However, the  beliefs  in  Case  B take  the 
interval illustrated in  Figure 3.4. Thus the support of the posterior beliefs  in  case  Bis 
a subset of the  support  in  Case  C.  For a given  distribution, this  relationship  would 
imply that the  information in Case B was better.  Furthetmore, white the beliets in  the 
intersection are  uniform  in  Case C, because  no  information  is  available  about  what 
the value of a might be,  in Case B the beliefs make use of additional infonnation that 
cornes  from  the equilibrium strategies. Therefore even  in  this  overlap, the  beliefs  in 
Case C can  be seen as a garbling of those  in  Case  B. Overall, therefore, when  m > 0 
the beliefs in Case C correspond to a garbling of the beliefs from  Case B. Because in 
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ail  cases where the  two  can be  compared, Case B is  more  informative than  Case C, 
while Case Ais always the most informative, we claim the following proposition. 
Proposition  6:  {m,e}  is  more  informative  than  {m},  which  is  more 
informative than {e}. 
lt  is  rather unsurprising that the combination of the  indicators would be  more 
informative  than  either  one  alone.  However,  the  result  that  messages  give  more 
precise  infonnation  than  effort  levels  seems  to  run  counter  to  the  conventional 
wisdom that "actions speak louder than words." As  mentioned above,  the  reason  for 
this  is  that  in  this  mode!,  the  Incumbents  separate  more  in  word  than  in  deed. 
Messages allow  Entrants  to  distinguish  between  lncumbents  who  successfully  self-
deceive  (sending  m  =  0)  and  those  who  do  not  (m  >  0). This  reduction  in  the 
infonnational  pooling  that  the  Entrant  perceives  pennits him  to  make  more  precise 
estimates of a. 
3.4  Discussion and extensions 
This  paper  introduced  a  framework  to  analyse  deontological  morality  and  self-
deception  in  a  .. rationalistic"  setting.  Self-deception  was  modeled  (in  somewhat 
reduced-fonn fashion) as an adjustment of prior beliefs so that observed evidence was 
closer to  desired states of the  world, in  which deontological  rules  were  less relevant. 
In  this  way  players  informed  of the  rule's  importance  (lncumbents)  were  able  to 
ad just their beliefs about it- for a cost- to  relax the constraint the rule imposed. The 
resultant  mode!  showed  endogenous  distortion  of beliefs,  with  a  partial-pooling 
equilibrium structure.  Uninfonned players (Entrants) used the deceptive signais that 
in fonned  players  sent  themselves,  the  actions  th at  th ose  informed  players 
subsequently  played,  or  both,  to  fonn  estimates  of  the  force  of the  rule.  The 
differences  between  these  cases  led  to  severa!  different  kinds  of effect  on  the 
Entrant's behavior that are summarized in the table below. Table 3.1  Summa  of the main results. 
Case 
Observable 
Correlation between 
Entrant action and 
Jr:c_t.''!':~f!Y!!typ~  -
Influence jèlt when 
lnformativeness of 
the information 
A 
Positive 
m =  0 (high  }'1) 
Best. Perfect 
information when 
m > 0, otherwise 
limited to  0,0'.). 
8 
Negative 
m > 0 (low  }'1) 
Second-best. 
Superior to C when 
m > 0; otherwise no 
comparable 
166 
c 
Positive 
Al ways 
Lowest. 
There  are  important  theoretical  extensions  to  the  mode!.  For  instance,  one 
aspect of the  phenomenon of moral  mies is  that people attach  sorne  social status to 
those  who  follow  them. There  is  a kind of ··righteousness" that comes with  (at  !east 
the  appearance  of)  having  a  strong  moral  sense. This  could  be  introduced  in  the 
mode! as  a parameter for each player that increases in  the  posterior expectation of y, 
perhaps along the !ines established in  Bénabou and Tirole (2006). White the details of 
the  extension are  left to  further  work,  qualitatively, one  might easily conjecture  that 
this would lead to higher effort levels, and potentially lower equilibrium messages. 
Another important theoretical extension  stems  from  the  fact  that  the  welfare 
effects  of  the  effort  have  so  far  been  le ft  entirely  obscure.  Moral  (or  other 
behavioural) mies drive a potential wedge between individual welfare and patterns of 
choice.  However,  the  social  welfare  effect  of a  mie  (or  mie  following)  depends 
entirely on the  inherent effects of the behaviour in question. Many (but not ali!) moral 
rules address public goods problems, where the behaviour that maximize the  leve!  of 
individual  welfare  is  not  necessarily  socially  optimal.  In  these  cases,  getting 
individuals  to  exert  more  or less  effort than  their individually  rational  leve! may  in 167 
fact  increase social  welfare.  This  is  the  basis,  for  instance, of Kaplow  and  Shavell 
(2007), and may be a familiar feeling about many moral strictures: they are somewhat 
of a  burden  individually,  but  overall,  society  is  better  for  their  presence.  The 
impression  that  actual  moral  rules  seem  to  address  social  welfare  issues  raises  the 
interest in developing the aspect of the public nature of effort in the theoretical mode!. 
The  public  nature  would  provide  a benefit  to  effort  that  would  in  turn  generate  an 
incentive for  the  Incumbent to  manipulate the  infonnation that the  Entrant has.  This 
feedback on  information and reward would bring the  mode! closer to  the literature on 
persuasion garn es (Grossman 1981 ). 
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APPENDICE E: SELECTED PROOFS 
Proof of Lem ma  1: 
Two cases can  be distinguished:  m =  0 and  m > O.  Consider first  m > O.  ln  this case, 
lncumbents follow the separating function, which  is  invertible; that is,  a given  y-type 
lncumbent will send a given message m only for one particular value of rr,  although a 
range of (y, rr)  combinations will  send each message m.  Because distortion increases 
in  y,  those  who  send  a given  message  m  having  seen  a higher value of Œ will  also 
have a higher value of y,  and so will also furnish  higher levels of effort. That is, given 
a message, every (y,  rr)  combination will exert a different leve! of effort, so e will  be 
sufficient  to  uniquely  determine the  lncumbenfs type  after  observing  rn  >  O.  Now 
consider the case where m =O. ln  this case an  observed effort leve! e tells the Entrant 
that  Œ  was  below  the  lncumbent's threshold,  Œr·  This  threshold  is  monotonically 
increasing  in  y,  and  so  the  expectation  p(O  \  y)  is too.  By  the  same  reasoning as 
above, therefore, higher-y individuals will  also  have higher expected values of rr,  and 
thus  will  furnish  higher  levels  of e:  there  will  again  be  an  invertible  relationship 
between  e and  ŒY>  allowing  the  Entrant  to  make  the  exact  same  inference  as  the 
lncumbent. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition  1  (d) 
The  Proposition  holds  that  Incumbents  have  a  lower threshold, and  hence  a  longer 
range of  separation, when y is  lower however only those with  y= 0 wi ll  never pool on 
m =O. for any value of  Œ, and only those with  y < k wi ll ever send  111  > O. 171 
Pro of 
lntroducing the assumption that  u is  uniformly distributed, so  p(O) =  uj 2,  and 
rearranging the threshold for poo ling defined in (3.11) with this information yields 
(E 1) 
This  is  quadratic  in  (m,u)  space;  it  partitions  that  spaces  into  an  "upper'' 
(positive) region, inside the curve, and  a "lower" (negative)  region  outside  it.  If and 
only  if the  separating  function  prescribes  a  message  in  the  upper  region,  the 
lncumbent  prefers  the  lower  distortion  cost  of the  positive  message  to  the  lower 
interpretation of the zero-message. 
By  inspection, the  threshold  decreases  linearly  111  y,  therefore  the separating 
function will eut it at a lower value of u. 
The  expression  is  without  real roots  for  positive  y. Therefore  any separating 
function which cuts the axis (as ali  must do) will  fall  outside the curve first; ali  types 
with  positive ywill send m = 0 for sorne  u. 
Recall  that  tor any  }1,  the  separating function  passes  through  the  point  ( 1, 1  ). 
Therefore the claim  is established ifthat pointis in  the •·upper region". Furthennore. 
this curve opens upwards in m with a local extremum (minimum value of u) at u= 111. 
For parameters y and  k, given  u =  m =  Ç,  the value at this extremum  is Ç  =  y/k. Si nee 
ali  separating functions pass through ( 1, 1) and eut the horizontal axis at sorne  uo > 0, 
is guaranteed to  intersect with the separating function  for any  lncurnbent with  ylk < 1 
Q.E.D. 172 
Caro/lary: When f  > k,  there are thosefor whom the minimum positive message is 
undefined  for any cr:::;  1: m =  0 dominates any positive message in  the acceptable 
domain jàr any cr and there is a positive measure of  lncwnbents with  cr, = 1. When 
f  <  k,  the  maximum  value  th at  cr, takes  is  less  than  1. and there  is  a positive 
measure of  crjàr which no lncumbent will choose m =O. 
Proof of Lem ma 2 
Messages  are  always  less  than  the  signal  by  Proposition  1,  which  establishes  the 
lower bound. For the upper bound, isolating yin and  plugging into (3.9) gives 
y (  .:_(m-1 ) l  (  111  l 
Œ  .. (m) =m+- l i-e
1  ). s.t. r =kml2 - J 
m .l'\  k  a lll.l \  (tn)  (E2) 
Taking the total differentiai of (E2) and simplifying shows that  it  is Oinax(lll) is a 
strictly increasing  function  whenever  cr > m. Moreover, inspection shows  that Oinax( 1) 
=  1. Therefore,  Oinax(m) < 1 for ali m < 1. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Lem ma 3 
The  !emma can  be  restated:  for  any  effort  leve!  e  in  [0./12],  for  any  cr  in  [0, 1  ], if 
the re  is no  y 
1  su  ch th at y 
1 
<J7 .f2 =  e th en the re  is a y • su  ch th at  y •  <J = e. 
Proof:  Note that for any e, the  y 
1  of the  lncumbent whose zero-message resu lts 
in e must be higher than the maximum  y • of  any Incumbent who would exert e after a 173 
positive signal. Therefore, cry·, the maximum  crwhich would  lead lncumbent oftype y 
1  to send m = 0 (and therefore exert e)  is greater than CTy•, the minimum  cr required to 
get sorne lncumbent to  exert  e after a positive  message. Furthermore,  lncumbent  y 
1 
will exert e following any cr < cr_..,·, and  Incumbents with  values of y from y • down to 
e will  exert e for the appropriate values of cr from cr=  cry. up  to cr = 1.  Therefore.  if 
the salience is higher than cry·,  then it  must be higher than sorne other CTy• such that y 
•  cr = e. Conversely, if cr < cry •, low enough that no  lncumbents would  exert  e atter 
observing cr and sending a positive message, then, as  long as e < y1 12, there must be a 
cry·> cr:  sorne  Incumbent who would exert e following m = O.  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lem  ma 4 
The  proof will  proceed  by comparison with  a  benchmark  case.  This  problem is a 
special  case  of a  general class  in  which a  value of  interest  is the average  of two 
quantities,  but  where  not  only  the  quantities  themselves  but  also  the  relative 
weighting depends on sorne other variable. The general format is therefore 
V(x)= p(x)F(x)+(l - p(x))C(x)  (E3) 
where p(.),  F(.)  and  G(.)  are  ali  continuous functions.  ln  this particular case. ali 
the derivatives are positive, and  F(x) < G(x) for ali x. 
The derivative of (E3) can be written as 
V'(x)= p
1(x)[F(x)-C(x)]+ p(x)F
1(x)+(1- p(x)) G'(x)  (E4) 174 
We can  divide this overall  change  into two  components.  Denote the first term 
the  weighting ej fect. Shifting the weight  placed on the values  will  exert an influence 
on the overall  value  proportional to the di fference  between them.  The remainder of 
(E4)  shows  an  average  change  effect.  This  reflects  the  intuition  that  if  each 
component  of a total rises,  that will  exert  an upward  influence  on the sum. ln  the 
current  case, the  overall  expected  value will  rise with  x  if and  only if the average 
increase  in  F and  G is greater than the  increase  in  the weight  assigned to the lower 
value.  Thus the weighting effect is analogous to a marginal cost, while the average 
change effect  is analogous to a marginal bene fit.  The value  increases  with  x  if the 
marginal benefit is greater than the marginal cost. 
Now consider the simple benchmark example with p =x. F = x/2, and  c; = ( 1 + 
x)/2  for x  in  [0, 1].  This  example  partitions  the  unit  interval at  x,  then  takes  the 
expected value of the lower and  upper regions, each weighted by its respective length. 
The law of total probability obviously implies  here that the average  will  not change 
with x. Applying (E4) implies 
lx  (1+x)l  1  1 
1 l- ---J  +x-+ (1- x)-=  0 
2  2  2  2 
(ES) 
ln the case of the mode! presented here, the expression can be re-written: 
l 
1 
1 where 
a-(2e)  -a-(e)lna-(e) 
â ,.  (e) =  p(e)--+(1- p(e))----
2  (1 -a- (e)) 
a-(2e) 
p ( e) = ----'-----
1-a-(e) 
a- (2 e) + e - --
a- ( e) 
Writing this in the format of(E4) yields 
'  r  a-(2e)  a-(e)lna-(e)l 
â,  (e) =  p'(e)l--+  1 
L  2  1-a-(e)  J 
r  1-a-(e)+lna-(e)l  + p(e)a-'(2e)+(l- p(e))l-a-'(e)  ,  1 
l  (1-a-(e)r  J 
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(E6) 
(E7) 
(E8) 
with  the  weighting  etfect  on  the  first  tine  and  the  average  change  effect  on  the 
second. The goal is  to interpret (E8)  in terms of a(e). Detine  cp(a(e)) =  a(2e). which 
can  be shown to  be an  increasing, con v  ex  function defined over 0 < a < k/2, and  e( a) 
is the inverse of a(e). an  increasing, concave function. Thus (E7) becornes 
rp (a-) 
p(a-)=----~~---
1- 0"  <O (a-) +e (a-)--
a-
(E9) 176 
The  proof of the  Lemma  will  be  based  on  two  claims.  First (Claim  a),  1 show 
that  the  weighting  eftèct  in  (E5)  is  greater  than  that  in  (E8).  In  other  words,  the 
weighting effect for the current madel  is  Jess than  0.5. Second (Ciaim  b), 1 show that 
the average change effect in  the benchmark is smaller than  in  the current madel- i.e., 
that  the  average  change  effect  under  examination  is  greater  than  0.5.  These  claims 
combine to show that the total must be greater than (ES), which  is the desired result. 
Claim a: The weighting effect is  less than 0.5 
Again, 1  take this in two steps. First, notice that for any  a in  [0, 1  ], <p(a)/2 > a/2, 
wh ile  a ·ln(a)/(1  -a) < ( 1 + a)/2. Thus [F- G] > -0.5. This implies that the claim  is 
established if  p' < 1. 
Suppressing  arguments  for  notational  clarity,  the  derivative  of (E9)  can  be 
written 
1- 0"  1 
--(  <p'e - <pe')-e -
2 
p ' =  0"  0" 
(  1- o- ) 2 
lqJ+e~ 
(E 1  0) 
This is  Jess than  unity if 
1-o- e  2  1-o- , (1-o-)
2 
--(cp'e-cpe')--
2  <cp  +2e--+e· 
2  0"  0"  0"  0" 177 
1  t-a l  t-a  e  [  ,  J  (EII)  Ü<q> l!p+e'----;;:-j +e----;;:-[ 2- q.>']+ a '  e(l-a) + 1 
This is guaranteed if rp'  < 2.  Notice that 
cp (Œ) =  0' (2e) =  0' +eŒ' 
e 
=a+-
e 
(E 12) 
by  a first-order Taylor expansion, where the  change  in  the  derivative  is due  to 
the  fact  that  the  derivative  of an  inverse  of a  fùnction  is  the  reciprocal  of the 
derivative of the function. This implies that 
,  (e')
1
- e·e" 
cp  =  1  + ---:---
( e' )  J 
e·e " 
=2--< 2 
(  e')  l 
(E 13) 
due to the concavity of  e( a). This establishes the  first claim. 
Claim  b: The average change effect is greater than 0.5. 
For any p, this  will  be established if both  F'  and  Ci'  are greater than  0.5,  since 
the average change effect is a weighting of those values.  Expression (E8)  reveals that 
F'  is shown  by (E 13). Th us  it is established as  long as 178 
e ·e" 
-- ==  liJ  < 1  .5  (  e'/ 
(E 14) 
Thus  it is  satisfied  ifthe function  is not "too curved". For instance, exponential 
curves have tJJ =  1, and  curves of the form  e"  have  tJJ = (n- 1  )ln < 1. Functions of the 
form 
(E 15) 
which  maintain  the  fixed  points at zero and  1,  violate  (E 14)  for any  a  only 
when n grows beyond  22. By contrast, the best fit with  the function as detined  in  the 
text has  n = 6,  which generates  tJJ < 1 for ali  ~  the curve also  looks substantially like 
e, as  noted below, which generates a constant  w = 0.63. For illustrative  purposes,  the 
figure  below  shows computational results for the di ffèrent  formulations.  The dotted 
curves are plotted from expression (E 15) with  n =  6, and  e270,  respectively; the sol  id 
line  is plots the  implicit relationship. The dashed curve,  which plots (E 15)  with  n = 
22,  illustrates  the  level ofcurvature required to violate (E I4). This makes  clear that, 
at  !east  for  functional  forms ·'close  to"  that  used  here  in  terms  of the  behavioral 
predictions they generate, the conclusion that F' > 0.5  is without much risk. 08  e 
05 
0 4 
0.2 
0.4  0.6  0.8 
s1grna 
sigma = e·'O 37 
n = 22 
n=6 
Figure E.3  Computed approximations and  the threshold violating function. 
Turning at last to G', the derivative of  the relevant (last) term  in (E8) yields 
C
'=_(l- Œ) + in O' 
---
2
- (E l6) 
(1- (J') 
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This  is  a decreasing function, with  a  li mit  of 0.5 when  CJ  =  1, and  therefore 
grea ter  than  0.5  for  ali  CJ <  1.  This  establishes  the  second  claim,  and  thereby 
concludes the proof. 
Q.E.D. 